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Adoption of advanced digital technology is one of the most controversial and fundamental 
transformations in contemporary police practice. Despite its significance, empirical enquiry of 
these technologies, and the way they shape and are shaped by policing environments is rare. 
Drawing on in-depth interviews with officers in a UK police force and ethnographic fieldwork 
in a large metropolitan police department in the US, this thesis aims to make a significant em-
pirical and conceptual contribution to this emerging field. It reveals the multifaceted character 
of data-driven technology in policing and the complex socio-technical negotiations that take 
place in these operational environments.  
In the UK case study, data visualisation and predictive policing techniques have been adopted 
to reduce service demand and prioritise actions in the context of austerity-driven budget cuts. 
In the US, following a federal consent decree addressing varied civil rights grievances, com-
pliance monitoring requirements have brought about rapid datafication and digitisation of many 
policing tasks including a radical adaptation of existing CompStat processes. Although both 
police forces employ similar arsenals of digital tools, these fuel very different types of policing: 
Within a mind-set of crime-fighting, US applications emphasise targeted surveillance and ter-
ritorial patrol. In the UK, officers seek a balance between enforcement and finding support 
through social services. 
Contrary to common techno-deterministic descriptions of predictive and digital policing, this 
research finds complex co-constructions of risk, suspicion, and priorities that are contingent on 
operational settings. In such settings, calculative and experiential knowledge intersect in dis-
cretionary decision-making. Yet the data reveals how technologies also have affordances: risk 
scores institutionalise a focus on repeat offenders, crime statistics drive competition between 
districts, and digital records shape the possibilities of policing. In other respects, the socio-
technological relationships are often fragile: computer systems crash, display inaccurate infor-
mation, and officers improvise workarounds. With increasing police reliance on production, 
processing, and interpretation of data, such insights demonstrate the complex ways police or-
ganisations become implicated in the outcomes of digital policing. 
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From whistle, to call box, to car, to siren, to radio, to modern-day information technology; 
technology shapes to a large extent the character of modern policing (Deflem and Chicoine, 
2014). Lately, the Black Lives Matter protests spreading from the United States around the 
globe have reinvigorated calls to ‘defund the police’ to allocate resources elsewhere (see e.g. 
Sharkey, 2020; Thompson, 2020; Vitale, 2017; Yglesias, 2020) and caused a backslash to com-
panies producing technologies for the police with Amazon, IBM, and Microsoft halting sales 
of facial recognition tools (see e.g. Fitch, 2020; Heilweil, 2020). Previously, predictive policing 
and the use of artificial intelligence fuelled a public discourse on the promises and perils of 
digital technologies in policing often drawing on utopian and dystopian imaginaries. These 
debates will shape the direction of law enforcement in the 21st century. Yet, there is a dearth of 
research into the role of technology in policing that goes beyond evaluating intended effects or 
theoretical, often techno-deterministic, accounts (Brayne, 2017; Brayne and Christin, 2020; 
Koper and Lum, 2019).  
This thesis situates the concerns for digital technologies in policing among numerous socio-
logical accounts from the last thirty years diagnosing a society increasingly governed by met-
rics of all sorts: It includes David Lyon’s accounts of the routine electronic data collection in a 
‘surveillance society’ (Lyon, 1994), as well as the technologically facilitated ‘social sorting’ 
(Lyon, 2003) aimed at influencing and managing populations. It is Michael Power’s (1997, 
2000) ‘audit society’ describing a change from direct control to self-regulatory oversight 
through performance measures created in auditing processes (in the public sector associated 
with ‘New Public Management’ (Hood, 1991)). Wendy Espeland and Mitchell Stevens (2008) 
call for a ‘sociology of quantification’ analysing the production and communication of numbers 
and how their implicit valuation intervenes and disciplines. More recently, David Beer’s (2016) 
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‘metric power’ locates the productive power of metrics shaping what is deemed valuable within 
the context of sustaining the competitive logic of neoliberalism. Jerry Muller (2018) describes 
in ‘Tyranny of Metrics’ the dysfunctional, managerial fixation with numerical indicators aimed 
at replacing professional judgement and controlling behaviour through penalties and rewards. 
There is also a rich literature based on concrete examples of governance by metrics. For exam-
ple, Oscar Gandy (2009) draws on examples from insurance to housing, health care, and crim-
inal justice in pointing to the racialized, ‘cumulative discrimination’ inherent to statistically 
derived categories of risk. Frank Pasquale (2015) describes in ‘black box society’ how the 
opaque and biased algorithms employed by the big online companies of the likes of Facebook, 
Amazon and Google, as well as the finance industry determine our reputations and finances, 
Deborah Lupton (2016) interprets quantified self-tracking as producing the neoliberal, individ-
ualized self that centres on personal management and responsibility rather than social life 
chances, Cathy O’Neil (2016) draws on a wide range of examples to highlight the damages 
inflicted by opaque and scaled up ‘weapons of math destruction’, Virginia Eubanks (2018) 
describes in ‘Automating Inequality’ the ‘digital poorhouse’ of America in which automated, 
digital, opaque, and unaccountable decision making processes in public services erode social 
safety, criminalize poverty and intensify discrimination, Ruha Benjamin (2019) tackles with 
the ‘New Jim Code’ the seemingly objective algorithms reinforcing racial discrimination, and 
Charlton McIlwain (2019) traces the history of the use of computers in allocating police forces 
according to racialized geo-statistics back to the 1960s.  
Of course, the role of numbers in how power operates is not new. Ian Hacking (1982), for 
example, draws on Foucault’s concept of ‘biopower’ placing the increase of categorisation 
fundamental for population statistics in the mid-18th century, and Theodore Porter (1996), an-
alysing the time from 1830 onwards, identifies a drive toward quantification in the search of 
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creating mechanical objectivity as a resource of power and trust. Criminal justice and law en-
forcement form an area in which many of these issues at the intersection of technology, society 
and citizenship are most acute. At the beginning of the 1990s Feeley and Simon (1992, 1994) 
coined the terms ‘new penology’ and ‘actuarial justice’ to describe a process parallel to this 
literature: a shift to managerialism focussed on a reduction of policing aims to indicators of 
internal procedures and a fixation on risks of populations instead of professional assessment of 
the individual. These accounts highlight the connection between (quantified) knowledge – pro-
liferated by today’s ubiquity of computers – and its capacity for power. 
The literature highlighting the power of numbers regularly takes a rather techno-deterministic 
stance in which calculative devices successfully shape human action or outright replace human 
decision-making. This is also reflected in the example of predictive policing: champions of the 
technology not only celebrate a fantasy of efficacy, but they also see it as a step towards erad-
icating human bias in the criminal justice system; critics, on the other hand, fear a mechanical 
application of machine decisions imbued with biases hidden in the opacity of a black-box al-
gorithm. These binary perspectives are seldom informed by any empirical engagement with 
messy operational practices (Sandhu and Fussey, 2020). Contrarily to these accounts, techno-
logical practices are rarely as straightforward but rather produce various moments of friction. 
Prominently, Manning (2008) demonstrates for the use of crime mapping (i.e. spatial statistics) 
in CompStat meetings that the way technology is used in policing is largely contingent on how 
it fits with existing processes and power structures. Thus, this thesis contributes closer attention 
to technologies in practice: to its affordances in officer discretion, to the spatio-temporal con-
ditions underpinning day-to-day police practice, as well as the myriad of breakdowns and frag-
mentations that occur. Attending to the affordances of technology in discretionary decision 
making significantly extends the focus on human factors in the policing literature (Dymond, 
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2019), and the theme of breakdowns not only cautions against the durability of artefacts often 
assumed in science and technology studies but also challenges accounts of a unified ‘surveillant 
assemblage’ (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000) and similar accounts relying on the fantasy of flaw-
lessly functioning technologies. Particularly in this last aspect, the argument is somewhat sim-
ilar to Manning’s (2008). But by tracing police actions beyond strategy meetings into the prac-
tice of frontline officers this research goes a long way beyond his study. Including investigatory 
practices, it further contributes to a largely understudied aspect of policing (see Manning, 2008: 
197). 
The literature mostly looks at specific technologies, often from a speculative and techno-deter-
ministic perspective. By contrast, this thesis seeks to contribute an empirical understanding of 
the wider setting of digital policing. Two case studies from the United States and the United 
Kingdom give unique insight into the richness and diversity of technological practices. The 
research reveals the myriad ways in which aspects of the organisations and features of the 
technologies shape each other as well as policing practices including strategic decision-making, 
discretion, and investigations. 
The thesis is structured as follows: The literature review in chapter 2 continues the argument 
outlined here. Based on the academic discourse and empirical findings discussed here, it de-
velops a conceptual framework that enables the empirical engagement with the dynamic and 
emerging field of technology in policing. It is followed by a short note on the methodological 
approach and reflections on the fieldwork in chapter 3. 
Based on extensive ethnographic engagement with a large metropolitan police department in 
the United States, chapters 4, 5, and 6 interrogate the interplay and fragmented nature of tech-
nological practice in policing from strategy making, to patrol and calls-for-service, to 
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investigations. The first chapter addresses the idiosyncratic knowledge practices through which 
crime and accountability numbers are created, interpreted, and translated into actions. The sec-
ond foregrounds the affordances of technologies for officers on patrol and answering calls-for-
service, with a specific focus on the role of police databases in suspicion formation and discre-
tionary decision-making. The third chapter analyses how the technologies’ spatio-temporality 
of recording infrastructure and past police activities shapes the possible avenues for investiga-
tions and engages with legal and ethical concerns arising from the unprecedented availability 
of digital records.  
Drawing on in-depth interviews with members of a British police force, chapters 7 and 8 ex-
amine the affordances of a data visualisation platform introduced to reduce demand in the con-
text of austerity measures applied to police and social services. The first chapter investigates 
its role in decision-making and contributes a perspective of co-construction to understand the 
use of individualised risk scores. The second chapter scrutinizes how the software institution-
alises a focus on risky individuals, redistributes knowledge, and reorders performance man-
agement. 
The last chapter discusses the findings along the lines of data collection, strategic decision-
making, day-to-day policing practice, and oversight. It highlights four concerns for future re-
search and police practice: 1) the effects of categorizations on knowledge and organisational 
structure, 2) attention to temporal affordances of technologies, 3) needed policies for data ac-
cess and use, and 4) technological fixes may help police cope with demand but cannot address 
larger underlying social issues. Collectively, these chapters will demonstrate the multi-faceted 
nature of digital policing practice and contribute an empirical perspective to the wider discourse 
on the promises and perils of the adoption of new technologies in policing.  
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2. Literature review 
The aim of this chapter is not to give a comprehensive review of all the literature relating to all 
the different technologies encountered in the following chapters. Rather, the chapter first in-
troduces CompStat – a management system by which mid-level staff are held accountable to 
crime statistics – and predictive policing – the automated allocation of resources in areas or for 
individuals deemed at risk – as the basis for the theoretical arguments that follow and as cor-
nerstones of the debate on digital tools in policing. It then picks up the grand narratives identi-
fied above to introduce two main lines of inquiry that are central to understanding how tech-
nology works in police operational practice and that provide a conceptual toolkit that underpins 
the analysis of this socio-technological practice beyond assumed effects. The first line of in-
quiry concerns the organisation of power and its interplay with situated and quantified types of 
knowledge. Towards this goal, the second section, taking Feely and Simon’s (1992, 1994) ob-
servation of a development towards ‘actuarial justice’ as a starting point, uses Latour’s (1987) 
concept of ‘centres of calculation’ and an empirically informed classification of five associated 
ways of knowing to develop a theoretical lens through which the quantitative knowledge of 
governance described by Foucault (2003, 2009, 2010) as ‘biopower’ can be studied in its prac-
tical consequences. Finally, the second line of inquiry introduces discretion, spatio-temporality, 
and breakdown as theoretical frames for studying police officers’ interactions with technology. 
Following Manning’s (2008) empirically founded scepticism towards the changes brought 
about by the introduction of crime mapping and information technology in policing, these lay 
the foundation for an empirical counterpoint to the often utopian or dystopian, and largely the-
oretical narratives on technology in policing. 
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2.1. CompStat and predictive policing as a lens on technology in policing 
CompStat and predictive policing are some of the main technologies discussed in the empirical 
chapters of this thesis and, as outlined above, serve as entry points to the theoretical framing 
of technology in policing. This section gives a brief overview of the two technologies and the 
questions on the role of quantitative knowledge in police governance and officer decision mak-
ing that they have elicited. 
CompStat is a system for police management that combines the regular update of digital crime 
data with meetings in which ‘middle managers’ such as district commanders are held account-
able to this data and have to justify the actions they have taken to address crime in their areas 
(Willis, 2014). Introduced by Jack Maple to the New York Transit Police and adopted by Wil-
liam Bratton to the whole New York Police Department when he became commissioner in 
1994, CompStat has been credited by its proponents with causing a decline in crime in New 
York and has been widely adopted (Weisburd et al., 2003). Critics of CompStat have been 
sceptical towards claims of crime reduction (e.g. Eck and Maguire, 2005; Harcourt, 2001), 
have highlighted the association with problematic policing strategies like zero-tolerance polic-
ing and stop and frisk exacerbated by quantified performance measures (e.g. Bowling, 1999), 
and have questioned the degree to which CompStat processes have actually transformed police 
practice (Manning, 2008; Weisburd et al., 2019). Especially Manning’s (2008) work is an ex-
ample of the necessity of ethnographic empirical research to determine the difference between 
discourse and practice. The issue of effectivity aside, the example of CompStat thus raises 
questions on the degree to which the public success stories in policing represent meaningful 
change and highlights the emerging importance of crime numbers not merely for understanding 
and addressing crime but as a managerial technique by which officers are held accountable.  
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As an attempt to quantitatively organise police work, CompStat can be interpreted as a precur-
sor to predictive policing (Willis, 2014; Wilson, 2020). According to one of the earliest reports 
on predictive policing, predictive policing refers to the use of a wide range of techniques “[…] 
to identify likely targets for police intervention and prevent crime or solve past crimes by mak-
ing statistical predictions” (Perry et al., 2013: 1). Notorious examples of predictive policing 
include the company PredPol that sells software for the prediction of areas likely to experience 
crime and the management of subsequent patrols (PredPol, 2016) and Chicago’s now-discon-
tinued “heat list” that provided a risk score for individuals on the department’s database 
(Foody, 2020; Saunders et al., 2016). While actuarial tools like COMPAS and patrol deploy-
ments based on crime statistics in the CompStat process have a long history in the criminal 
justice system (Feeley and Simon, 1994; Harcourt, 2007; Willis and Mastrofski, 2012), in-
creased accessibility, new methods of analysis and automation have spurred interest in predic-
tive policing both from proponents and critics. 
Early on, Charlie Beck, then chief of the Los Angeles Police Department, and Colleen McCue 
(2009) hyped predictive policing as ‘the next era in policing’ and drew parallels to the increases 
in efficiencies companies like Walmart and Amazon had achieved through data analysis – a 
proposition that was all too welcome given budget cuts to policing in the wake of the 2008 
financial crisis. The term quickly attracted media reports likening predictive policing to the 
movie Minority Report and celebrating astonishing crime reductions (e.g. Frangoul, 2013). 
However, just as much as the term caused hopes for police forces to reduce crime, it spurred a 
critical debate on the use and misuse of data in policing. With concerns around the quality of 
the underlying data in terms of errors, underreported crimes, and discriminatory biases, as well 
as feedback loops focussing attention where it has been before, critics argued that predictive 
policing may be nothing more than a high-tech justification for racial profiling (Ferguson, 
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2017a, 2017b; Joh, 2016; Lum and Isaac, 2016; Raso et al., 2018; Richardson et al., 2019; 
Sanders et al., 2015; Scannell, 2019). Other concerns relate to the lack of transparency and 
accountability that these systems afford – especially when the underlying algorithms are owned 
by private companies and protected by copyright law or nondisclosure agreements (Ferguson, 
2017a; Joh, 2016; Raso et al., 2018).  
Beyond the concerns around predictive policing, mostly voiced in law journals, the academic 
discourse on predictive policing is mostly limited to either the development and evaluation of 
predictive policing technologies themselves (e.g. Gerstner, 2018; Mohler et al., 2015; Saunders 
et al., 2016), or theoretical discussions of the extent to which predictive policing constitutes a 
turn towards a pre-crime society (Lawrence, 2017; Mantello, 2016; McCulloch and Wilson, 
2015; van Brakel and De Hert, 2011; Wilson, 2020; Zedner, 2007) or a new style of policing 
marked by its public-private relations and termed ‘platform policing’ (Egbert, 2019; Linder, 
2019; Wilson, 2019). There are only a few notable exceptions to this: Based on interviews with 
software engineers, Benbouzid (2019) shows how predictive policing tools, in parallel to 
CompStat, are designed as a management tool rather than purely serving the purpose of crime 
control. Kaufmann, Egbert, and Leese (2019) highlight the assumptions around what consti-
tutes a crime that are rendered opaque when analysts point to the ‘objective’ patterns that they 
reveal. While both constitute important contributions to the discourse on predictive policing, 
the perspective of software engineers necessarily has a blind spot towards policing practice in 
which ‘objective’ patterns are dismissed (just as in other contexts, see Asdal, 2011) and senior 
police officers may reject the software’s management appeal. Accordingly, Ratcliffe, Taylor, 
and Fisher (2019) accompanying officers on patrol in predicted areas find officers doubting the 
software’s predictive capabilities, highlighting how they believe their tacit knowledge to be 
superior, and the instruction to stay within a box would conflict with their perceived duty to 
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assist in calls for service. Yet, the software also helped to break up routines and widen officers’ 
knowledge by sending them to places they would not have visited otherwise. Brayne and Chris-
tin (2020) and Sandhu and Fussey (2020) also find that tensions with discretion based on ex-
periential knowledge, awareness of biases and flaws in the predictions, and a perceived increase 
in managerial surveillance lead to resistance in adoption of predictive policing tools among 
police officers. Hence, rather than a techno-determinist view in which officers follow a pro-
gram’s instructions, this thesis describes a more complex situation in which officers and algo-
rithm co-construct risk and senior officers are keenly aware of the misrepresentations provided 
by the counts in their management systems.  
Finally, a wider perspective is adopted by Brayne (2017). Based on qualitative research within 
the Los Angeles Police Department, she describes a general transformation of policing prac-
tices towards risk scores, prediction, automatic alerts, and more exhaustive and integrated da-
tabases – all facilitated by big data analytics and materialised to different degrees. Her work 
highlights the importance of looking beyond a single technology and its adoption and paying 
attention to how the increasing digitization of police work transforms many areas of policing. 
This thesis follows the same approach particularly in the US case study. Brayne’s (2017) work 
is an important description and analysis of new technologies and the ways they transform po-
licing practice. As it describes a development towards big data policing, it edges close to a 
techno-deterministic account in which new technological practices replace old practices. In 
contrast to this argument, this thesis not only provides another case study of technology in 
police practice but also pays attention to the fragmented nature of technological practice – the 
ways things break down, the workarounds officers find, the idiosyncrasies in use – and the 
ways the new knowledge stemming from the datafication of policing has to be translated and 
brought in line with existing knowledges. Here, rather than a linear development towards big 
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data policing, technologies add to policing, augment existing practices, and shift rather than 
replace existing priorities. 
With few exceptions the current literature on technology in policing is limited in scope and, 
since it lacks empiricism, rarely addresses technologies in practice beyond evaluations of ‘ef-
fectivity’. The nascent discourse on predictive policing has brought about not only a critical 
theoretical discussion of effects of biases encoded in data and feedback loops but also a small 
number of empirical studies that address questions of officer discretion in the face of ‘objec-
tive’ data and increased workplace surveillance. Building on this work, this thesis contributes 
two case studies from the UK and the US that shine a light on the ways officers make sense of 
data and how quantified knowledge from simple crime counts to individualized risk scores are 
translated into practice, how data reshapes power relations within the police and reshapes who 
is policed, and the affordances technologies have on everyday police practice including how 
technologies often do not work the way they are imagined and intended. 
2.2. Actuarial justice, biopower and discipline – a new form of governmen-
tality? 
Already at the beginning of the 1990s Feeley and Simon (1992) argued that a ‘new penology’ 
was developing within the justice system. Instead of focussing on individualistic concepts such 
as guilt, responsibility and rehabilitation, this new discourse redirected attention to the actuarial 
management of social aggregates. Apart from a change in language, stressing probability and 
risk, the authors identified a change in objectives that were now tailored to internal system 
processes and the deployment of new techniques targeting groups instead of individuals. An 
example of new objectives is the shift from evaluating performance as achieving societal goals 
(e.g. rehabilitation) to measuring system functioning on internal indicators such as the average 
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time between arrest and conviction. Feeley and Simon (1994) later renamed this trend more 
meaningfully as ‘actuarial justice’ and provided some examples of its institutionalisation as 
well as possible reasons for its implementation. Particularly relevant here, are the risk profiles 
that were first developed for the detection of potential plane hijackers in 1969 and whose usage 
was extended to drug couriers by 1974. Although they were ‘riddled with subjectivity and prej-
udice’, their attempt at rationalising prevention through targeting a population with certain 
characteristics fitted well with the actuarial approach (Feeley and Simon, 1994: 177). While 
the (potential) for rationality within those profiles appeals to actuarial justice’s aspect of creat-
ing formal systems of rules, criminal profiles are also a measure of prevention and risk mini-
misation drawing on general characteristics of a population (of drug couriers or hijackers). 
According to Feeley and Simon (1994: 177f), actuarial justice is constituted by three elements: 
1) The target of power becomes the population itself in the form of statistical aggregates, 2) 
formal systems of internal rules replace individual decision making, and 3) prevention and risk 
minimisation, not necessarily its eradication, are aimed for. The following interrogates and 
challenges these three theses in the context of the practices of CompStat and predictive polic-
ing.  
Do statistical aggregates become the target of power? As the authors argue,  
“This does not mean that individuals disappear in criminal justice. They re-
main, but increasingly they are grasped not as coherent subjects, whether 
understood as moral, psychological or economic agents, but as members of 
particular subpopulations and the intersection of various categorical indica-
tors” (Feeley and Simon, 1994: 178).  




“The individualization movement […] rested on a probabilistic model that 
attempted to predict likely success of different treatment interventions on the 
basis of inferences from an accumulation of data points about a particular 
individual” (Harcourt, 2007: 45).  
Harcourt (2007: 19) and Carrabine et al. (2014) locate ‘actuarial justice’ in a wider body of 
literature that draws on a Foucauldian perspective of governmentality. Particularly the thesis 
of statistical aggregates as targets of power resonates with Foucault’s description of biopower 
(interchangeably used with the words ‘biopolitics’ and ‘security’). As the prefix ‘bio’ suggests 
biopower has life as its object. Accordingly, many of Foucault’s (2010) examples revolve 
around public hygiene, medical care, and more generally the politics of life and death; and so 
do most interpretations of the concept (Lemke, 2007; Rabinow and Rose, 2006). With bi-
opower, Foucault describes a form of governmentality that emerges in the 18th century due to 
the increasing self-regulation of cities and circulation of, among others, people, goods, and 
plagues between them (Foucault, 2009: 91ff). In contrast to disciplinary technologies, which 
Foucault (1977) had already explored in Discipline and Punish, biopower is not centred on the 
individual body but rather on the population (Foucault, 2003: 242). What is governed “[…] are 
phenomena that are aleatory and unpredictable when taken in themselves or individually, but 
which, at the collective level, display constants that are easy, or at least possible, to establish” 
(Foucault, 2003: 246). Given the statistical knowledge of these phenomena, interventions do 
not seek to prohibit (as in sovereignty), or to prescribe (as in discipline), but rather to manipu-
late the conditions of reality so that ‘naturally’ occurring events happen (or do not happen) in 
the desired manner, or, as Foucault puts it,  
“[…] the law prohibits and discipline prescribes, and the essential function 
of security, without prohibiting or prescribing, but possibly making use of 
some instruments of prescription and prohibition, is to respond to a reality in 
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such a way that this response cancels out the reality to which it responds – 
nullifies it, or limits, checks, or regulates it.” (Foucault, 2009: 69).  
One of the examples Foucault (2009) gives in Security, Territory, Population, is the shift from 
preventing food shortages by controlling prices by constraining storage, cultivation, and ex-
ports, to freedom of commerce and a system of import and export tariffs relying on the ‘reality’ 
of actors’ motivations and the market. While tolerating scarcity for some, it would eliminate 
revolt triggering food shortages at the level of the population. This same logic can be found in 
theories of deterrence, whether it is increased sentences aimed at ‘rational’ actors, or the 
hotspot presence of police patrols in predictive policing. Moreover, to connect this back to 
Feeley and Simon’s (1994) thesis of targeting individuals as members of subpopulations: Fou-
cault (2009) further describes the emergence of new notions of risk, danger, and crisis within 
the framework of biopower. The quantitative analysis of diseases at the end of the 18th century 
brings about risk as the risk of dying given factors such as age, profession, and vaccination; 
danger as the distribution of this risk across milieus, places, age groups; and crisis as the sudden 
increase in cases – all of which are used to address disease primarily in those most affected by 
the disease, instead of separating all the sick from the healthy (Foucault, 2009: 89f). Foucault 
describes this as a process of ‘normalization’ in which  
“[…] we have a plotting of the normal and the abnormal, of different curves 
of normality, and the operation of normalization consists in establishing an 
interplay between these different distributions of normality and [in] acting to 
bring the most unfavorable in line with the more favorable” (Foucault, 2009: 
91).  
Thus, the use of risk scores to prioritize those likely to re-offend (see section 7.1) or the iden-
tification and targeting of rises in crime numbers in CompStat (see section 4.2) fall squarely 
into these knowledge practices. 
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To clarify, what would be the population targeted by such biopolitics? Multiple scholars have 
argued that predictive policing practices target disproportionately poor and black communities 
and equated it to a high-tech justification for racial profiling (Ferguson, 2017a, 2017b; Joh, 
2016; Lum and Isaac, 2016; Raso et al., 2018; Richardson et al., 2019; Sanders et al., 2015). 
The software-sorted geographies (Graham, 2005) and social sorting (Lyon, 2003) inherent to 
predictive policing targeting areas and individuals could thus be interpreted as a functional 
element of the institutional mesh between ‘hyperghetto’ and prison as described by Wacquant 
(2009). While these accounts contribute an important perspective on the socially unequally 
distributed consequences of policing (a perspective that particularly section 5.2 on stop and 
search will take up), they perhaps overstate the racist intentionality behind the production and 
use of these technologies. The populations explicitly targeted by quantitative technologies can 
be racist (see e.g. McIlwain, 2019; Oosterloo and Schie, 2018), but they do not need to be for 
racist outcomes to occur through encoded biases and feedback loops1. Instead, the racially dis-
parate outcomes of knowledge that deals with populations (in the strict statistical sense) of 
crime events highlights the indeterminacy of measures based on biopolitical knowledge and 
the importance of empirical research into their situatedness in police practice. 
Foucault’s project is one of describing the changes in the knowledge of governing, in the ‘rai-
son d’état’, rather than the practice. As he says in The Birth of Biopolitics,   
“I have not studied and do not want to study the development of real govern-
mental practice by determining the particular situations it deals with, the 
problems raised, the tactics chosen, the instruments employed, forged, or re-
modeled, and so forth. I wanted to study the art of governing, that is to say, 
the reasoned way of governing best and, at the same time, reflection on the 
 
1 Even more so, proponents of predictive policing like Brantingham et al. (2018) argue that it does not entail more 
bias in police actions. 
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best possible way of governing. That is to say, I have tried to grasp the level 
of reflection in the practice of government and on the practice of government. 
In a sense, I wanted to study government’s consciousness of itself […]” 
(Foucault, 2010: 2). 
Consequentially and in contrast to the argument in Discipline and Punish, Foucault (2009) 
somewhat decouples the governmentalities of sovereignty, discipline, and security from the 
practices employed by them. For instance, he argues, torture associated with sovereignty could 
also be interpreted as having a disciplinary effect on those watching, and harsh bodily punish-
ments for minor offences would possibly occur because of their probability and hence within 
the framework of biopower. The other way around, mechanisms of security would also rely on 
juridico-legal structures as well as disciplinary mechanisms (Foucault, 2009: 21f). Thus, while 
pointing to the logic of governmentality based on statistical populations, the concept of bi-
opower leaves the ways this knowledge is translated into practice undetermined. At best, this 
opens the process of translation for empirical investigation, at worst it invites techno-determin-
istic arguments that assume the governing of populations to be successful or at least conse-
quential (for this same critique of techno-determinism levelled against Feeley and Simon’s 
(1994) argument see the discussion of the second thesis below). Accordingly, Hacking argues 
that some of the biopolitics Foucault describes, like tax incentives for large families, are un-
likely to have had any of the desired effects (Hacking, 1982: 289). Therefore, to provide an 
empirical lens for the creation and use of quantitative knowledge in policing, this thesis draws 
on concepts from actor-network theory, specifically ‘centres of calculation’ (Latour, 1987), 
‘obligatory point of passage’ (Callon, 1999), and ‘centres of translation’ (Callon, 1986; Law, 
2003). 
With ‘centres of calculation’, Latour (1987) describes how inscription devices are used to es-
tablish a self-perpetuating loop of fact gathering. The example used in the book is the creation 
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of maps in Europe based on the information brought back by explorers who then could make 
use of these maps to gather more data more easily (Latour, 1987: 215ff). As the maps produced 
in this manner are of use for the navigators, the centre of calculation can become an ‘obligatory 
passage point’ (Callon, 1999). That is, to access maps collated centrally a navigator may be 
required to contribute to charting new territories. The passage point can control access, the 
distinction of inside and outside (see Law and Bijker, 1992: 294). Consequentially, ‘centres of 
calculation’ describe an asymmetrical configuration of a network affording power to the centre 
(Law, 2003; Porter, 1996). Law and Hetherington (2000) further qualify this asymmetry: the 
centre as obligatory point of passage allows for the accumulation of knowledge at a distance 
(or surveillance) implying manipulations of scale in reductions and simplifications as in the 
statistics relevant to biopower. Simultaneously, it may act at a distance (or dominate) by dele-
gating through something that holds its shape such as drilled soldiers or paper documents – 
Latour’s (1987) ‘immutable mobiles’. To distinguish these two functions Law (2003) refers to 
the creation of representations (maps, statistics, etc.) in one place as ‘centre of calculation’ (the 
incoming side) and to the production of effects on the periphery as ‘centre of translation’ (the 
outgoing side) (see also Callon, 1986), linking knowledge accumulation and power. An exam-
ple of this configuration can be found in hotspot types of policing in CompStat systems where 
crime reports are centrally processed to map crime densities and direct patrol officers accord-
ingly – if they subscribe to the problematisation of this ‘obligatory point of passage’ and believe 
that to reduce crime means having to patrol where most crime is and to know where most crime 
is one must map it.  
This last qualification, the need for the periphery to subscribe to the centre in the example, 
points to centres of calculation/translation being not only historically contingent (Law and 
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Bijker, 1992: 305) but also unstable and contested2 - as demonstrated in the various breakdowns 
of relations described throughout the empirical part of this thesis (and the centrality of break-
down as concept further explored below). Nonetheless, ‘centres of calculation/translation’ and 
‘obligatory passage points’ can serve as a heuristic device in unravelling the ways knowledge 
is accumulated and put into action – particularly in the case of statistical knowledge and bi-
opower. 
Through the empirical lens of the coming chapters, it is possible to distinguish at least five 
different ways of knowing that are enabled by centres of calculation. The first two are not 
strictly related to practices of calculation and are hence discussed in more detail further below. 
1) Command and Control: This is the direct command and control of multiple agents en-
abled by the simultaneous connection of the centre to its agents. In policing, this can 
for example be the sergeant monitoring and assigning calls for service, as well as 
checking and approving reports (see chapter 5).  
2) Archive: With all the information coming together in centres of calculation, they are 
in a good position to function as archives. The archive, as conceptualized by Waterton 
(2010), is in a structurally equivalent position:  
“[Archives] build upon deeply held, spatially segregated, cultural under-
standings of knowledge whereby certain forms of ‘raw data’ are gathered ‘in 
the field,’ through experience of life and of the world. Data are then con-
densed and curated in places ‘set apart’—the monasteries, science parks, 
ivory towers, the back rooms within museums, and research centres—the 
places where, nowadays, databases are built. The enlightenment panoptic 
 
2 Law (2003), for instance, views the various competing modes of ordering (enterprise, administration, vision, and 
vocation) he identified in Organizing Modernity (Law, 1994) as competing centres of calculation/translation. 
19 
 
project of assembling all knowledge in one place has overwhelmingly in-
formed the archetypal archive […]” (Waterton, 2010: 648f).  
Drawing on Derrida’s (1998) Archive Fever, she describes the archive as an ‘epistemic 
time machine’ that stores past and present experiences for (imagined) future use. Such 
an archive, or the police’s databases, come with questions and conflicts around what 
should be recorded, how should it be recorded, for how long should it be accessible, 
who should have access, and how is it accessed? These are just some of the questions 
that are supporting the analysis, particularly in section 5.2 and chapter 6. While the 
knowledge contained in archives may be retrieved through individual records, centres 
of calculation also offer different means of access establishing the remaining three 
forms of seeing/knowledge.  
3) Aggregation and Reaction: Centres of calculation allow for the aggregation of catego-
rised information into statistics. The categories used for counting create new ‘objects’ 
that can be addressed, such as the crime rate for ‘types’ of crime. Thus, the categories 
used have consequences (see Bowker and Star, 1999). Hacking (1982: 292) therefore 
argues that the main change brought about by population statistics is perhaps not the 
effect of the political measures they provoked, but rather the creation of categories 
bringing about new ways of ‘conceiving the person’ – such as the category of ‘risky’ 
individuals. In the case of crime statistics, the numbers are regularly doubted and the 
underlying systems of classification are contested (Bialik, 2016; Maguire and McVie, 
2017). Yet, CompStat and, within a different epistemology, predictive policing make 
extensive use of crime statistics to focus police activity. The underlying reasoning 
closely relates to theories of deterrence and incapacitation. Sections 4.2 and 4.3, and 
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chapter 7 explore this process and how the priorities produced through crime numbers 
are translated back into action.  
4) Attributing Causes: Beyond the ‘reactivity theme’ of policing in which priorities are 
decided according to recent events and crime spikes (as in the previous epistemologi-
cal arrangement), Manning (2008) hoped to find a theoretically informed analysis of 
why crime spikes occurred and a problem-oriented response aimed at solving the un-
derlying issues. Although he did not find this in practice, more recently programs like 
‘risk terrain modelling’ which loosely fall into the predictive policing category try to 
link aspects of a city’s spatial make-up, such as the presence of bars or the quality of 
street lighting to locations of crime (Caplan and Kennedy, 2011; Kennedy and Du-
gato, 2018). Similarly, problem-oriented policing aims to identify and address the 
causes of crime patterns (Braga, 2014; Goldstein, 1979). The attribution of causes is 
relevant for the translation of quantitatively derived priorities into action (see section 
4.3)3. 
5) Algorithmic Discovery: This final way of knowing is arguably a more recent develop-
ment and can be related to a discourse on the epistemic value of machine learning, big 
data, data mining and associated keywords. Examples of big data analysis are mani-
fold: Google using search terms to predict flu trends (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 
2013: 1ff), Target using purchase patterns to individualize advertisements (Harford, 
2014), and mass surveillance by the NSA (Lyon, 2014). Beyond the technical discus-
sion stressing challenges of data processing (Chen et al., 2014; Hu et al., 2014; Sagi-
roglu and Sinanc, 2013; Ward and Barker, 2013), perspectives from outside this 
 
3 Causation here is used in a different sense than traditionally discussed in criminology. Instead of the broader 
question of the aetiology of crime (‘why is crime’) and criminology’s debate between individual and structural 
factors of crime (e.g. Young, 1997), the question is more focussed on the practical answers to ‘why is crime here’ 
or ‘why does this person commit a crime’.  
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discussion stress how big data is different from traditional research (and hence the 
logic discussed above):  
“Big Data analytics enables an entirely new epistemological approach for 
making sense of the world; rather than testing a theory by analyzing relevant 
data, new data analytics seek to gain insights 'born from the data'” (Kitchin, 
2014a: 2).  
Data is analysed with the goal of prediction in mind, calling on patterns and correlations 
instead of causality, and trading uncertainties in sampling for errors in measurement 
(Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013: 11ff). Big data challenges traditional social re-
search as to who can legitimately produce knowledge, which methods are scientific and 
what counts as proper data (Levallois et al., 2013). On the other hand (social) science 
questions the mythology that comes with selling big data services:  
“[...] the widespread belief that large data sets offer a higher form of intelli-
gence and knowledge that can generate insights that were previously impos-
sible, with the aura of truth, objectivity, and accuracy” (boyd and Crawford, 
2012: 663).  
This clash in epistemologies between one where knowledge is not really necessary as 
long as ‘it works’ and one that wants to give reasons to experience, does also extend 
into policing and criminology with Berk (2013) arguing that machine learning tech-
niques could capitalize on complex patterns in data and discover unexplained aspects 
to the aetiology of crime, and Chan and Bennett Moses (2016) problematizing the reli-
ance on correlation over causation and the opacity of the analysis. Algorithmic discov-
ery can be central to predictive policing approaches where data patterns are automati-
cally detected and transformed into the prediction of risky areas or individuals.  In the 
case of big data collected from mass surveillance being employed to identify potential 
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offenders this may take decidedly different forms from traditional approaches. Tradi-
tionally officers form their suspicion during observations and contacts by a combination 
of stereotypes, prior contacts, incongruities with what is normal or incongruities within 
a story, and nonverbal clues such as body language; which factor contributes to what 
degree is disagreed upon though (Johnson and Morgan, 2013). As data from mass sur-
veillance contains information about everyone, the process by which suspicion is raised 
is somewhat different. According to Amoore and Piotukh (2015), the process of analy-
sis needs to generate a threshold of perception so that the results are reduced in a way 
that they can be displayed in one place.  
“Understood thus, the little analytics are instrumental in what is called target 
discovery, the defining of a political threshold of perceptibility where a per-
son [or object] of interest comes into view” (Amoore and Piotukh, 2015: 
354).  
Within policing this has the potential to transform the way police decides who to inves-
tigate. "[...] suspects can emerge from the data for purposes of investigation. These 
suspicious persons and activities can appear even if police do not seek a particular per-
son for a particular crime. Nor do they need to begin the collection of data, if data is 
already being collected all of the time" (Joh, 2016: 21). While none of the technologies 
discussed in this thesis are as ‘advanced’ as those that inform this debate, the risk scores 
discussed in chapter 7.1 have similar properties in that they are opaque to the officers, 
leaving them second-guessing the reasons for some of the ratings. This highlights again 
the non-techno-deterministic role of these technologies and the necessity to study users’ 
understandings of the outputs. 
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It is certainly possible to order these elements in a chronological fashion that reflects epistemic 
shifts from ‘analogue’ policing, to the introduction of information technology and the first 
CompStat meetings, to a form of ‘Big Data policing’ that resides somewhere between the pre-
sent and the near future. Accordingly, Sarah Brayne (2017), in one of the very few detailed 
empirical engagements with digital technologies in policing, analyses to what degree this de-
velopment has already played out in the Los Angeles Police Department. While this is a useful 
perspective in rendering visible how these technologies are ‘new’ compared to ‘traditional’ 
policing, it creates a narrative of displacement in which one supersedes the other (see also 
section 2.3.1 on discretion below). But in practice, these different modes of operation of centres 
of calculation are entangled and coexist. The centres themselves are, at times, separated and 
incoherent producing different scores for the same purpose or holding different information on 
the same individual. For example, justifications for predictive policing models and the varia-
bles they include rely on either an assumption of criminals as creatures of habit returning to the 
same locations and committing the same types of crime or on rational choice theory allowing 
to model a criminal’s decision making (Perry et al., 2013: 2f). Threat scores for individuals 
may incorporate psychological theories about personality. Theory informs data selection, data 
patterns inform theory, theory explains ex-post, and theory is disregarded if patterns do not 
seem to make sense, and so on. Similarly, algorithms that highlight risk may transform what 
records are reviewed from the archive and the way the archive is constructed may influence 
how algorithms can operate. Palantir’s (2013) mixture of information retrieval and manual an-
notation is an example of such an entanglement (see also Brayne, 2017: 986f). A key research 
question for the analysis in the following chapters is then how biopower associated with the 
last three modes of operation interacts in centres of calculation with other forms of knowledge, 
particularly the intimate knowledge of individual cases and officers’ tacit knowledge of the 
environment that they operate in (see particularly sections 4.3 and 7.1). 
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Interrogating the way biopower operates also means that its operation is not taken for granted. 
Just as tax incentives for large families may not have had any of the desired effects (Hacking, 
1982: 289), it is unlikely that officers give up their discretion in planning their shifts without 
any kind of resistance, that they surrender their personal knowledge of the place to the aggre-
gated knowledge of the analysts. There are indications that this is why a predictive policing 
program was dropped in Burbank (Los Angeles Times, 2016). Finally, even if statistics suc-
cessfully mobilise action, it may not always be clear what effect the action has on the statistics 
targeted – as demonstrated by practices aimed at influencing the recording of crime rather than 
the occurrence of crime and the debatable ‘success’ of CompStat (see e.g. Bowling, 1999; 
Muller, 2018; Weisburd et al., 2019). 
As argued here, ‘centres of calculation’ provide a useful concept for analysing how biopower 
operates (or fails to operate) in practice. This conceptualisation is markedly different from its 
use by Haggerty and Ericson (2000) in their description of the ‘surveillant assemblage’. Instead 
of describing the operation of biopower, the authors relate ‘centres of calculation’ to the Pan-
opticon and disciplinary power (additionally drawing on Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). Disci-
plinary power operates through technologies that are used to govern the soul as opposed to the 
punishment of the body (Foucault, 1977). The famous metaphor for these technologies is the 
Panopticon. A prison designed in a way that the warden in the central watchtower can observe 
all the inmates in the surrounding cells, but the inmates are unable to tell whether they are being 
watched at any given time. This hierarchical observation then leads to an adjustment in inmate 
behaviour (Gutting, 2005: 82f). While this is the well-known part of disciplinary control, it 
extends to a normalizing judgement – enabled through said hierarchical observation – that 
places those who are judged on a ranked scale in comparison to others instead of directly judg-
ing someone’s acts. This plays out in regular examinations leaving a paper trail that in the end 
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allows for these comparisons to be made (Gutting, 2005: 84ff). Haggerty and Ericson (2000) 
claim that modern surveillance employing computers uses these (formerly paper) trails to cre-
ate ‘data doubles’ that integrate data from various institutions already central to Foucault’s 
account, such as health sector, police and education, and that are rendered mobile for compar-
ison in various ‘centres of calculation’. While the authors do not argue for a new prefix for the 
Panopticon4, they do argue that these ‘surveillant assemblages’ entail control:  
“Data doubles circulate in a host of different centres of calculation and serve 
as markers for access to resources, services and power in ways which are 
often unknown to its referent” (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000: 613).  
Interestingly, this contains precisely the point that Norris and Armstrong (1999) make regard-
ing the inapplicability of the Panopticon to modern surveillance systems. They argue that 
CCTV is unlikely to entail anticipatory conformity because people can evade the gaze, are 
often unaware of being monitored, and wrong-doing is not necessarily followed by any kind of 
response (Norris and Armstrong, 1999: 91ff). Furthermore, as Fussey (2002) argues in the same 
context, Haggerty and Ericson’s (2000) account ignores the often fragmented nature of surveil-
lance systems and overly stresses their convergence. Fussey (2013), building on Foucault’s 
Security, Territory, Population lectures, further stresses that ‘security’ is always partial as it is 
predicated on allowing circulation so it can be monitored and that the mechanisms to do so are 
heterogeneous, fragile, and contested. The calculative practices described within the ‘surveil-
lant assemblage’ are thus perhaps better understood within the framework of biopower as out-
lined above. Disciplinary power, on the other hand, can serve as a way to understand the second 
way in which numbers have effects by turning the gaze away from those who are the supposed 
 
4 Haggerty (2006) problematizes the widespread use of the Panopticon as metaphor with ever-changing prefixes 
that indicate that something different is meant. 
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targets of surveillance to the control of the surveillers and hence the managerialism Feeley and 
Simon (1992: 452) associate with actuarial justice. 
The disciplinary orientation of hierarchical monitoring, ranked judgement, and consequentially 
subjectification in the form of anticipatory conformity, is central to many of the accounts of 
data-driven managerialism where numbers increasingly become internalised indicators of suc-
cess (e.g. Beer, 2016; Espeland and Sauder, 2007; Muller, 2018; Power, 1997). Deleuze’s 
(1992) ‘societies of control’ can serve as an illustration here. He makes a distinction between 
moulds and modulation that describes the difference between disciplinary societies and ‘soci-
eties of control’. While prison, family, school, factory, and so on, as institutions of the disci-
plinary society, were rather separate entities that functioned as different moulds and provided 
an order of time and space, the modulations of societies of control designate an ever-changing 
process of striving to attain something, be it the next bonus on the income sheet or yet another 
certificate of education – or a better indicator value such as lower crime counts. Note that this 
conceptualization does not necessarily contrast formal systems of decision making with indi-
vidual decision making but rather entangles the two (see also section 2.3.1 below). Further-
more, while these techniques are built on the idea of normalization and hence statistical 
knowledge of biopower – those that fall below the average receive closer supervision, those 
that are above average are rewarded (see also sections 4.4 and 8.2.1) –, the mechanism is closer 
to discipline and the ‘surveillant assemblage’. 
At first glance, the second thesis of ‘actuarial justice’ – formal rules replacing individual deci-
sion making – seems to be easily met by CompStat and predictive policing. CompStat provides 
a formalised process of allocating patrol resources that takes such decisions out of officers’ 
hands. Similarly, Benbouzid (2019) argues that more than a technology of crime control, area-
based predictive policing software is a management tool that allows for the “rational” allocation 
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of patrol and its monitoring. For individual risk scores, Feeley and Simon’s (1994) observation 
is exactly the fear frequently voiced by critics: biased risk scores replacing professional judge-
ment, the offenders’ grouping becoming more important than the individual circumstances (e.g. 
Ferguson, 2017a; Joh, 2016; Schlehahn et al., 2015) – a fear that also matches the first element 
of a turn towards aggregates (see above). However, there are clear limitations to such an ac-
count. Technical systems seldom merely replace individual judgement but rather transform it, 
shape it, create resistances, and often have unintended effects (see section 2.3.1 below). The 
‘actuarial justice’ thesis – as well as many other accounts of disciplinary power operating 
through metrics – just assumes the uninterrupted control by formal systems, as Leonidas Che-
liotis argues, it includes an “[…] unstated presupposition that misleads the new penology thesis 
into a dystopian cul-de-sac, that is, the perception of penal agents as executive automata or 
docile bodies entrapped in the ‘iron cage’ of an over-rationalized criminal justice system” (Che-
liotis, 2006: 314). Accordingly, Brayne and Christin (2020) show that the influence of risk 
scores on decision making varies with the institutional role of the decision-maker. Legal pro-
fessionals would, for instance, be more likely to overrule scores than law enforcement person-
nel. This highlights the need to empirically study the power relations that technical solutions 
are embedded in, as well as the way in which they shape these relations. 
Willis and Mastrofski (2012) argue concerning CompStat that the program was not adopted in 
a drive towards a technical-rational process but rather as a means of appearing progressive 
while having little influence on police’s actual performance. From their perspective, a neo-
institutional approach as developed by Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Scott (1995) is more 
likely to explain the adoption of CompStat as a presentable “solution” to external pressures. 
Manning (2008) makes the same argument claiming that the crime analysis in CompStat does 
not bring any fundamental changes to the reactive nature of policing. Accordingly, he argues 
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Ericson and Haggerty’s (1997) assertion that police focus on managing risk and enhancing 
security would be premature and flawed given the many empirical resistances to such programs 
(Manning, 2008: 262). Both, Manning (2008) and Willis and Mastroski (2012) underline that 
systems designed to control may not have the intended effects as they would be assumed by 
the ‘actuarial justice’ thesis. However, this research also points to a common shortcoming of 
research into technological changes in policing: the authors focus on the presumed effects of 
the technology and thereby become impervious to other changes. Manning (2008), for exam-
ple, comes to his conclusion without examining any of the practices that follow from the 
CompStat meetings that he observes. This is despite speculating that the CompStat process 
may be contributing to a shared knowledge of best practice and the creation of new information 
infrastructure (Manning, 2008: 248ff). Not seeing a change in the reactivity theme of policing, 
he is not asking if that which is reacted to has changed. In UK policing the House of Commons 
Public Administration Select Committee found in 2014 that the ‘target culture’ of policing 
(brought about by a series of reforms informed by the New Public Management ideology (de 
Maillard and Savage, 2012; Guilfoyle, 2012)) had generated perverse incentives to mis-record 
crime and diagnosed a flawed leadership model in conflict with the policing code of ethics 
(Public Administration Select Committee, 2014). Already in 2000, Maguire (2000) warned that 
since the Thatcher government, the pressure to demonstrate ‘value for money’ and the Audit 
Commission’s stress on targeting criminals was leading to “[…] a strategic, future-oriented 
and targeted approach to crime control, focussing upon the identification, analysis and ‘man-
agement’ of persisting and developing ‘problems’ or ‘risks’ (which may be particular people, 
activities or areas), rather than on the reactive investigation and detection of individual crimes” 
(Maguire, 2000: 316) – raising questions of privacy, proportionality, police ethics and priorities 
(Maguire, 2000). Contrary to the supposed cosmetic changes in US policing, this suggests that 
the formal systems described by Feeley and Simon (1994) can have profound effects on 
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policing. The question that arises is to what extent this plays out in an increasingly quantified 
environment brought about by digital technologies. What is needed then is an empirical analy-
sis of the human-technical relations that make up the managerialism described by Feeley and 
Simon (1992, 1994) going beyond the binary division of professional judgment and rational 
systems. The ‘actuarial justice’ thesis, together with the idea that metrics provide modulations 
of control, can inform a sensitivity towards potential shifts in internal power dynamics – alt-
hough perhaps in unintended ways. 
Finally, because the allocation of resources through CompStat and predictive policing is, at 
least according to its proponents, intrinsically geared towards preventing crime from happening 
(by whatever policing strategy that is chosen), it seems natural to assume that its application is 
in line with the last element of actuarial justice: prevention and risk minimisation. Depending 
on the policing strategy chosen, one could also argue that it does not address causes of crime; 
that it does not aim to eradicate crime but only tries to minimize its occurrence. In this sense, 
predictive policing and CompStat are completely congruent with the risk management ap-
proaches described within the context of actuarial justice and new penology. However, one 
might question the extent to which this is a new orientation. Lawrence (2017) provides a his-
torical analysis tracing pre-emptive policing and arrests based on character and intent back to 
1750 and the beginnings of policing in the United Kingdom. Directly challenging accounts by 
Zedner (2007), Ashworth and Zedner (2014), and McCulloch and Wilson (2015), this criticism 
of diagnosing a new turn towards pre-emption also applies to Feeley and Simon’s (1992, 1994) 
diagnosis, as well as to many other works that fall into the same line of argument (e.g. Mantello, 
2016; van Brakel and De Hert, 2011). Not only is pre-emption not a new phenomenon, but 
outside of quantified risk assessments, anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs) introduced by 
New Labour in England, Scotland and Wales with the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, now 
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replaced with the less discussed criminal behaviour orders (CBOs) (Brown, 2020), have caused 
wide debate in (British) criminology (Ashworth and Zedner, 2008; Burney, 2008; Crawford, 
2009; Di Ronco and Peršak, 2014; Donoghue, 2008, 2012; Millie, 2008; Simester and Hirsch, 
2006; Squires, 2006, 2008). ASBOs and CBOs are civil court orders aimed at preventing future 
‘antisocial’ behaviour under threat of criminal punishment. They can impose duties and re-
strictions on individuals that range from prohibiting begging in a specified area, being drunk 
in public space, congregating with a group of a specified size, carrying a knife, or wearing 
clothing with an attached hood (Home Office, 2017). This legislation has clearly a pre-emptive 
angle, as Donoghue puts it, “[…] antisocial behaviour policy is quintessentially ‘risk’ assess-
ment. And these assessments can be contextualized as attempts to render future happenings as 
controllable” (Donoghue, 2008: 346). Consequentially, and in parallel to the argument above, 
rather than just locating predictive policing and CompStat within a “new” trend for pre-emp-
tion, the thesis will pay attention towards how technology participates in shaping (existing) 
prioritisations aimed at prevention (see e.g. section 7.1.2 on the use of CBOs in the context of 
risk ratings). The question underlying this analysis is how the situated knowledge of police 
officers and their appraisals of a person’s ‘criminality’ – the form of pre-crime highlighted by 
Lawrence (2017) – interacts with the quantitative risk scores that are the basis to the more 
recent diagnoses of a turn towards pre-crime. 
All in all, this discussion of ‘actuarial justice’, ‘biopower’, and ‘centres of calculation’ opens a 
set of four interrelated questions: 1) how is quantitative knowledge created in police organisa-
tions? 2) How is this knowledge (associated with ‘biopower’) translated into practice and what 
is its relationship with officers’ tacit knowledge? 3) What is the role of quantitative knowledge 
in (managerial) oversight? And 4) what consequences do different ways of connecting the past 
to the future (archive, memory, risk scores) have in practice? 
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2.3. Technology and practice 
While the previous section dealt with more abstract concepts that help to describe the organi-
sation of knowledges and power in policing, this section outlines three theoretical frames that 
support the analysis of the socio-technical practice of policing: the role of technology in dis-
cretionary decision making, the consequences of technologies for the spatio-temporality of po-
licing, and the often ignored issue of breakdowns and fragmented use of technologies. 
2.3.1. Discretion 
The decision to intervene for example in the form of a stop, the degree of intervention as in the 
decision to search, the choice of consequences between none, warning, fine, and arrest, the 
recording of an interaction – discretion is a key element of police work. A common concern in 
the literature on technology in policing in general, and predictive policing in particular, is the 
question of its effect on police officers’ discretion. This is reflected both in arguments of those 
championing technologies as eradicating human biases from the criminal justice system, and 
those that fear a mechanical application of machine decisions imbued with biases hidden in the 
opacity of a black-box algorithm. This tension mirrors a long-standing debate in legal scholar-
ship as well as in policing research on the role of laws, regulations, and policies in shaping or 
curtailing police discretion. This section first sketches out this debate, then gives an overview 
of empirical research on discretion particularly within the context of suspicion formation in 
stop and search practices, and finally, argues that the question of discretion is necessarily an 
empirical one. As such discretionary decision making is the core of the analysis particularly in 
sections 5.2 and 7.1. 
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The most prominent text on discretion in the legal debate is probably Davis’ (1969) Discre-
tionary Justice. The author voices a since often repeated concern that bureaucratic discretion 
could lead to arbitrariness, inconsistencies, and injustices: 
“I think the greatest and most frequent injustice occurs at the discretion end 
of the scale, where rules and principles provide little or no guidance, where 
emotions of deciding officers may affect what they do, where political or 
other favoritism may influence decisions, and where the imperfections of hu-
man nature are often reflected in the choices made" (Davis, 1969: 1). 
He argues that discretionary powers should be curtailed to find a better balance with legal rules 
by issuing publicly accessible guidance and policies that limit and structure discretion, as well 
as instating oversight mechanisms to enforce these. Pepinsky (1984), however, argues that such 
a curtailing of discretion solely represents a move by society’s ruling class to force police to 
enact laws controlling the underclass. Contrastingly, he highlights the value of police discretion 
in attenuating the force of the law with respect to the needs of the (poor) communities they 
serve.  
Two observations stand out from this exchange: the debate centres on 1) who is the legitimate 
final arbiter? Is it the police officer or is it the lawmakers? As Pepinsky’s (1984) argument 
demonstrates, curtailing police officer discretion solely means moving it elsewhere, whether 
that is lawmakers, or, as in the case of arguments around the influence of algorithms, the tech-
nologies that are assumed to control discretion. However, these movements may play out 
mostly in theory while any limitations on discretion may have several unforeseen consequences 
in practice, as argued further below. The second central question is, 2) what makes a fair deci-
sion? Is it the equal application of laws to everyone as in the example of automated traffic 
enforcement (Joh, 2007), or is fairness dependent on taking the circumstances of the individual 
into account and affording compassion (see section 5.2 for officers arguing the latter)? As Joh 
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(2007) concedes, the social expectation for law enforcement is regularly one that focusses on 
the spirit rather than the letter of the law: 
“[…] perhaps a legitimate objection would arise […] from [the people’s] 
view that there is a meaningful distinction between technical legal violations 
and abiding by the purpose for which the laws exist. Traffic laws exist to 
make illegal unsafe driving, a standard that is perhaps best judged by a per-
son rather than by a machine” (Joh, 2007: 231). 
Beyond the discourse around the advantages and disadvantages of police discretion, there is 
both a theoretical argument as well as empirical research that questions the tendentially binary 
conception of discretion versus no discretion. In the theoretical argument, drawing on 
Dworkin’s (1977) Taking Rights Seriously, discretion is a concept that always stands in relation 
to something, as he describes: 
“Discretion, like the hole in a doughnut, does not exist except as an area left 
open by a surrounding belt of restriction. It is therefore a relative concept. It 
always makes sense to ask, ‘Discretion under which standards?’ or ‘Discre-
tion as to which authority?’” (Dworkin, 1977: 31). 
Accordingly, Evans and Harris (2004) argue (with regards to the discretion of social workers) 
that those fearing a loss of discretion conceptualize discretion solely in what Dworkin (1977) 
refers to as the ‘strong sense of discretion’: not being bound by the standards of an authority. 
Stricter oversight mechanisms and technologies are seen as restricting decisions. However, as 
the authors stress, these arguments ignore the far greater role of discretion in the ‘weak sense’: 
interpreting the rules as officers see fit. As such, more rules could paradoxically result in more 
discretion.  
Based on empirical work, Lipsky (2010) coined the term ‘street-level bureaucrats’ in 1969 to 
describe the structurally equivalent position of workers in different areas of public service faced 
34 
 
with a gap between ideals and overwhelming workloads that causes them to employ their dis-
cretion to find coping mechanisms tolerated by the system: 
"At best, street-level bureaucrats invent modes of mass processing that more 
or less permit them to deal with the public fairly, appropriately, and thought-
fully. At worst, they give in to favoritism, stereotyping, convenience, and 
routinizing-all of which serve their own or agency purposes" (Lipsky, 2010: 
xiv). 
Lipsky (2010) tendentially takes the same position as Davis (1969) in highlighting the dangers 
of discretion. He even describes CompStat as a successful restructuring of police officers’ ac-
tions through incentives and sanctions based on strategically chosen indicators (Lipsky, 2010: 
227). While such a perspective hardly takes into account the various unintended consequences 
of technologically enabled systems like CompStat (as discussed further below), his account 
does highlight empirically that discretion is employed as interpretation of and in relation to the 
rules rather than denoting a vacuum within which officers decide freely. Crucially, this refo-
cuses question 1) from above (‘who should be the final arbiter?’) onto the empirical factors 
that steer the extent of discretion and the conditions of its use. Without knowing when and how 
officers exercise discretion, attempts to transform and ‘improve’ it are futile. 
So, what are the conditions? Highlighting the gap between aspirations and overwhelming work-
loads, Lipsky’s (2010) analysis is built on the human and organisational conditions of the work 
of street-level bureaucrats. As Dymond (2019) observes, much of the literature on police dis-
cretion also focusses on these human factors. An example of this is the literature on one of the 
most prominent areas for police discretion: stop and search. Johnson & Morgan’s (2013) liter-
ature review summarises the factors influencing this decision as officers’ stereotypes, known 
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persons and locations, incongruency of observations, and non-verbal cues5. Quinton (2011) 
finds for police in England and Wales that officers rely overwhelmingly on stereotypes and 
routinely conduct unlawful stops – underscoring the need for empirical research that goes be-
yond assumed relations between law and discretion. What is missing from this literature is an 
appreciation of the role of technologies in officers’ decision making. Dymond (2019) calls for 
more attention to the agency of nonhumans and the socio-technical networks in which decision-
makers are embedded. In her research these are the unintended consequences of Tasers for use 
of force situations; in the analysis presented here, these are going to be the consequences of 
technologies rendering information from simple records of previous police encounters (section 
5.2) to automated risk scores (section 7.1) available to officers.  
The conceptual frameworks used within science and technology studies offer a sensitivity to 
the role of technology in police practice addressing the gap in policing research that has so far 
focused on the constraints of formal procedure, culture, and regulation. This approach stresses 
the active role technologies play as part of social assemblies. Technologies, as Hutchby (2016) 
argues, can be conceptualised to possess affordances that shape their use in a non-deterministic 
way. Artefacts do not determine their use through some inherent properties, nor do their uses 
depend solely on the users’ interpretation of the object. To take a simple example from the 
fieldwork presented here, a police radio is designed to enable communication over distance. 
Hutchby (2016) argues with reference to Norman (1990), that designers impart properties on 
things that make certain interpretations of their uses more likely – the officer knows that the 
 
5 These factors are similar to the categories of suspicion Norris and Armstrong (Norris and Armstrong, 1999) 
found for CCTV operators: "categorical: suspicion based merely on personal characteristic such as dress, race, 
membership of subculture group[;] transmitted: surveillance initiated by someone else e.g. police, store detective 
or member of the public[;] behavioural: suspicion based on behaviour, i.e. fighting, public display of drunken-
ness[;] locational: suspicion based on a person's location, e.g. walking through a car park with a high rate of theft 
late at night[;] personalised: suspicion based on personal knowledge of the person surveilled[;] protectional: sus-
picion based on fear for persons [sic!] safety, e.g. woman late at night at a cash machine[;] voyeuristic: monitoring 
based on prurient interest" (Norris and Armstrong, 1999: 112). 
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buttons on the radio are meant to be pressed. However, because it is heavy and bulky, one of 
the interviewed platoon officers adds to this its potential use as a weapon. Hence, the radio’s 
affordances also stand in relation to the user’s interpretations. But it would be unlikely for the 
officer to try and prepare her dinner with the radio – the set of affordances an object can have, 
that is the ways in which it can be interpreted, are limited6. The goal of this research is to 
interrogate these affordances of technologies in police decision making. 
One productive way to think of power from this perspective is argued by Law (1991) in his 
essay Power, Discretion, and Strategy: he differentiates a productive and enabling ‘power to’ 
from a controlling and limiting ‘power over’. Both can be present at the same time and can be 
stored in objects. For example, money simultaneously allows one to obtain something and ac-
cordingly make someone else do something (possibly encountering resistance). At the same 
time, having money means having a store of power (Law, 1991: 178f). Similarly, Winner’s 
(1980) famous example of Long Island Bridge – designed by Robert Moses to be inaccessible 
 
6 Hutchby (2016) tries to make an argument for a middle ground between realism (inherent properties) and con-
structivism (user’s interpretation). The limits of interpretation that things pose constitutes the main point of de-
parture of his argument from the constructivist reference point that he finds in Grint & Woolgar’s (1997) The 
Machine at Work. Yet, the problem with Grint & Woolgar’s (1997) perspective is arguably a different one. After 
all, the limits of interpretation are as much a construction as the interpretations themselves which could be ac-
counted for within their constructivism. Therefore, the actual underlying problem is epistemological and method-
ological: Whose interpretations can be studied? The social constructivist perspective outlined by the authors draws 
back into second order accounts – interpretations of interpretations. This leaves no room for new interpretations 
of what things do that are not already existent. In fact, Grint & Woolgar’s (1997) criticism towards ANT is exactly 
this, the creation of new interpretations of things which they condemn as a form of essentialism (Grint and Wool-
gar, 1997: 28ff). This position seems to unnecessarily limit research to the analysis of explicated interpretations 
and excludes the articulation of original observations. Perhaps a more useful understanding of social constructiv-
ism is given by Latour (2005) who himself tries to solve the issue of a false dichotomy based on a misunderstand-
ing of ‘realists’ interpreting ‘constructivists’ as arguing that things do not exist since they are (socially) con-
structed. “When we say that a fact is constructed, we simply mean that we account for the solid objective reality 
by mobilizing various entities whose assemblage could fail; ‘social constructivism’ means, on the other hand, that 
we replace what this reality is made of with some other stuff, the social in which it is ‘really’ built. An account 
about the heterogeneous genesis of a building is substituted by another one dealing with the homogeneous social 
matter in which it is built. To bring constructivism back to its feet, it’s enough to see that once social means again 
association, the whole idea of a building made of social stuff vanishes. For any construction to take place, non-
human entities have to play the major role and this is just what we wanted to say from the beginning with this 
rather innocuous word.” (Latour, 2005: 91f). From this perspective, Hutchby’s (2016) description of affordances 
lays squarely within a social constructivist approach. 
37 
 
for public transport thereby making Jones Beach inaccessible to minorities and low-income 
people relying on such transport – first had the intended effect but later, with the decline of car 
prices, as Law (1991: 175f) argues, transformed into a source of ‘power to’ access Jones Beach. 
The affordances of an object can change over time when the socio-technical relations they are 
embedded in change. It also means that the power effects designed into an object are never 
certain; the relation is non-deterministic7. Furthermore, the idea that power is stored in objects 
allows for the description of unequal power distributions and, crucially, actors’ capability for 
discretion (Law, 1991: 169f). This discretion is not to be interpreted as being unbound by rules, 
as in some of the conceptualisations discussed above, but rather as the calculation of a multi-
tude of relations:  
“[…] it is, I suggest, sensible to avoid making an overall decision about 
whether a given agent is, or is not, a power. This is because most agents are 
typically treated and experienced as powers from some points of view, 
whereas they look like authorities from others. Accordingly, the distinction 
(or continuum) is best treated as a relational matter. Again, and more im-
portantly, there is the issue of calculation. Should a habit etched into the mind 
(or the body?) be treated as a calculation? Is there not, in fact, a large territory 
between explicit calculation on receipt of signs on the one hand, and 'auto-
matic' response to the input of signs on the other, a territory that may pertain 
to both of these” (Law, 1991: 171f)? 
From this perspective, the police officer’s discretion is the effect of the socio-technical network 
that constitutes it: in the example of a traffic stop, this is the law that sets conditions for legiti-
mate stops, the stereotypes and ways of looking for incongruencies that are trained, acquired 
 
7 Law highlights this: “[…] though the organisation of physical materials may be directed by (frequently conflict-
ing) strategic concerns (in the narrower, intentional sense of the term), the effects of these arrangements may turn 
out to be other than what was expected” (Law, 1991: 174f). This addresses criticisms like the one by Woolgar & 
Cooper (1999) that target the primacy of intentionality in Winner’s (1980) account (not to mention the possible 
factual inaccuracies).  
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or from experiences outside the job, and it is also a long list of technical devices that enable 
the situation: from the uniform signalling authority, to the siren used to stop the car, to the 
sergeant’s reminder to stop cars in a certain area because of a spike in the crime statistics, to 
the database revealing an outstanding warrant – and many more factors. Not only renders this 
perspective the multitude of non-human influences visible (without neglecting the role of hu-
man actors), it also overcomes the structure/agency dualism inherent to arguments for or 
against discretion. As Law (1991) puts it, "agents are both sets of relations, and nodes in sets 
of relations” (Law, 1991: 173). Instead, the question becomes an empirical one of carefully 
identifying the agents that make up an officer’s discretion – intended and unintended power 
effects, human and non-human agents. It becomes an effort of filling Dworkin’s (1977) dough-
nut of discretion and this research aims to particularly add the influences of technologies on 
officer discretion. 
If discretion is the outcome of a set of relations that form the officer, then where does this leave 
the two starting questions of who should exercise discretion (law vs police officer) and how it 
should be exercised (equally vs contextualised)? The binary distinction in the first question 
becomes a question of whether the influence different actants have in the officer’s discretionary 
calculation is in a ‘good’ balance, that is it produces largely hoped-for outcomes. By paying 
closer attention to what makes up a discretionary decision, this research problematises discre-
tion and thereby opens it to scrutiny – without necessarily prescribing what a ‘good’ balance 
would be8. Similarly, the second question of applying the same rule to everyone vs. attenuating 
it to circumstance is already implied in the first: the law is associated with the equal, unbiased 
 
8 This thesis thus adopts a social constructivist perspective that for its critique turns power from explanandum into 
explanans. Refuting criticisms of social constructivism being uncritical (Winner, 1993), the aim is to extract the 
contingencies of the present – to turn ‘matters of fact’ into ‘matters of concern’ or, in Foucauldian terms, to 
problematise (Latour, 2004, 2005, 2008; Rabinow and Rose, 2003). 
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application of morality, and the police officer is associated with deciding based on situated 
knowledge. Again, the question is one of balance and power dynamics – from systems intended 
to check officer actions discussed in sections 4.4 and 8.2.1, to officers’ ethical dilemmas in 
decision making (see section 5.2). The increasing prevalence of algorithms in decision making 
has brought about a vigorous debate on questions of responsibility, accountability, transpar-
ency, and ethics of such arrangements (for an overview see Mittelstadt et al., 2016) – all of 
which revolve around the distribution of agency between humans and non-humans. When dis-
cretion is distributed as suggested here, an accusation could be that such an approach dilutes 
responsibility. However, the argument seeks to separate the (empirical) question of the factors 
of discretion from the (moral) question of responsibility. Indeed, a human actor like the soft-
ware developer may be ascribed responsibility for an unforeseen consequence of the software, 
or a police officer may be ascribed responsibility for enacting an automated instruction9. Prob-
lematising discretion, however, may provide clues to reconfiguring the network for a ‘better’ 
outcome10. 
While there has been considerable research into the human factors that affect officer discretion 
(as described above), there has been little research on discretion in the context of technologies. 
Some of the exceptions are Brayne and Christin (2020) who find strategies of resistance among 
law enforcement and legal professionals fearing devaluation of their experience and managerial 
surveillance, and Sandhu and Fussey (2020) reporting officers’ intention to maintain their in-
tuitions in the face of mostly area based predictive policing systems perceived of as patronising 
 
9 This could be taken even one step further, as also the question of how responsibility is ascribed is an empirical 
one. And thus, wherever there is a chain of command, even disregarding non-human actors, there are systems in 
place that seek to assign responsibility. Thus, the question is what makes a ‘good’ system of accountability. 
10 In this sense, Rubel et al.’s (2019) insistence on human responsibility – describing all else as ‘agency laundering’ 
– can be reinterpreted as urging to find an address for such a reconfiguration of the network. 
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and imbued with problematic biases. While these studies tendentially concern the replacement 
of subjective decision making with ‘objective’ predictive policing tools and thus construct a 
binary opposition between the two, the data presented in section 7.1.1 adds to this research by 
instead suggesting a co-construction of risk between software and officers’ experiential 
knowledge. Furthermore, section 5.2 draws attention to the role digital technologies play in 
discretion for comparatively low-tech solutions like access to the police database on on-board 
computers in police cruisers. 
2.3.2. Spatio-temporal conditions of practice and knowing 
Particularly discussions of predictive policing provoke a closer examination of the spatio-tem-
poral patterns of policing. Prediction comes with a clear orientation towards potential futures 
and area-based predictive policing, just as CompStat, aims at identifying spaces for interven-
tion. Beyond these examples, the introduction of new technologies is often associated with 
hopes for increases in efficiency and time savings (Koper and Lum, 2019). Furthermore, police 
technologies, as exemplified in the possibility for feedback loops in predictive policing (Ensign 
et al., 2018; Lum and Isaac, 2016), encode the spatiality of policing or create their own spati-
alities, as in the case of sensor networks like CCTV (Graham, 2005). 
In Security, Territory, Population, Foucault (2009) argues, as described above (section 2.2), 
that the new knowledges of biopower emerge in the context of the problem of circulation. 
Power shifts from controlling everything within the walls of the territory to controlling the 
flows through the territory,  
“[…] it was a matter of organizing circulation, eliminating its dangerous el-
ements, making a division between good and bad circulation, and maximiz-
ing the good circulation by diminishing the bad” (Foucault, 2009: 34). 
41 
 
Elden (2007) highlights the spatial categories that not only underpin the statistical devices that 
create populations (cartography and statistics develop together (Elden, 2007: 575)) but are also 
central to the way that circulation is controlled. At the time of the Holy Roman Empire,  
“This no man's land is beginning to be perceived as an open space traversed 
by men and things. Squares, markets, roads, bridges, rivers: these are the 
critical points in the territory which police will mark out and control” (Pas-
quino as cited in Elden, 2007: 578). 
The knowledge practices in CompStat and predictive policing seem then an almost obvious 
instance of minimizing ‘bad’ circulation based on geo-statistics (aimed at) determining the ter-
ritoriality of police presence. Indeed, much of the field of environmental criminology seems to 
be concerned with the spatial segmentation of populations (e.g. see Eck and Weisburd, 2015; 
Weisburd, 2016). Perhaps an even clearer link, that includes spatial statistics as well as the 
spatiality of control points discussed by Pasquino (1991) above, are the license plate readers 
discussed in section 6.5, in which case their positioning was decided upon based on ‘hot spots’ 
of shootings. Where the categorisation of spaces and the monitoring of movements through 
spaces is automated, these can be thought of as ‘software-sorted geographies’ (Graham, 2005) 
much in the same way as the ‘social sorting’ (Lyon, 2003) of populations. In this thesis, spati-
ality serves as a perspective from which two different ways of translating the calculative 
knowledge of space into practice can be interrogated empirically: First, how does it relate to 
and interact with the tacit knowledge of officers, and, hence, how is it translated into practice 
(see particularly sections 4.3 and 7.1.2)? Second, where this knowledge is translated into infra-
structure like the license plate readers, how does this material spatiality influence policing (see 
chapter 6)? These are crucial questions that will be interrogated empirically through rare and 
sustained access to the policing environments in which these technologies are deployed. More-
over, whether it is the spatiality of recordings from networks of sensors or the patterns of police 
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presence, the spatiality of policing becomes encoded within databases for future use simulta-
neously shaping the conditions of what is knowable in the future. The archive, as referenced 
earlier, takes on the spatial qualities of the network that feeds it. 
As discussed above, the archive in the form of databases and paper records functions as an 
‘epistemic time machine’ (Waterton, 2010) and is essential to the circulation of knowledge in 
centres of calculation. As such, it is the precondition to all the aggregations that enable the 
control of populations. The archive is essential to constructing the futures that are to be policed 
– at least within the technological arrangement of predictive policing. As Lawrence’s argument 
(2017) on pre-emption suggests, police officers will always have had ideas about who to target 
and which areas to target based on situated knowledge. Thus, as discussed in the context of 
discretion, the question becomes how these imagined futures relate to each other in practice. 
When it comes to policing practice, another dimension of time becomes relevant for the anal-
ysis in the coming chapters. As Koper and Lum (2019) note in their overview of research into 
policing technologies, technology is often adopted under the assumption that it will increase 
effectiveness and efficiency. Even more so, efficiency is the main ‘frame’ by which officers of 
all ranks perceive the value of adopting new technologies (Lum et al., 2017). The ‘more with 
less’ argument for predictive policing – Beck and McCue’s (2009) article in The Police Chief 
is one of the earliest instances of this – illustrates this tendency well. However, the question of 
whether introduced technologies afford any time savings is perhaps formulated too narrowly. 
Based on the intuition that technologies rarely work as planned and rather transform when they 
are put into action (see e.g. Latour, 1990), the wider question of how they reshape the tempo-
ralities of policing comes into focus. This can become particularly important when technolo-
gies break down and thereby cause interruption. 
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Further insight for this study can come from Kavanagh and Araujo’s (1995) concept of ‘chro-
nigami’ which, drawing on actor-network theory, explicitly includes non-human actants11. 
What the authors describe as a relation between artefacts (but also routines, habits, customs, 
etc.), inscribed with programs of action by planners, and users, who may or may not subscribe 
to these temporalities, can be interpreted as a temporal form of affordance. For example, the 
surveillance cameras discussed in section 6.4 regularly overwrite the saved footage creating a 
pace to which detectives must adhere if they want to utilise them. Furthermore, processes (tem-
poral zones in a network of multiple times) compete in ‘trials of strength’ to conscribe actants 
(Kavanagh and Araujo, 1995: 109f). The computer-aided dispatch, for instance, aims to enrol 
a police officer engaged in another activity in an emergency call by alerting them with a sound 
cue to a new call. The idea of ‘trials of strength’ also applies to the competing versions of the 
future described above. 
2.3.3. Breakdown and workaround 
Finally, a short note on breakdowns: Not only does a lot of the literature on technologies in 
policing (particularly critical, techno-deterministic narratives that stress the danger of total con-
trol) assume that technologies just function as imagined without any resistances and transfor-
mations in practice, it also frequently assumes that the technology works as advertised. Yet 
particularly police departments are regularly filled with legacy information systems that must 
be maintained and brought into alignment with newer solutions. While failures and resistance 
to the adoption of technologies in policing have received some attention in the literature (see 
 
11 Few approaches in social theory take non-humans into account (Nowotny, 1992). Perhaps the most amenable 
definition of time for this project can be found in Norbert Elias’ relational approach: “For him the word time is a 
symbol for a relationship which a group of beings endowed with the capacity for memory and synthesis establishes 
between two or more continua of changes, one of which is used by them as a frame of reference or standard of 
measurement for the other” (Nowotny, 1992: 427). 
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e.g. Fussey, 2002, 2013; Koper et al., 2014; Manning, 1992; Sandhu and Fussey, 2020), and, 
perhaps most prominently, Manning (2008) has pointed to the fragmentation of police infor-
mation systems (Manning, 2008: 74ff), there is little research on the practice and consequences 
of dealing with the continuous breakdown and need for maintenance of technologies. What 
follows is a short discussion of the notions of maintenance and repair in science and technology 
studies that provide a framework for analysing this aspect of technology in policing. 
As Denis and Pontille (2019) describe, actor-network theory used to focus on successful tech-
nologies but neglected the amount of necessary maintenance work. Only more recently, schol-
ars have focussed on the practices of maintenance and repair and this newly emerging area 
questions and repositions some of actor-network theory’s underlying assumptions: it chal-
lenges the binary distinction between mundane functioning and breakdown as well as high-
lighting the fragility, decay and vulnerability of materiality in contrast to its supposed durabil-
ity12. Breakdowns, together with accidents and controversies, have been discussed in actor-
network theory as moments in which the mundanity and taken-for-grantedness of technologies 
collapses; instructive in revealing its inner workings and problematising them anew. Repair 
and maintenance studies qualify this further: 
“Even at rest, artefacts are not as sealed and stable as they may appear […]. 
The ability for technologies to remain the same and to be taken for granted 
by most of their users requires a constant work that such terms as ‘black box’ 
and ‘immutable mobiles’ seriously understate” (Denis and Pontille, 2019: 
286). 
 
12 However, while durability is a prominent argument in ANT, already Law (1992) cautions, “[…] durability is 
yet another relational effect, not something given in the nature of things. […] the argument about durability is 
attractive and has much merit – but it needs to be handled with caution” (Law, 1992: 387). 
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The authors note that some forms of malfunctioning visible to those who maintain the technol-
ogy are never even experienced as such by its users. An example of this is the data work per-
formed by the analysts linking different databases in the background (see section 4.1). To add 
to this idea, the research presented here shows how not only for some the technology is just 
working while others work constantly to hide its fragility, different users will also put up with 
different levels of hiccups and inconvenience. Consequentially, various forms of workarounds 
develop where users enrol alternative technologies for their goals leading to a fragmentation of 
technological practices. Graham and Thrift (2007) point to this idiosyncrasy of repair, and the 
role of breakdowns for adaptation and improvisation13. Technology’s adoption, or the less hu-
man-centred version of ‘interessement’ (Callon, 1999), is rarely homogeneous, especially in 
the absence of training. A fragmented version of the binary between crisis and for-grantedness 
develops in which technologies are problematised and reshaped by some and not others. 
Lastly, breakdowns, as well as attention to maintenance work, are methodologically useful in 
the way they have always been to actor-network theory: they render the roles technologies play 
visible. As Star and Ruhleder (1996) point out,  
“The normally invisible quality of working infrastructure becomes visible 
when it breaks; the server is down, the bridge washes out, there is a power 
blackout. Even when there are back-up mechanisms or procedures, their ex-
istence further highlights the now-visible infrastructure” (Star and Ruhleder, 
1996: 113). 
 
13 Beyond this, Graham and Thrift (2007) and Jackson (2014) highlight the importance of breakdown and repair 
for the process of innovation, whether that is through the knowledge gained from how things break and overcom-
ing the issues problematised in breakdowns, or the knowledge gained from developing processes for recycling 
broken artefacts. “[…] repair occupies and constitutes an aftermath, growing at the margins, breakpoints, and 
interstices of complex sociotechnical systems as they creak, flex, and bend their way through time. It fills in the 
moment of hope and fear in which bridges from old worlds to new worlds are built, and the continuity of order, 
value, and meaning gets woven, one tenuous thread at a time. And it does all this quietly, humbly, and all the 




To conclude, the use of technologies in policing has recently elicited a growing debate on its 
uses and misuses – a debate that, as Brayne (2017) highlights, remains largely speculative. 
Important issues like officer discretion, which have received wide attention in past research, 
are poorly understood empirically within the context of technologies in policing. Using Fou-
cault’s (2003, 2009, 2010) lectures on ‘biopolitics’, Latour’s (1987) ‘centre of calculation’, 
Law’s (1991) perspective on discretion, and the concept of ‘affordances’ (Hutchby, 2016) this 
literature review provides a theoretical framework to challenge existing, techno-deterministic 
accounts and to address empirically the question of how technologically mediated knowledge 
production shapes police practice and informs routine decision-making from strategy, to patrol 





This thesis adopts a social constructivist perspective in a) tracing how police create, process, 
interpret, and negotiate calculative knowledge and how it is reconciled with officer’s experi-
ential knowledge, and b) studying the affordances of technologies in police practice. For this 
purpose, I use primarily interviews and observations to study officers’ perceptions of technol-
ogies and their engagements with them. 
Christin (2020) differentiates three possible ways for studying algorithms that apply to predic-
tive policing in particular but also to other data visualizations studied here: 1) algorithmic au-
dits studying in- and outputs quantitatively often to reveal discriminatory impacts (e.g. Lum 
and Isaac, 2016), 2) cultural and historical critiques situating algorithms in political, racial, and 
economic formations based on adverts, industry publications, and journalistic materials (e.g. 
Benjamin, 2019; O’Neil, 2016), and 3) ethnographic studies that interrogate technologies in 
practice (e.g. Brayne and Christin, 2020). The latter strategy is best suited to move beyond the 
techno-deterministic and speculative narratives prevalent in the literature described above 
(Brayne, 2017; Sandhu and Fussey, 2020) – the overly generalizing cultural and historical cri-
tiques, and the decontextualised ‘fetishism’ of algorithmic audits (Christin, 2020; Monahan, 
2018). Even though not an ethnography in the classical sense of a long-term empirical engage-
ment with a group of people (Fassin, 2017), this thesis does follow its inductive logic and 
employs semi-structured interviews with individuals and groups, participant observation, and 
review of relevant documents in the form of policies, press announcements, laws, and more. 
Collectively, these approaches provide a ‘thick description’ of the operational settings and of-
ficers’ interactions with technology. To contextualise discretionary decision-making during 




The following first outlines the choice of field sites and how access to them was negotiated, it 
then thematises the challenges of the practical work and finally describes the process of ana-
lysing the data. 
3.1. Field sites and access 
The language of ‘sampling’ common to method textbooks suggests that researchers have a 
choice in selecting who to study, and even more, reminiscent of quantitative methodologies, 
that chosen cases are comparable, or at least exemplary. However, it is commonly acknowl-
edged that gaining access to police departments is challenging (see e.g. Monahan and Fisher, 
2015), turning the question of how to choose a case into one of how to access it. Moreover, as 
will become visible from the contrast between the two cases analysed here, the technological 
assemblages and their affordances for organisational power relations and individual decision-
making differ considerably from department to department. The goal of presenting these two 
cases is not to make generalizable claims about technological practice in other police depart-
ments but rather to problematise it and raise wider issues for discussion that may or may not 
(yet) apply elsewhere14. Thus, although the process followed for this research could be charac-
terized as ‘illustrative’ or ‘evocative’ sampling (Mason, 2002: 126), or, better, ‘opportunity’ 
sampling followed up with ‘snowball’ sampling asking for further contacts (Patton, 2015: 
284ff), it is perhaps best to describe how access to the two case studies discussed in this thesis 
was achieved, and why the two locations are of value. 
 
14 See Rabinow & Rose’s (2003) perspective on Foucauldian critique. 
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The United States and the United Kingdom became research sites for this project as the main 
locations in the early academic and public discourse on predictive policing15 which closely 
links the two countries. CompStat, often portrayed as the precursor to place-based predictive 
policing, comes out of the New York police department (Willis, 2014; Wilson, 2020) and, 
drawing on a common literature in environmental criminology, predictive policing developed 
in parallel between efforts by researchers in London with first tests in Manchester (Johnson et 
al., 2009; Maguire, 2018) and in various projects funded by the National Institute of Justice in 
the US (National Institute of Justice, 2009). Within this context, the US police department 
studied here has been one of the early adopters of CompStat in the past and recently introduced 
many new digital tools in the wake of a consent decree requiring increased reporting and over-
sight, and the UK police force has served as a testing bed for adjusting a commercial, US based 
Big Data analytics platform to policing which now bundles all its data and makes it accessible 
to every officer. Thus, the two police forces provide unique insight into the digital transfor-
mation of policing. 
The first case study is set in a large metropolitan police department in the United States with 
over 1200 police officers. In 2017, one year before the fieldwork, the city had one of the highest 
crime rates in the US. The department has undergone and is undergoing major cultural change 
having been placed under a consent decree with a federal monitor ensuring that policies and 
procedures are in place that bind the department to constitutional forms of policing. A lot of 
the technologies discussed here, such as body-worn cameras, electronic police reports, and 
 
15 This does not mean that the application of predictive policing is limited to the US and UK. Predictive policing 
can also be found, for example, in the Netherlands (Oosterloo and Schie, 2018; van Brakel, 2016), and Germany 
(Egbert, 2018; Gerstner, 2018). Even more so, while at times these are later adoptions inspired by UK and US 
approaches and translated to local contexts, some of these have been developed in parallel – at times even earlier 
– based on the new availability of digital crime data. Examples for this are KeyCrime deployed already in 2008 




field interview cards, were initially adopted to monitor compliance and had later found addi-
tional uses. This situation makes the department unique in having a well-developed corpus of 
policy documents regulating the use of technologies, and, at the same time, many officers that 
are learning to use new technologies who can tell of the changes they bring about. 
Access to the department was enabled by the head analyst serving as gatekeeper to the organi-
sation and making introductions to various units. I first met the head analyst at the IACP con-
ference in 2017, a professional conference and exhibition, where he had presented the depart-
ment’s compliance monitoring. I had visited the conference because of articles about predictive 
policing I had identified in the IACPs monthly magazine and had been able to organize several 
other interviews at the conference’s location which could not be included here for lack of space. 
In several Skype calls with the head analyst I (later together with thesis supervisors Prof Pete 
Fussey and Dr Daragh Murray) developed a research proposal that would allow us to study 
officers’ engagement with technologies and provide feedback to the department (see Appendix 
11.1). This was approved by the chief of police and the head analyst facilitated wide-ranging 
access to officers in different sections of the organisation and of varying ranks. I carried out 
ethnographic work over four weeks, of which the first week was conducted as mostly inter-
views and two ride-alongs together with the thesis supervisor. These first interviews were in-
strumental in securing further access for the following weeks. In total, the fieldwork comprises 
of interviews with 49 officers and at least 39 hours of observation in three districts and at 
headquarters. It includes five ride-alongs with platoon and task force officers, as well as time 
with district detectives. I also observed four CompStat meetings at district and headquarter 
levels. 
The context of the consent decree in which external and internal observers had scrutinized the 
compliance of officers with legal and policy standards, in addition to the aim of gaining a 
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picture of the whole organisation within a relatively short time frame presented a challenge of 
needing to continually negotiate access16. The way a sergeant introduced the department’s 
anonymous job satisfaction survey is an illustration of this apprehension towards information 
collection: “Now, this is about the federal monitor tryin’ to find out what we think about the 
department” – suggesting for officers not to take part. Despite this, I achieved good access to 
many parts of the organisation and officers were open to sharing their perspectives with me. I 
built on the preparatory conversations with the head analyst to get a sense of the department’s 
culture before arrival, identified key interlocutors in advance from organisational charts and 
sought to become conversant in acronyms and other elements of the department’s language to 
build rapport. Apart from introductions by the head analyst and approaches via email, officers 
regularly introduced me to further people to speak to, and, while ‘hanging around’ by the sta-
tion, officers I had met previously would offer me to accompany them. By the end of the month, 
officers were accustomed to me being around, as illustrated by this fragment from a conversa-
tion between multiple officers: 
“Does he have a body camera too? They need to get you a body camera, and 
a gun, [crosstalk]. Look, every time he comes, we're gonna give him some-
thing extra. Next time, he's gonna have a taser. Then a whole duty belt, then 
a uniform, then a badge, then he's just gonna be a police officer, and he's 
gonna be like, wait what's going on” (Task Force Officer 7, District B). 
The second case study is a mid-sized British police force with over 2500 officers. The force is 
a pilot force for the digitisation of policing and the use of individualised risk scores for priori-
tisations. In the context of this research, I had made a list of police forces in the UK which 
according to media reports were using predictive policing and I had contacted multiple of those 
 
16 Although not helped by the context, this is common for ethnographies of police (see e.g. Marks, 2004). 
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forces via email for interviews. Again, these interviews provided a wider context but could not 
be included in this thesis. At the end of these interviews I would ask whether the interviewee 
was aware of any other forces I should speak to and this police force was named multiple times 
as being ahead in its technological capabilities. Thus, this case could be an indication of the 
future direction of British policing. I contacted the force through an address for general enquir-
ies and was given the opportunity for a first interview with the Business Intelligence Manager 
responsible for the data visualisation platform. At the end of this interview, I asked if I could 
speak to some of the users of this software. After submitting a formal research proposal (see 
Appendix 11.3) and confirmation from the College of Policing that such research would be 
valuable, I was introduced to 10 ‘power users’ of the software via email. I was able to arrange 
interviews with 6 of them (with non-responses from the others). A seventh interviewee joined 
one of the interviews. While the interviewees covered a wide range of police functions, there 
are of course limitations in a) the low number of interviews, b) the lack of observations, and c) 
their characteristic as ‘power users’ (early-adopters who gave feedback to the developers or 
ranked high in the automatically recorded measures of engagement with the software). But they 
provide a rare glimpse into the effects a central data platform that allows officers to do their 
own analysis can have on policing in the future. 
While each case could stand on its own, various contrasts between the two allow deeper insight 
into the kinds of questions the use of digital tools in policing gives rise to. In this, this study 
follows what Ragin (1992) refers to as a ‘case-oriented’ approach to comparative research that 
sets boundaries around the places and times studied, as opposed to ‘variable-oriented’ compar-
ison examining cases in their variation along pre-defined variables. As Becker (2014) argues, 
comparative reasoning through cases allows social research to identify factors that explain the 
relationships obscured in conventional social research, to identify new variables, and ask new 
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questions. For instance, the relationship between officers and technology is often portrayed in 
a techno-deterministic way in which the technology dictates officer action, while this research 
demonstrates the messiness and entanglements of that relationship as well as pointing to the 
affordances that become particularly visible in the contrast between technologies employed in 
the two locations. The reasoning by analogy, central to Becker’s (2014) approach to developing 
more general ideas about how society works and common to science and technology studies, 
reveals for example the shortcomings of the concept of ‘centres of calculation/translation’ (and 
need for reformulation) where suddenly centre and periphery are not as clearly distinguishable 
anymore (see chapter 8). Such an approach is, as Becker (2014: 121) highlights a never-fin-
ished analytical process: the findings provide starting points for understanding what happens 
elsewhere but cannot explain it fully. As he writes, “close observation invariably shows that, 
even in the most ordinary situations, more than a few easily measured variables are at work 
and that everything in the situation has some effect on what happens next. If any one of those 
things isn’t there or, better put, is there in a different degree or in a different form, the result 
(the next events that happen) will differ” (Becker, 2014: 2). 
3.2. Dynamics of interviews and fieldwork 
Interviews were carried out as ethnographic interviews employing a conversational style and 
accompanying observations made in the field (Patton, 2015: 432). I used a list of questions to 
loosely guide the topics I would cover (see Appendix 11.2 and Appendix 11.3).  
In the UK, interviews lasted around an hour each and were audio-recorded. The officers seemed 
keen on explaining their work to me and interviews developed as conversations – usually in a 
pattern of initial questions according to my interview guide and questions for clarification, 
followed by a more open discussion for the last 20-30 minutes of the interview. The main 
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limitation of these interviews lies in officers’ hesitance of showing me what they would do in 
the software out of a concern for sensitive data. Consequently, in some interviews, I had to rely 
on my notes and memory of a ‘scrambled’ version of the software I had been shown in the first 
interview. Some of the officers also dealt with the problem by not opening any underlying case 
files but showing the top-level data visualisations. 
The ethnographic work in the US was of a different character. As Souhami (2020) notes, police 
ethnographies contain repeated tropes of (moral) challenges the researcher needs to overcome 
to gain the trust of her interlocutors and tales of physicality, risk, and endurance. While I could 
tell stories of risk from some of the participant observations in the US, these would not con-
tribute much to the aim of this thesis. After all, these moments of ‘action’ are part of police 
work, but they are typically not the moments of engagement with information technology and 
traffic stops are, although officers stressed the possible dangers, more routine interactions. Per-
haps the ethnography in the US department is less of a classical police ethnography and more 
of an ethnography of technology use. Apart from gaining access, the main practical challenge 
was gaining officers trust – however, given the relatively short duration of fieldwork and reli-
ance on interviews, not in the usual ways of ‘building rapport’ or partaking in morally ques-
tionable jokes and actions17. Some officers displayed initial scepticism towards me. For exam-
ple, one commander asked half-jokingly, “You are not from the KGB, are you?”, and another 
officer’s gaze seems to check for weapons. Especially given the context of the consent decree 
and to prevent being seen as a ’spy’ for senior officers (Souhami, 2020), I would assure officers 
that I would anonymize them, and I adjusted my note-taking behaviour according to how it 
seemed to be received (some seemed suspicious while others seemed to read it as me being 
 
17 Indeed, Souhami (2020) questions the necessity of this for short term engagements. 
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interested in what they had to say). I would also explain the purpose of the research and, to 
legitimise it, refer to the value for the department. In one instance it felt as if the officer was 
taking part solely because he was ordered by a senior officer (Ericson (1982) also describes 
this problem). In this case, I ended the interview early. As participation in interviews was often 
spontaneous, I would sometimes speak to officers of different ranks in which case sometimes 
hierarchical dynamics entered the conversation with officers deferring to their seniors. Gener-
ally, however, officers were very forthcoming and became more so over the course of the in-
terview. In one case the interviewee told me at the end of the interview, 
“Ok, I was very apprehensive about this meeting because, I mean, you’ve 
probably dealt with enough police officers to know that we’re distrustful of 
people who want to find out how we do things. But this was very pleasant” 
(Major Case Narcotics Detective). 
Police can be an intimidating environment (Marks, 2004: 873). While not the case in the UK 
department, there were two instances of being surrounded by trained task force officers in the 
US that felt intimidating for their stature alone. However, given my positionality as a white 
male researcher from the UK, this felt never problematic and I was not challenged even when 
I asked critical questions – as opposed to a black, female interviewee from a software company 
interviewed for this project who, in a different department, was aggressively asked whether she 
was ‘pro-police’. 
An issue that existed, for both the US and UK police departments, was the difficulty of follow-
ing the coded language officers use in referring to tools, crime types, radio codes, and organi-
sational structures in abbreviations and numbers. Over time I became more familiar with this 
vocabulary through a mixture of asking for clarifications with officers that seemed keen to 




In the evening or while ‘hanging around’, I completed the short notes I had jotted down during 
interviews and observations. Later I typed them out and collected them together with the tran-
scriptions of the audio recordings. I then exploratorily coded this data first in NVivo, adding 
categories for anything that seemed interesting (see Appendix 11.6 and 11.7 for the codes). I 
then printed these categorised quotes and arranged them spatially into clusters. Beyond atten-
tion to knowledge/power relations and the aim of taking technology seriously, these categories 
inductively produced the framework of analysis. The final thesis is the result of an iterative 
writing process in which sections were repeatedly rearranged to make sense of the data. 
3.4. Ethics 
The research underwent thorough ethical review and was granted approval through the univer-
sity’s ethics procedures. As the research in the United States was funded through and aligned 
with broader work in the ESRC funded Human Rights, Big Data and Technology project at the 
University of Essex, it additionally received a higher level of institutional approval required 
for research projects  in accordance with the ESRC’s framework for research ethics (Economic 
and Social Research Council, 2015). 
In the UK, I provided interviewees with a consent form and an information sheet (see Appendix 
11.4 and 11.5), explained the purpose of the research in general terms, asked for permission to 
record the interview, and stressed that they could choose to not answer questions or withdraw 
from the interview completely at any time. One interviewee was at first concerned that he could 
not speak for the force and I reassured him that I would report views as officers’ personal 
views, and that they and the force would be anonymised. Consequentially, he consented and 
all interviewees in the UK agreed to audio-recordings of the interviews. 
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While carrying consent forms was not practical in the US department, I clearly explained the 
purpose of the research, asked for oral consent, and pointed out that participation was volun-
tary.  
Audio-recordings were transcribed by me, and, in case of some of the US interviews, a vetted 
transcriber who signed a non-disclosure agreement. To protect participants and allow them to 
speak freely, all transcripts were anonymized, and no interviewees are named in this thesis. 
Personal information was stored in a locked container separate to the data.  
As mentioned above, dangerous situations were not central to the research and risk to the re-




Data Part 1. Practices of data policing in the US: From strategy and 
oversight to patrol and investigations. Preface to the US case study 
The following three chapters comprehensively interrogate the data and digital technology prac-
tices in a metropolitan US police department. It is organised into three chapters: the first chapter 
details the idiosyncratic ways in which crime and accountability numbers are created in the 
backrooms of the department and how they – and the social practice of CompStat meetings that 
they are embedded in – drive priorities. CompStat meetings are held weekly both at headquar-
ters where the districts have to report to the chief and at the district level where lieutenants and 
sergeants report to their respective commanders. Meetings largely consist of communication 
of updates, discussion of crime and clearance rates, and narratives of individual crimes. In 
addition to this core of the original CompStat meetings as for example described by Manning 
(2008), meetings also contain an element of compliance monitoring demonstrating the multi-
dimensional uses of police data. This chapter particularly pays attention to the ways in which 
the statistical knowledge of crime negotiated in these meetings has to be translated into strate-
gic instructions for and by officers – often through its contextualisation in officers’ tacit 
knowledge of crime in their districts. Here, data open spaces of subjectivity and instrumentality 
in its interpretations and in its translation into practice. The analysis also reveals an underlying 
tendency for crime trends to support territorial responses to crime rather than the targeted po-
licing of serial perpetrators favoured by many in the department. For both compliance and 
crime data it further problematises how the categorization inherent to counting equates differ-
ence and invisibles connections across categories.  
The second chapter investigates the affordances of technologies used by officers on patrol or 
responding to calls-for-service. These include radio dispatch, databases, and electronic forms. 
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Looking at frequent breakdowns and the various workarounds officers find to them, the analy-
sis here demonstrates the highly fragmented nature of technological practice in policing where 
fractures in the technological infrastructures are complemented by the unevenness of adoption 
and enthusiasm among officers - an overarching theme of this and the third chapter. The main 
contribution of this chapter lies in unpicking the role of databases in structuring interaction and 
suspicion formation during stops, adding a crucial non-human element to this area of research. 
A central element of this is a rising tension between officers’ empathy and leniency towards 
the stopped individuals, and the recordings of previous stops pushing towards enforcement and 
an amplification of deviancy. 
In addition to the fragmented nature of technological practice, the third chapter pays special 
attention to the spatio-temporal affordances of technologies in investigations and proactive po-
lice work. These render the past available for investigations in unprecedented detail but are 
often bound to the specific spatiality of the infrastructure of police practices. Another aspect 
are the ways the use of these technologies structures the temporality of investigators work 
where the continual overwriting of recordings requires instant action or where data overload 
consumes many hours of work. The technologies and types of data discussed here are police 
databases, social network charts, body worn cameras, video surveillance, license plate readers, 
social media, and phone data. Lastly, this chapter also engages with some of the legal and 
ethical concerns around these technologies. Concerns include the easy accessibility of infor-
mation on social media and the use of fake profiles for this purpose, as well as the curation of 
evidence and the question of how much evidence is enough. 
The separation of these three chapters is a heuristic device to communicate the analysis. How-
ever, the practices described regularly engage with each other. As an illustration: numbers in 
the backroom inform strategic instructions, these are interpreted and implemented by officers 
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on the streets, they produce reports which are used in turn to produce numbers; the reports, 
however, also form the starting point for detectives to investigate. The same tools are used by 
different parts of the organisation for different purposes and what is fed into the systems at one 
end is used by someone else at another. The following quote form the Chief of Police illustrates 
this, 
“[They] are the eyes and ears of the department. So, when they go out there 
[…] and they stop a car and they go three people in it that’s probably insig-
nificant to that police officer. But it’s really important for them to be able to 
accurately capture that information and sometimes they don’t do a good job 
of doing that. And, if they mess up, they put the wrong colour car, or they 
make that mistake, you know, it’s not a onetime mistake; I mean we pay for 
that later. But that information is really critical. It really is. […]. […] we do 
need to constantly remind our officers how important it is that those stops 
get [recorded]. Because it really can make or break a case, six months, a year 
later” (Chief). 
The fragmentation of technological practice is partially related to the organisational split into 
districts with a high degree of autonomy. Officers at different levels have access to different 
systems and are embedded in different contexts of their use. Particularly for detectives, rela-
tionships with neighbouring departments, as well as state and federal agencies, allow some to 
have unique access to databases and tools the department itself does not own.  
Given this fragmentation and the various interrelations, there is not one order that could de-
scribe and explain the actions of everyone and everything in the department. There is not one 
centre of calculation/translation that controls the whole organisation. Rather the findings reso-
nate with John Law’s (1994) theorization in Organizing Modernity based on an ethnography 
of Daresbury Laboratory: He argues that in contrast to the modern impulse of seeking total 
order, the social world is complex and messy. Order would only ever be aimed at in constant, 
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never-ending processes of ordering and organisations would be shaped by a multiplicity of 
contradictory, interacting, incomplete, and materially heterogeneous orderings based on differ-
ent ways in which the organisation is imagined. Thus, what would be obvious ‘centres of cal-
culation and translation’ (Law, 2003) in chapter 4 – the CompStat meetings, the analysts, or 
the compliance monitoring team – are not quite successful in monopolising the aggregation of 
information and directing action. Looking more towards the periphery in chapter 5, the analysis 
demonstrates that both, the translation of central instructions from the emergency call centre 
has points of friction (despite forming one of the core ordering principles of police work) and 
the reporting of information into the central database or to a senior officer comes with its own 
challenges. More importantly, the discussion of officer discretion highlights the part the (cen-
tral) database plays in discretion without determining it. The influence exerted here looks a lot 
more like the flexible strings connecting puppeteer and puppet than a direct translation of com-
mands (Latour, 2005: 214ff). More successful in ordering action are the ‘obligatory passage 
points’ (Callon, 1999) created by the various technologies posing as central to solving cases 
and thereby structuring the spatio-temporality of detectives’ work as analysed in chapter 6. 
What follows is a short description of the different functions present in the police department 
to facilitate the analysis in the following chapters: The police department is separated into mul-
tiple districts that are controlled by commanders who can set strategic priorities for their areas. 
Every district has three shifts of platoon officers, each led by a sergeant. Their main task is to 
answer calls-for-service. In the districts observed for this study the number of officers per shift 
was around twelve. In addition to platoon officers, each district would have a handful of task 
force officers working in two shifts, each led by a sergeant. Task force officers perform pro-
active policing in the form of patrols and surveillance mostly targeted at drug crimes. They set 
their own shifts and do not need to respond to calls-for-service. Finally, districts have ‘District 
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Investigatory Units’ (DIUs) composed of detectives investigating property and persons crimes 
within the districts. Not all capabilities are available in the districts. Another division exists 
between the districts and the headquarters. At the headquarters, “central” detectives are tasked 
with investigating major crimes such as murder, bigger narcotics cases, child sexual abuse, or 
domestic violence. Another central function is a task force put together to address the city-wide 
problem of armed robberies. The headquarters would also host a group of analysts creating 
crime statistics, writing reports, and maintaining data systems. The administration, from com-
pliance department to the chiefs of police overseeing all the districts and detectives, are located 
at headquarters. 
Lastly, the technological practice interrogated in the following chapters is also conditioned on 
levels of adoption. Formally, one would expect uniform access to and use of databases and 
technologies by officers in the same position and with the same security clearance level. To 
some extent this exists with detectives having, for example, access to systems for background 
checks that ordinary officers could not use. However, access and adoption of different tools 
varies considerably between different sections of the organisation and individuals in the organ-
isation. Partly this is due to several factors including training that is in progress and has only 
happened for parts of the organisation, individual preferences, or outright resistance. Whether 
the variation is systematic is outside of the scope of this research. Some officers suggest that 
older officers would be less likely to engage with new technologies compared to younger of-
ficers. Especially, senior officers of the armed robbery task force credit their younger officers 
with innovating by using social media for investigations. Others argue that differences would 
rather be down to individual preference. Despite regularly differentiating between the “old 
way” and the “new way”, officers stress that they would make use of every technology 
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available to them18. Both younger officers that rather stick to pen and paper, and older officers 
that are perplexed at the technological illiteracy of some of their colleagues have been part of 
this research.  
4. Numbers that count – strategy and accountability through numbers 
This first chapter consists of four main sections that interrogate the role of data in strategic 
decision-making and accountability. The first section details the efforts of crime analysts to 
unify and streamline databases, data processing, and dissemination of results – in other words, 
to improve the production of representations and the translation of effects on the periphery 
(Law, 2003). These require political engagements with those that control data in- and outside 
of the department, as well as those that use the data outputs. Efforts to streamline contrast with 
various idiosyncrasies in counting found in the districts. Here, parallel counting systems of 
various sophistication exist as the centrally provided data is no deemed fit for the plethora of 
ways in which commanders base their decision-making on them. As much as there is not one 
‘objective’ way of counting crimes, there is not one ‘objective’ way to derive priorities and 
strategies from crime numbers. The status of different representations produced in ‘centres of 
calculation’ (Latour, 1987) and how to transform them into actions is messy.  This is the focus 
of the second section. In the context of CompStat meetings, crime data open spaces for subjec-
tivity and instrumentality. Data is used to motivate competition for lowering crime counts and 
it is selectively interpreted to ascribe crime reductions to police actions. In setting priorities 
and instructing supervising officers, commanders navigate between an aggregated knowledge 
of crime and the details of individual crimes communicated through the hierarchy. Where 
 
18 This suggests a possible disconnect between the narratives of age related differences in technology use described 
also by Côté-Boucher (2018) and the actual practice. 
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commanders base instructions mainly on crime patterns without tying them back to the under-
lying crimes, they risk promoting untargeted strategies like stop and search – strategies that, as 
this section outlines, officers criticise for being ineffective and causing tensions with the com-
munity. The third section analyses how priorities are translated into action by frontline officers. 
It describes the limited success of top-down communication of areas for patrol which often fail 
to connect with commonly maintained tacit knowledge, the horizontal communications that 
enable more long-term case building strategies based on surveillance, the information overload 
caused by a system supposed to streamline information sharing on things to look out for from 
detectives to patrol officers, and finally how assigning detectives to specific types of cases 
renders connections between those cases opaque. The final section on supervision through data 
mirrors many of the issues developed in the previous sections. Where counts have a close re-
lation to the underlying infractions, they trigger clear reactions and succeed in centralising 
compliance management. But where they are based on the false equation of officers into cate-
gories supposed to enable comparison, the data becomes useless and supervisors stress the need 
for supervision in direct contact. 
4.1. Data work – from crimes to crime 
A lot of work is necessary to turn the steady inflow of police reports and other files into com-
putable data and thereby allowing for the manipulation of scale that comes with the statistical 
accounts fundamental to the knowledge at a distance in centres of calculation (Law and Heth-
erington, 2000). This section first addresses the data politics that are associated with the analyst 
role. Analysts must solve political issues of negotiating access to data sources and integrating 
data systems, ensuring the quality of data input, managing expectations, and pushing for adop-
tion of the tools they develop through training. Despite all these efforts, districts are still main-
taining their own idiosyncratic ways of counting crimes resulting in competing orderings (Law, 
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1994). This is addressed in the second section that outlines how different understandings of the 
centrally provided data and the data’s collision with operational purposes lead to a plurality of 
approaches. 
4.1.1. Data politics - gathering and disseminating data 
The central data visualization platform is a testament to the success of the analyst section in 
bundling previously disparate data and making it accessible across the department. Multiple 
officers mention how now they have insights into what happens in other districts that previ-
ously were unavailable to them. Even more so, a whole infrastructure for tracking compliance 
data had been created only in the context of the recent consent decree. As analysts are trying 
to maintain and expand the current capabilities they have to negotiate with others in- and out-
side of the department for access, and to ensure adoption by the officers that ultimately are 
feeding new data into the system. That is, the analysts are busy in maintaining and extending 
the ties that form their ‘centre of calculation/translation’ (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987; Law, 
2003). This section outlines the struggle they face in integrating disparate systems from data-
bases and software that impart resistance to integration, to organisational units within the de-
partment and agencies outside having little interest in providing data, to the data itself being 
messy. The strategies they employ to counter these resistances range from scripts that copy 
data into their own systems and clean the data, to negotiation, to a combination of training and 
control. Some of the limits of their success manifests itself in the idiosyncratic ways crime 
statistics are used and maintained in different districts described in the next section. It also 
constitutes a running theme throughout this chapter with officers often finding their very own 
ways of using (or not using) the systems they are equipped with. 
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The department’s own data is held in multiple, separate systems which partially overlap and 
all require separate logins from officers. To change this, analysts had to negotiate access to 
these databases – access they would often only get through workarounds: 
“[…] people don’t want to give you direct access to their database but you 
can go on and download Excel spreadsheets, so then I have to make scripts 
that have this really weird work around to automatically download these 
spreadsheets and go put them in our SQL database. So, I feel like a lot of 
what I do is coding […] to try to get things to work together and line up” 
(Analyst 1). 
In other cases, they would be unsuccessful as they would not have the clearance necessary to 
see data accessible to detectives, such as residence and financial histories. 
Given these issues with internal data it is unsurprising that analysts, and the chief of police for 
that matter, struggle using data from other agencies within the criminal justice system, such as 
the jail, the courts, or the district attorney. What a district commander attributes to “piss games” 
between mayor, district attorney, sheriff, and police, is seen by the chief in terms of a lack of 
incentive to spend money to change existing systems so they could interoperate.  
“I’m not aware of any legislation that we have that prevents us from sharing 
data. It’s just that we create these little fiefdoms […]. […] to be able to share 
that data they do have to spend some money. So, why would they spend 
money for something that doesn’t really benefit them? And [data sharing 
would benefit] the public as a whole, but the way we’ve sub-divided every-
thing, that’s when it starts getting complicated” (Chief).  
Sometimes the data required for the analysis requested by others in the department would just 
not be available. Officers of the armed robbery task force had asked for a way to automatically 
identify possible robbery series. However, without any labelled data as to which crimes were 
probably committed by the same perpetrator, the analysts are unable to carry out any machine 
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learning. Yet, the officers also did not want to manually label the data. Consequentially, ana-
lysts have to manage expectations of what is possible and with what effort. This example also 
highlights the human work that is behind all data, whether that is labelling data, as in this case, 
or just the daily recording of information in various forms (see section 5.3). 
Having successfully acquired data and made it available in tools for officers, analysts are con-
fronted with maintaining the system and driving adoption of its use. These tasks are interrelated 
as the training of officers would inform the quality of data input into the system. Analysts 
would have to clean the data as in the case of misspelled names: 
“[…] I spend a lot of time […] name cleaning, because […] they have a lot 
of open text fields[.] I have a Python script that goes through all the names 
in our database and basically figures out if there’s duplicates and puts them 
into one. Marks them as this is actually one person” (Analyst 2).  
Generally, electronic forms, although in principle being able to request very specific data from 
their users, cause trouble where they are not used as intended by their authors (the trouble goes 
both ways as officers’ problems with the forms show; see section 5.3). As the analysts com-
plain, 
“It’s mostly that people get to type in whatever they want” (Analyst 3).  
“Or the fields do exist, they’re just not used properly. […] They’ll put it in 
the freeform narrative section when it should be fielded in the weapons or 
the vehicles section” (Analyst 1). 
For this reason, and to drive adoption of their tools, analysts are engaged in training officers. 
The training works by recording the use of all digital tools and frequent checks. Here, two 
analysts discuss a training approach heavily reliant on monitoring the use of digital tools 
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implying a power relationship between analysts and officers in which analysts push officers to 
adopt tools who are perceived to resist change:  
Analyst 1: “Tracking every use. Every time they click on it, we know”. [Laughing] 
Analyst 2: “We're giving them a quiz next month too”. 
Analyst 1: “I don't mean to be all big brother about it. We're not telling them before-
hand”. 
Analyst 2: “We're just showing up”. 
[…] 
Analyst 1: “Then they'll be motivated to do it for the next time, because we're going to 
go back a few times and do a few follow-up”. 
[…] 
Analyst 2: “We were super nice the first time. This time we're going to be a little—“ 
Analyst 1: “Still nice”. 
Analyst 2: “We'll be nice, but we're... [Laughing]...showing them we mean business”. 
Apart from this combination of training and control, analysts use design to motivate adoption. 
For example, they would strategically employ visualization to increase uptake. In the case of 
social network analysis reports disseminated to detectives for violent crime investigations, the 
graphs are designed to be interactive and visually compelling (even though this does not con-
vince all detectives as discussed in section 6.2):  
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“[…] I think when you’re trying to sell it to a detective; they don’t want to 
see something that’s just static and not very compelling. We were doing the 
diagrams in Analyst’s Notebook19 as a stopgap solution for a while and cut-
ting and pasting it into the body of the email, doesn’t really enhance the in-
vestigation and people weren’t really using it so we had to come up with 
something different” (Analyst 1). 
4.1.2. Idiosyncrasies in counting 
Crime counts are crime counts – or are they? With a central data platform in place, it is sur-
prising to see that not all district commanders rely on it in the same way. While the chief of the 
operational policing section has direct access to the analysts at headquarters, different districts 
have developed and maintained their own ways of accumulating, aggregating and interpreting 
crime statistics – their own little ‘centres of calculation/translation’ providing alternative or-
derings (Latour, 1987; Law, 1994, 2003). This contrasts with the analysts’ struggle above to 
unify approaches to crime numbers and highlights the existing resistance to this. The head of 
crime analysts suggests that this is due to past errors in the data that had eroded trust. But 
beyond this, the examples below show that the changes in counting systems are reflecting the 
different purposes the numbers are put to, legacy processes that are protected, and varying 
awareness of issues with the central system. This section unfolds the idiosyncrasies in dealing 
with crime numbers that exist in different districts. While all of them attach a lot of importance 
to the numbers, approaches vary from ignoring glitches in the central data system, to keeping 
one category of arrests separate, to a complete parallel system of counting crimes. 
In District C, the deviance from the central system is minor but reflects that changes are made 
where it does not resonate with local purposes. Here, the lieutenant creates his own sheets with 
 
19 IBM i2 Analyst’s Notebook is software standard in policing investigations. It is used to render networks and 
map evidence temporally and geospatially. Examples are mapping phone calls or financial transactions. 
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crime counts and percentage changes for the district. On one of the printed sheets, he notes that 
he would be using dispatch codes for his crime classifications rather than the categories used 
in the central system as these are operationally more important. For example, in the central 
system misdemeanour arrests included ‘catch and release’ arrests for violations like running a 
red light. These would be irrelevant for strategic decisions. The two types of arrests would be 
separate in the dispatch codes that he uses. 
A bigger deviation is visible in district B where a whole parallel counting system is maintained. 
Every Sunday, a detective in district B creates a report on the recent crime statistics for the 
district commander. Some of the columns in the report are titled “CompStat”, indicating it had 
been used already before the new data platform had been launched that renamed the CompStat 
meetings. The detective explains that the crime counts in the case management system would 
be way off what he would calculate. For instance, he has 30 incidents in his weekly count while 
the software shows only 6. Over a year the software would miss around 200 crimes. The central 
data visualisation solution, separate from the case management software, would also be of little 
use as it would regularly go offline on Sundays for updates – exactly when he would need it. 
Furthermore, the district’s detective lieutenant points out that while the central system’s inac-
curacies would be mainly due to it updating too slowly for their purposes. It would also occa-
sionally count events twice. Hence, the detective would create the statistics manually. He 
would start with the department’s report log which was “like gospel” (Detective 1, District B) 
and includes all reports written in a day. He would then compare this list with electronic police 
reports held in a separate system. These would not be accurate for statistical keeping as the 
recorded date was the date of the report rather than the date of occurrence which would have 
to be extracted from the report itself. Then he would check the record from the computer aided 
dispatch and look for signal changes where a call had been attended but it had been unfounded. 
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Altogether, he would filter crimes that had occurred further in the past, unfounded calls, and 
include crimes for which the report had not been submitted yet. Finally, he would compare 
these numbers against a spreadsheet filled by sergeants. Just as the analysts above he would 
have to deal with errors in the data. Even after multiple conversations about it, some sergeants 
would still change cells and he would have to correct it. “Everybody reads it different; every-
body reports different” (Detective 1, District B). There would always be human error, irrespec-
tive of the amount of training. Lastly, some error in the data could not even be avoided by this 
meticulous cross checking of different reporting systems: Not all crimes in the district would 
be recorded by the district’s officers. Crimes reported online would be recorded by a central 
unit and the university in the district had its own police force. Both would enter the systems 
with significant delay making it impossible to include them in weekly crime statistics. 
All the complications that this detective encounters in producing the weekly crime count 
demonstrate the amount of decisions that had been taken, implicitly or explicitly, in creating 
the official crime counts for the central data visualisation system. While in the long run, these 
numbers are likely to converge, the time frames from responding to a call to records on the 
various systems seem to introduce sufficient variance and delay in the weekly crime numbers 
for the district to create its own. Apart from fuelling divergent accounting practices, this high-
lights an important time dimension to data: in its Latin origin data are givens. The detective’s 
experience, however, demonstrates that to arrive at a state of ‘givens’, there needs to be a pro-
cess of giving – the recording and transmission of information by a variety of actors. With 
cases being discovered until long after they occur, this production process approaches its end 
only asymptotically. Consequentially, decision-making is always based on more or less incom-
plete data.  
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In contrast to District B, officers in district A use the statistics provided through the central 
data dashboard and the case management system. They seem unaware of the reasons for why 
sometimes the statistics shown in these programs would not match with the cases they remem-
ber. During one CompStat session, the detective sergeant for property crimes notices missing 
data in two categories: “For some odd reason it’s not showing the business burglary we had 
last week”, and then a little later “I don’t understand why property snatching is empty” (Detec-
tive Sergeant, District A). Yet, the rank is held accountable to these numbers by their com-
mander and the lack in knowledge on how the data are compiled potentially leads to prioritisa-
tions that are not warranted by the data. This case suggests a need to explain the limitations of 
data visualisations to those who use them for decision making as discussed in the next section. 
4.2. Making strategy – between crime counts and crime accounts 
This section addresses the ways in which crime data informs policing strategy highlighting the 
variability of knowledge types that complicate the functioning of ‘centres of calculation’ as 
‘centres of translation’ (see the ways of knowing differentiated in section 2.2). It starts out with 
an account of specialised analysis performed by analysts that successfully informs policy 
change. The two following sections interrogate the consequences that routine data analysis in 
the form of crime statistics has for setting priorities and instigating competition. From the al-
location of patrol to the prioritisation of certain investigations, commanders often base their 
strategic decision making on the crime statistics available to them either through the depart-
ment’s data dashboard or their own record keeping as described in the previous section. The 
interpretation of this data opens spaces of subjectivity and instrumentality. Commanders bal-
ance and translate between the technically mediated knowledge from crime statistics and the 
knowledge of individual incidents communicated through the hierarchy. As a result, practices 
vary between districts. 
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4.2.1. Specialised analysis 
Before discussing the main avenue for numbers to inform day-to-day strategy, this section 
looks at the specialised analysis prepared by analysts to inform strategic decisions. These re-
ports provided to commanding officers are targeted at instigating change. They mobilise the 
‘objectivity’ of data analysis to change systems. Despite this fundamental influence and their 
successes, analysts are frustrated by cases where the currency of ‘objectivity’ does not gain 
traction highlighting the multitude of other logics that may conflict with their analysis. 
One example of successfully implemented policy change based on data analysis is a new fine 
system for false alarms. As an analyst describes, 
“[…] so they actually created a fine system where I think it’s either two 
strikes or three strikes you’re out and then you get hit with a fine. Since that 
was instituted, the incidence of false alarm calls just dropped off 50% in the 
12-month period that was implemented” (Analyst 1). 
Other analysis pushes for a more proactive approach to repeat domestic violence “[…] because 
the pattern is that domestic violence will progressively get worse over time. We’ll typically see 
ten [verbal altercations] and then a[n assault]” (Analyst 1). The aim is to send social workers 
before a case would escalate and thereby also reduce the number of hours officers would spend 
on domestic violence related calls.  
Paradoxically, while these examples and the data dashboard informing strategy decisions as 
interrogated in the following sections demonstrates analysts’ success in influencing decision 
making, analysts feel that they have little influence in shaping policy:  
“I wouldn’t say to date that we’ve played a huge role in shaping policy in 
any really meaningful way. Largely because I think the data doesn’t always 
line up with what people want to see” (Analyst 1).  
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This juxtaposition of ‘data as it is’ and ‘what people want to see’ presumes a primacy of ‘ob-
jective truth’ versus subjective political priorities or knowledges. However, as the following 
sections demonstrate, the translation of crime statistics into actions is often less straightforward 
than analysts expect. 
4.2.2. Instigating competition 
CompStat meetings are an organisational management tool through which officers are held 
accountable to the crime statistics within their areas of responsibility. These meetings can in-
stigate competition between different organisational units for example on who has the lowest 
crime rate – a form of ranked judgement central to the managerialism Feeley and Simon (1994) 
associate with ‘actuarial justice’. This competition may be wanted for figures concerning ac-
countability but can be detrimental to strategic decision-making when commanders increase 
problematic strategies like stop and search to influence a number that may depend on factors 
outside of their control. The process is technologically supported by the department’s data vis-
ualization platform which displays rates and trends compared against the previous year and 
against the whole department (see Figure 1). This section reveals how numbers open spaces 
for interpretation and valuation that can drive competition between districts and priorities 
within districts. Some commanders mostly ignore the data dashboard, others let it inform pri-




Figure 1. Crime trends as displayed in the department's data visualisation platform. 
In the past, as a detective in district B describes, CompStat meetings based solely on crime 
numbers had been “bastardized” when they had been turned into “a numbers game between the 
leaders”. With the inclusion of compliance monitoring (see section 4.4) and change in manage-
ment style this had become less of a problem. Accordingly, the chief stresses cooperation be-
tween the districts: 
“[…] we’ve gone back and forth. Like, we used to have a lot of tension and 
now everybody really gets along. There’s a really good, big spirit of cooper-
ation […]. Every once in a while, we get in a fight and I kind of have to 
remind everybody like, ‘There’s way more bad guys to go around’. […] we 
don’t need to be fighting about who’s arrested and who’s working which case 
[…]” (Chief).  
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Yet, the way officers speak about crime numbers reveals how closely their perception of suc-
cess and failure is linked to them. They frequently say things like, “we’re looking good, we’re 
down”. Note that it is not the crime numbers being “down” but “we”. Complementarily, offic-
ers from a district reporting a crime increase during the CompStat meeting at headquarters 
attribute it to bad luck (“once we get lucky that’s going to get better”) and try to move through 
their presentation quickly to avoid scrutiny. The data opens space for interpretation, and this is 
instrumentalised by officers when they associate crime reductions to police action.  
However, the chief does not reinforce this focus on numbers as performance indicators and 
rather asks for details on the crimes and possible ways additional resources could help in ad-
dressing the problem – at headquarters’ CompStat meeting, the crime numbers set priorities 
but do not indicate performance. This is quite different in district A’s meeting where the detec-
tives’ clearance rates, and the platoon and task force officers’ numbers of arrests, written re-
ports, issued citations, vehicle and pedestrian stops and FICs are reported as performance 
measures – measures that senior officers are held accountable to by their commander against 
the context of the whole department’s figures: 
“This is what is holding up our clearance rates. […]. Let me show you, we’re 
pretty much ahead in every other category except that. […]. Our overall 
clearance is 4% over anyone else but this one is killing us. […]. This has 
been continually holding us down for the entire year. […] That’s not accepta-
ble. Is our crime so different than the others? What’s going on?” (Com-
mander, District A). 
Given this focus, it is unsurprising that the CompStat meetings in District A make ample use 
of the department’s data visualizations. As indicators of performance, the crime statistics also 
drive priorities. Based on the statistics of the last four weeks the commander decides, “[…] 
armed robbery is our problem right now” (Commander, District A), and asks the sergeant to 
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focus efforts on a suspect for a series of cases. Similarly, the property crimes sergeant is asked 
to focus on an uptick in residential burglaries. 
However, the presence of a data visualization tool does not determine a competitive environ-
ment like the one in District A. While the violent crimes sergeant in district B mentions an 
increase in crimes compared to the previous year, the commander is more interested in the 
detailed account of what was known about the recent crimes. The priorities seem to be set by 
whatever crimes are currently occurring. Only at the end of the meeting, as kind of a routine 
check, a spreadsheet titled “CompStat” is opened (paradoxically, this spreadsheet is created 
because of a lack of trust in the numbers provided centrally; see section 4.1.2). This spreadsheet 
includes the crime counts for the past week and numbers of arrests. The commander asks for 
more ‘good’ arrests instead of ‘catch-and-release’ arrests that are handed out for violations 
such as running a red light. At least in this meeting, this is the only way that officers are held 
accountable to crime numbers. 
4.2.3. Balancing information and strategies 
This section sets out a heuristic distinction between two epistemologies at play in commanders’ 
strategic decision making: an epistemology of crime that deals with changes in crime statistics, 
and an epistemology of crimes that deals with the characteristics of individual incidents. The 
quantification of crimes into crime is argued to render links between cases invisible and pull 
attention towards patterns within crime categories. The section discusses maps as a translation 
device between the two epistemologies with a tendency to elicit territorial responses. It finally 
highlights officers’ criticism towards untargeted patrol strategies that are often a consequence 
of strategies based on an epistemology of crime. 
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While the department’s data dashboard is intended to make issues visible and manageable, it 
creates a new problem in that the data must be interpreted. As the chief describes, 
“The tough part is that we […] started to collect all of this data on all of these 
different management issues. And then how do I analyse that? All the data is 
given to me, I’m not a data person and I got a million thing[s to do]. […] all 
this raw data is just flying by you left and right. I try to look at some of it 
when I can, but it needs to really be condensed into something that I could 
do. Some type of way when a data is boiled down to: this is the problem, and 
this is what we’re seeing, and these are maybe some things we can do to fix 
it” (Chief).  
Just as crime statistics inform prioritisation to differing degrees, as described in the previous 
section, the ways commanders decide which actions are to be taken are based on crime statistics 
in different ways and to varying extents. For instance, some commanders fixate their priorities 
on different numbers than others: The commander in district A describes using four- and eight-
week comparisons instead of the standard 365-day comparisons to identify strategic priorities 
in the following way: “It’s not an exact science, it’s an art form” (Commander, District A).  
There are two ways in which crime statistics can motivate action: a) an increase is important 
because more crime is the opposite of the police’s goal, and b) an increase may point to a series 
of crimes perpetrated by the same person or a similar underlying reason. In the first option, the 
knowledge of crime in general is the direct cause for action. Such an epistemology of crime 
can only entail untargeted action such as patrolling areas more intensively. Statistical ‘reasons’, 
that is reasons operating at the same level as crime rates, such as changing socio-economic 
conditions or ‘non-reasons’, such as random variation, are not considered. The second option, 
on the other hand, means searching for what causes a change in the crime rate. While a decrease 
is strategically attributed to past police action, a crime increase has to be explained. Reasons 
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are sought in the stories that officers report on the crimes. Can they be connected into a series? 
Or, are there crimes that given the available evidence are likely to be solved and are therefore 
of less concern? This epistemology of crimes brings the crime statistics back into a frame of 
reasoning familiar to officers working on these cases. Contrary to the first approach this entails 
targeted action such as investigations or surveillance.  
Quantifying crimes as crime can both add and subtract information. It adds information when 
the numerical pattern allows for making connections between cases. This is the case when an 
increase in crime prompts the search for underlying reasons such as a serial offender. However, 
it can also subtract information when the numerical aggregate is not linked back to the individ-
ual cases. This happens when crime counts drive untargeted action without consideration for 
the underlying crimes. Even more fundamentally, crimes need to be categorized to become 
countable. This means compartmentalising them and obfuscating the links that may exist be-
tween different ‘types’ of crime. A detective in District B describes how commanders would 
be “losing a lot of valuable data” by discussing only violent crimes in their weekly meeting 
and ignoring the connections with other crimes. The type of case is leading the decision-making 
rather than the criminals linking those cases. Similarly, the way cases are presented at 
CompStat meetings, crime counts suggest focussing on changes within crime categories: in the 
context of a recent increase, the commander in District A asks if there was a serial perpetrator 
within armed robberies. Patterns that cross these categories are easily missed. Last but not least, 
there can be errors in classification interfering with this prioritisation by crime type:  
“[…] a few weeks ago, there was a situation where there was a robbery that 
didn’t get included in the list of robberies that needed to be talked about be-
cause the perpetrator implied that he had a weapon – as opposed to actually 
showing the weapon. […] I don’t fault [the analyst] for not knowing but an 
implied weapon in a robbery is exactly the same as actually showing 
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somebody the weapon. But she didn’t know that so it wasn’t included” (Ma-
jor Case Narcotics Detective). 
Apart from stories, maps are another device that allows to connect both epistemologies. Maps 
help identify areas of crime for patrol and connect isolated crimes into series of incidents con-
nected by their spatiality. In district B, officers deliberate where and when to deploy patrols 
based on an interactive crime map20 that is part of the department’s data visualization dash-
board. The property crimes detective sergeant in district A brings a physical map marking zones 
that he would like to see patrolled because of recent concentrations of auto burglaries. He iden-
tifies the crimes of opportunity mentioned above as those crimes that are not co-located with 
others. 
Maps render spatial patterns visible (the commander in district A praises the newly introduced 
maps for making before unnoticed problems traversing district borders visible), but they can 
also distract from a view in which criminals are the focus and instead focus attention on ‘crim-
inal’ areas. This falls directly in line with November et al.’s (2010) distinction of interpretations 
of maps as mimetic or navigational devices. Using maps for navigation means continuously 
relating between features on the map and direct observations. In the context of crime maps this 
means that the map guides through the crime data giving importance to some clues over others. 
But above all, a navigational use requires the establishment of a relation with officers’ 
knowledge of the underlying crimes, possibly supported by an awareness of how the maps are 
constructed. Consequentially, the maps can be used in different ways, different officers will 
identify areas of risk differently. Contrastingly, in the, as the authors argue mistaken, mimetic 
 
20 Just as with many of the other technologies introduced further below, uptake of the crime maps varies from 
commander to commander. In district A, the only crime map is a physical board presented by one of the detective 
sergeants. The commander in district B makes use of the interactive map circling those areas officers should be 
focussing on, as does one of the commanders presenting at headquarters. Yet another commander finds the maps 
of little use as the colour scheme (“It’s all gray and brown”) would make them difficult to navigate. 
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interpretation of maps, maps have a direct resemblance with the territory they depict. As such 
a crime map depicts ‘criminal areas’ that the commander instructs their officers to target. In 
this vein, District A’s commander speaks of ‘taking back’ an area and maintaining authority in 
an area. Similarly, District B’s commander uses a map of patrol locations over the past two 
weeks to identify if patrols had shifted crime away from targeted areas. When commanders do 
not seek to translate the clusters of crime into reasons within an epistemology of crime (i.e. 
interpret maps navigationally), then the spatial rendering of crimes invites a spatial response 
in the form of untargeted police patrol. Fighting crime is territorial. However, in a second step 
officers regularly translate these territorial instructions into more targeted approaches based on 
their tacit knowledge (see section 4.3). 
In practice, both epistemologies coexist. The allocation of police patrols according to where 
crimes are clustered is as common as prioritising investigations based on accounts of individual 
crimes or commonalities between them.  The reasoning can also mix when only those crimes 
that can be linked through a suspected reason are targeted with unspecific patrol. The property 
crimes detective sergeant in district A, for instance, distinguishes auto-burglaries that could be 
part of a series from those that he suspects to be crimes of opportunity. The latter do not receive 
any further attention. Similarly, crime can receive both targeted and untargeted actions. The 
commander in district A asks the detective sergeant for violent crimes to have his detectives 
retrieve video evidence as quickly as possible on selected cases, as well as ordering some of 
the locations of recent crimes to be patrolled. Some of the mixing of approaches is due to the 
ambivalence of the patrol function between unspecific deterrence and territorial control on the 
one hand and intelligence gathering related to specific crimes on the other. 
The quantification of crime renders connections between crimes invisible, drives prioritisation 
of police work by crime types, and, when not translated back into an epistemology of crimes, 
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produces untargeted patrol strategies. In this way the constant availability and easy accessibil-
ity of crime statistics, as well as their embeddedness in the organisational procedure of 
CompStat meetings, stabilises a type of policing that many interviewees condemn. Patrol can 
entail rather unspecific stopping of persons and vehicles that seem suspicious in order to even-
tually come across someone responsible for crime in an area. By contrast, targeted operations 
aim at observing suspicious persons until enough evidence is collected to be sure that they are 
involved in crimes. From the chief to officers of the armed robbery task force to district task 
force officers, interviewees criticise the ineffectiveness and negative consequences of untar-
geted operations and contrast them with approaches that target specific offenders. Lieutenant 
and sergeant of the armed robbery task force distance themselves from an untargeted ‘flooding 
the streets’ strategy employed since the 70s that was inspired by New York Police’s broken 
windows policing:  
“[…] are you familiar with the term jump out work? So, in other words, up 
till recently, in the last five years here, jump out work is: you get a unit, you 
get in an aggressive street, you get a sergeant and ten guys, they go out every 
night and they look for criminals, they look for guys standing on the street 
corner dealing dope, holding guns, they look for armed robbers, they look 
for different things like that. You see three or four guys on a corner, you 
think one of them has a gun, you jump out on, jump out work. It leads to a 
lot of arrests of drugs and narcotics, leads to a lot of chases, a lot of shootouts, 
different things like that” (Lieutenant, Armed Robbery Task Force).  
They see the strategy as failed because a) it caused tensions and loss of trust in the community, 
 “when you’re stopping a lot of people for minor violations […], they might 
be good, honest people, but they maybe didn’t stop all the way at the stop 
sign or they didn’t put their blinker on and you’re stopping them because 
you’re just trying to find some crime to charge somebody with, you lose the 
public’s trust […]” (Sergeant, Armed Robbery Task Force). 
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and b) it was ineffective as criminals, if caught, would be caught for only one crime, 
“[…] it affected crime in a specific area for a short period of time. The people 
that you got for those cases never did any significant jail time, unless there 
was some extenuating circumstance, they had multiple felony convictions” 
(Lieutenant, Armed Robbery Task Force).  
and crime would be suppressed only momentarily: 
“[…] you got to have a part of your response that’s trying to catch the guys, 
because you could look at 10 different problems and always over deploy 10 
problems, and what that does though is it drives your problem out of there or 
makes them quiet for a day or two, but if you never catch the criminal [the 
crimes continue]” (Sergeant, Armed Robbery Task Force). 
Citizens recording police encounters on their phones, complaints against the police, and insti-
tutional pressures of a consent decree increasing scrutiny and the introduction of body worn 
cameras, according to the task force’s lead officers, add further pressure to change the depart-
ment’s style of policing. 
Consequentially, as the chief describes the new strategy is to focus on serial perpetrators,  
“Who do we need to target? You know, we know anecdotally that only a 
small percentage of people are causing a lot of crime in the city. […] And 
then how do we […] use that information to build a case against those indi-
viduals and get them off the street, you know?” (Chief). 
Some units, notably the armed robbery task force and district A’s task force, have the legal and 
technical knowledge to build these kinds of cases largely based on diverse forms of surveil-
lance: covert surveillance, video surveillance, license plate readers, and, prominently, social 
media. These techniques are explored further in chapter 6. In contrast to untargeted patrol, the 
armed robbery task force lieutenant argues that this targeted strategy would be more successful, 
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“[…] if you focus your attention on the crimes and the criminals committing 
them, you’ll be much better off than just throwing a big wide net and seeing 
what you caught. The term is shooting a shotgun in the dark, turn the light 
on and see what you hit and go pick it up, so to speak, it doesn’t help with 
reduction of crime. Look at the crime, solve the crime and understand who’s 
committing the crime and then focus on those people and those groups of 
people and you’ll be much better off with reduction of crime” (Lieutenant, 
Armed Robbery Task Force). 
4.3. Translations – priorities between crime counts and situated knowledge 
Strategic priorities, developed as set out in the previous section, need to make their way to the 
frontline officers who enact them. This section analyses four interconnected arenas of translat-
ing priorities into action. The first arena is roll calls – briefings at the beginning of each shift 
in which senior officers, among other information, give instructions to officers. Here, officers 
are told which zones to patrol given the decisions taken in CompStat meetings. However, of-
ficers rarely get to know the reasons why they are supposed to patrol these areas. Tacit 
knowledge of recent events and the social dynamics driving spatio-temporal crime patterns is 
maintained through informal contacts and, at times, helps to translate patrol instructions that 
otherwise go ignored. The second arena are horizontal briefings in task force units specialised 
in gathering information through surveillance to build bigger cases. Instead of needing to trans-
late knowledge operating at the level of crime, these work with detailed knowledge of crimes. 
Consequentially, connections between crimes become visible. Briefings and mobile phone chat 
groups help maintain a common knowledge of operations. Third, is a system of BOLO (“be-
on-the-lookout”) emails intended to order the information flow between detectives and front-
line officers. Officers’ observations can be crucial to detectives’ investigations and the 
knowledge contained in BOLOs could – and perhaps senior officers conveniently assume they 
do – transmit the detailed information that is lacking from roll calls in the first arena. Yet, the 
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system is burdened with information overload (some detectives seem to see the number of 
BOLOs as a measure of productivity), information is often irrelevant (as every email reaches 
the whole department), and emails are irretrievable once needed (poorly labelled emails are 
impossible to search). As a result, practices fragment with districts and individual officers find-
ing their own workarounds with print outs and derivative digital tools. Finally, prioritisation of 
cases for investigation by detectives is compartmentalised into crime types. Apart from causing 
frustration for detectives working the same kinds of cases repeatedly, this type of prioritisation 
runs the danger of concealing connections between cases that cross crime types and that are 
necessary to build bigger cases as is done in the second arena. 
4.3.1. Patrolling areas – translation into action 
This section contrasts the often insufficient, formal communication of areas to target as devel-
oped in the CompStat meetings with the diverse channels of informal communication that en-
able a common awareness of recent events. This commonly maintained knowledge helps in 
translating instructions to target zones within the district with patrols because they give officers 
an idea of what to look out for – they link the instructions at the level of crime back to individual 
incidents of crimes. Furthermore, this informal information sharing allows officers to build 
their own tacit knowledge of spatio-temporal crime patterns that informs their personal deci-
sions on where to patrol. 
The patrol function is shared between platoon officers, who have to balance it with answering 
calls for service, and task force officers, who operate more independently patrolling areas or 
gathering intelligence to build cases. This gives task force officers the chance to build up more 
detailed tacit knowledge of their area as discussed further below. At the beginning of every 
shift, officers receive a briefing from their superior officers in a roll call. Roll calls differ from 
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unit to unit (and day to day): some focus solely on instructions such as reminders to use digital 
tickets and assign radio codes, others contain an element of training. Among this information 
are also instructions to patrol zones within the districts. However, these instructions are infre-
quent, especially in contrast to the importance the identification of areas takes in CompStat 
meetings. Surprisingly, despite its availability, senior officers make no use of maps and graphs 
visualizing recent crime in the department’s data visualization dashboard. Officers are fre-
quently only told to patrol certain zones without any additional context. Consequentially, mul-
tiple officers do not know where these locations are and why they are supposed to patrol them. 
In one observed case an officer asks for clarification why an area is to be patrolled and the 
sergeant does not know either. Even task force officers, who are supposed to do proactive po-
licing, would often struggle to translate the instructions into action, as one of them explains,  
“[In roll calls and briefings] it is normally disseminated from the top down 
saying, ‘Hey, around this area right now this is going on. Around this area 
that’s going on’. But I would like to be able to know a little bit of history of 
the place before I’m going there” (Task Force 3, District A). 
Apart from an obvious breakdown of communications caused by a reference to zones that are 
taken to be clear to everyone, this reveals the problem that patrolling areas poses to officers on 
the frontline: Zones create an epistemological gap. Individual cases, including details on ac-
tions, perpetrators, motives, etc. are collected, stripped down, and centrally aggregated into a 
new thing: a pattern on a map. However, this pattern needs an explanation to be acted upon. 
Sometimes senior officers do this by linking patrol instructions to information on concrete 
cases. For example, during roll call, the sergeant in district A tells the officers to patrol an area 
because of an armed robbery on the previous night. She wants them to go to the location of the 
incident whenever they have free time, especially after dark since the lighting there was bad. 
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However, these concrete instructions are rare compared to just naming street blocks or alpha-
betically named zones. 
These unclear instructions fall together with 1) a lack of time to patrol because platoon officers 
mostly answer calls for service: 
“I don’t have time to drive [up there just to write my reports]” (Platoon Officer, District 
B),  
and, as already mentioned above, 2) doubts concerning the efficiency of visible patrol as a 
police strategy itself:  
“[…] it's like, you know, having a cockroach problem in a large apartment 
building. You get the cockroaches out of one apartment, but they've really 
just gone to the other apartment. […] So, I mean, it is beneficial, but at the 
same time […] that's not going to solve […] the problem” (Platoon Officer 
7, District A). 
Taking these issues together, it is not surprising that many platoon officers seem to ignore 
instructions to patrol areas. 
Some of the confusion around which areas to patrol and what to look out for can be resolved 
through personal contact with the district detective sergeants and lieutenants who advise the 
commanders on which areas to patrol in the first place. Some of them would visit roll calls 
from time to time to explain why they would want certain zones to be patrolled. However, the 
relation between platoon and detectives differs between districts. A platoon officer in district 
B complains that information would “not transition very well” from the District Investigatory 
Unit (DIU) to platoon officers. They would get a list of zones that are “hot” without anyone 
explaining the reason. She describes the problem as a “downstairs-upstairs mentality”. There 
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is some reason to take this quite literally with detectives located on the floor above platoon 
officers. This makes encounters and therefore information exchange between the two groups 
unlikely. By contrast, all rooms are on the same floor in district A. Even more so, the room 
used for roll calls is the same room used for all briefings: MAX sessions, task force briefings, 
platoon roll call. It is also located on a circular corridor that passes through the room. Hence, 
not only platoon officers would pass through the roll call but also detectives and task force 
officers, giving opportunities for chats. Consequentially, the “downstairs-upstairs mentality” 
seems to be less prominent in district A. Here, the detectives’ sergeant comes into some of the 
roll calls explaining zones and recent cases thereby bridging the information loss. The transi-
tion of information from detectives to platoon and task force officers is also relevant for more 
targeted policing strategies discussed in the next section. 
Informal communication channels, like those mentioned above, help sustain a real-time 
knowledge of what is happening within the district in lieu of centrally provided updates21. The 
roll call rooms provide a space for encounters and informal exchange. Not only does every 
platoon shift begin here, the roll call rooms in districts A and B also contain racks for the 
officers’ body worn cameras forcing officers to return to the roll call room to drop off their 
cameras. This provides a chance for exchange between officers from different shifts. Com-
monly the returning officers would be asked how busy it was outside and, particularly while 
the new officers are waiting for the roll call to start, they would share a short story from their 
shift. Generally, patrol officers within the same shift, friendships formed in the academy, task 
force officers and detectives in the same district would often tell each other about what 
 
21 The literature on suspicion formation regularly assumes officers to possess experiential knowledge and ‘cul-
tural’ influences are reduced to learned stereotypes and heuristics (see e.g. Johnson and Morgan, 2013; Quinton, 
2011). However, as the analysis highlights here, this experiential knowledge is largely maintained in continued 
exchange with others. 
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happened during their shifts. This supplements officers’ awareness of incidents during their 
own shifts gleaned from listening to what is communicated over the radio. 
Especially for task force officers for who a substantial amount of work consists in patrol, this 
commonly maintained knowledge is conjoined with officers’ tacit knowledge of spatio-tem-
poral crime patterns in their districts. The self-description as “detectives of the streets” (Task 
Force 3, District A) embodies this aspiration to gather information on criminal activity in the 
present as opposed to detectives focussing on criminal activity of the past. This knowledge 
both helps translate areas of priority into action – possibly irrespective of the underlying crime 
statistics – and overwrite areas of priority where other, more concrete factors may outweigh 
abstract instructions. As an example of the tacit knowledge, a task force officer in District B 
explains, crimes would happen when people were drunk out on the streets after festivals, crimes 
would be associated with the location of certain clubs, and weekends would generally be busier.  
However, task force officers’ tacit knowledge goes beyond locations and times by including 
the social dynamics in their district. These could be specific community events creating oppor-
tunities for conflict, 
“So, like people gather around, […] and that’s where if you wanted to go 
there and hurt somebody or confront somebody, you know they’re gonna be 
at a community event […]. So, we have to be able to figure out when that’s 
gonna happen and who’s having an […] argument or something to beef in 
[…]” (Task Force 1, District B). 
or the dynamics created by shootings when specific persons would be involved: 
“if there’s a shooting or a murder of who we call a ‘player’, somebody who’s 
involved in street life, somebody who’s heavy, then you’re going to see an 
uptake in violent crimes” (Task Force 3, District A). 
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This type of single-event knowledge laying out paths of causation between different incidents 
is not reflected in the general crime statistics. But it can be used to tie spatial patterns back to 
potential perpetrators and thereby to more targeted action. 
In the absence of any clues from this type of knowledge, task force officers attempt to build 
new knowledge by increasing surveillance in an area. As a task force officer describes, 
“[…] we’ll set up surveillance […], and we’ll have certain target areas during 
that time period, and we’ll try to utilise the cameras or individual officers 
using surveillance vehicles or cameras. Even utilising officers maybe who 
are under cover […] so we try to find who is committing the crime” (Task 
Force 3, District A). 
This strategy is chosen over untargeted approaches like visible patrol or stop and search. Yet, 
without any information on what has happened in a zone to warrant extra attention (as com-
monly the case for platoon officers), such a strategy is impossible and leaves only untargeted 
policing strategies that are widely criticised (see above). Where the priorities set by crime 
counts are not translatable into an epistemology of crimes and a desire to identify causes for 
the crime patterns, the two approaches collide. Perhaps there is no formal communication of 
what to look out for in zones assigned during roll calls because senior officers rely on an email 
system by which detectives send out this kind of information and officers are expected to up-
date themselves (which as section 4.3.3 below shows is near impossible). A platoon officer 
describes this expectation but concedes that officers would often only know why certain zones 
are to be patrolled if they handled the crimes there: 
“It really is dependent upon you to look at your emails and just draw your 
conclusions from […] what the emails are put out there for the bulletins. A 
lot of times we don’t really know unless you handled that crime […]” (Pla-
toon officer 7, district A). 
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4.3.2. Targeting individuals – building cases together 
The short-term prioritisation of zones for activities from patrol to exploratory surveillance, as 
described in the previous section, has a counterpart in longer term targeted operations aiming 
to build bigger cases on individuals. The exploratory surveillance detailed in the previous sec-
tion can be a starting point to such case building if it does not immediately stop with the iden-
tification and immediate arrest of a suspect. This section details the aims of these operations 
and shows how communication structures like the informal exchanges above help maintain a 
common understanding of the cases and connections between them.  
There are two units that I come across who operate by longer-term intelligence gathering: 1) 
district A’s task force, when not bound by other day-to day priorities, employ conspiracy 
charges to build bigger investigations. They would connect individuals via social media (see 
also section 6.6) and gather video evidence (see also section 6.4) for a prolonged amount of 
time in order to then gain plea bargains. The involvement of narcotics would often lower the 
threshold for additional forms of surveillance. Officers argue that District A was in a unique 
position having three sergeants who had previously worked similar cases in a now dissolved 
multi-agency gang unit. They would understand prosecutorial culture and would know what 
works well in court. This institutional knowledge seems to be lacking in district B. 2) The 
armed robbery task force, being more flexible as an independent unit, use a similar approach 
in targeting armed robberies, shootings, and auto-theft. Here, the institutional knowledge is 
maintained in a close working relationship with the district attorney’s office. 
While the initial motivation to create the armed robbery task force came from a high number 
of armed robberies, the task force’s strategy is driven by the tacit knowledge of crimes, which 
in turn reveals the interconnectedness of crimes that is lost in the crime numbers. Investigations 
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unfold a network of actors and build evidence against them instead of arresting the first person 
of interest. As the lieutenant describes, 
“So, our main focus in this unit is serial robbers, guys who commit multiple 
robberies, serial shooters and we assist homicides and high profiles. With 
that said, we realised, when we started working these robberies, that these 
cars and guns that are being taken, stolen cars and stolen guns from cars, are 
being directly linked to the robberies and the shootings based on the tools 
they need to do it. […] so, we started focussing our time a little bit on the 
guys who are giving them the tools […]. We’re trying to […] [get] the pros-
ecution of these guys to look at it a little through that lens, rather than just, 
it’s just a guy who got stopped in a car that he might have borrowed from 
somebody” (Lieutenant, Armed Robbery Task Force). 
This approach reveals the connections between different types of crime – connections that are 
at danger of being concealed by crime statistics that need to categorize crimes to make them 
countable.  
When working together towards a common purpose, districts’ task force units are small enough 
to enable direct information exchange between members. This horizontal information flow akin 
to the informal communications described in the previous section is necessary to work a com-
mon investigation in which individual officers may focus on separate persons of interest. This 
is particularly evident at the armed robbery task force where briefings are markedly different 
to the platoon and, to a lesser degree, also to the district’s task forces. The lieutenant describes 
a less hierarchical from of briefing: 
“[…] in the old days you’d have a sergeant who kind of ran units, this is what 
we’re going to do, this is our focus, and it was kind of cut and dry. Here, in 
our unit, everybody has an equal say when we have our briefings. At the end 
of the day, the sergeants and myself have to make a decision as to what we’re 
going to do because eventually it comes back on us, you know. But 
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everybody talks and everybody does. When these guys go out in the field, 
we’re not micromanaging them, we’re not directing them to go do certain 
things” (Lieutenant, Armed Robbery Task Force).  
Whereas task force and platoon officers’ common knowledge of what is going on is maintained 
through random informal connections (see previous section), these communications are made 
more accessible and reliable by these in-person briefings. In addition, the briefings are supple-
mented with a common chat group that officers access on their phones. This makes communi-
cation possible at any time and makes it visible to anyone in the group. It also allows for the 
exchange of media files that transport information like a photo of a car which would be difficult 
to convey in an oral briefing and which is maintained in the phones’ storage for possible later 
use. The accessibility of information on what to look out for is crucial, as the next section 
shows. The chat group is unique to the unit. As the lieutenant explains, this helps everyone to 
stay up to date, 
“[…] we all have departmental cell phones and we pass this on as we’re in 
the field going. So, if you’ve got [three officers] out on surveillances and 
they see something, they take a picture of what they see and they put it in the 
group […]. We’ve got detectives who start looking at this guy and start re-
searching the target location […]. […] we put it in here so that everybody 
has a sense of everything that’s going on” (Lieutenant, Armed Robbery Task 
Force). 
4.3.3. Failing to alert officers – “be-on-the-lookout” bulletins 
Roll call, as described above, does rarely contain any information on things officers should 
look out for such as persons of interest or cars related to past incidents. The task of transmitting 
this information – operating on a level of knowledge of crimes – is taken up by an email system. 
BOLOs – “be-on-the-lookout” emails – sent by detectives to everyone in the department con-
stitute an attempt to order information flow in the organization and make the information more 
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accessible. The system replaces sending bulletins via FAX to the individual districts. BOLOs 
present a way for detectives to tap into the tacit knowledge and ongoing observations of front-
line officers. Yet, BOLOs, like many of the technologies described in the following chapters, 
break down and cause fragmentation of approaches due to various workarounds. The system 
renders itself useless through information overload with a high number of daily emails, irre-
trievability of information where the relevant email needs to be found and information is hidden 
in pdf attachments, and irrelevance where BOLOs relate to incidents in other districts. Individ-
ual officers and districts try to counter these issues by returning to analogue print outs or de-
rivative digital tools. 
With all detectives sending emails the number of BOLOs platoon officers receive is predictably 
large. As a result, many of the officers are overwhelmed by the overall amount of emails re-
ceived, including the number of irrelevant BOLOs relating to other districts. For instance, one 
platoon officer complains about receiving fifty BOLO emails a day and that some detectives 
would use those “emails [to] make you seem busy”. She deems the system so “overused that it 
has become useless”. Part of the issue of information overload is that many BOLOs contain 
information that is very unlikely to be relevant to officers in a particular district. A person 
wanted for a shoplift on the other side of the city, as one platoon officer explains, would be 
unlikely to travel into his district, and hence the BOLO would not be useful. Keeping BOLOs 
up-to-date and filtered by relevance seems to be a challenge given the lack of a system for 
detectives to add tags for filtering or retract outdated BOLOs. Especially outdated BOLOs pre-
sent a problem outside of inefficiencies of police procedures if they cause unnecessary police 
encounters for citizens (this problematic is taken up again in the context of warrants in section 
5.2). Furthermore, BOLO emails are sent out once but may be relevant for a longer period of 
time. However, it is near impossible for officers to memorize all of them. As a task force officer 
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describes, “Once you check your email five days a week, you’re not going to remember Mon-
day’s [BOLO]” (Task Force 5, District A). Even if they remember a relevant BOLO it can be 
difficult to find it again. For example, a detective in district B is unable to retrieve a BOLO 
about a gun that is relevant to a current case. 
These issues cause districts and officers to implement their own workarounds, fragmenting 
practices of communication relating to cases. For example, district A uses print outs pinned to 
the back of the roll call room. This way officers see only those BOLOs relevant to them, the 
person charged with putting them up can take obsolete ones down, and they are available for 
repeated viewing. Several officers read through the pinned BOLOs before their briefing starts. 
Yet, while the push pin wall makes BOLOs more accessible, officers can hardly take the wall 
with them in the police car. The irretrievability of information is still an issue. For the BOLO 
to be of value, officers need to take note of it, remember it, and then be confident enough to act 
on their memory of the BOLO. For example, one officer is concerned that she would have seen 
the BOLO back in the station but would be unable to ensure the description in the BOLO 
matches the person she observes in the streets. However, this would be necessary to “act in 
good faith believe it’s them”. Consequentially, the use of BOLOs relies on lucky coincidence. 
This is not to say this would never work, as this example demonstrates: 
“I had just got done doing a report and I'm just like, I'm just going to check 
my emails really quick and it was just like pure coincidence that I had just 
checked the email and a minute or two later I see the guy just walking on by. 
Like, huh. [Laughing] So. […]. And I decided I'd stop them, and I ended up 
arresting him for the automobile burglary that he committed. So, they obvi-
ously, they do serve their purpose” (Platoon officer 7, district A). 
To solve the push-pin walls lack of retrievability in the car, a task force officer in District A 
has found yet another workaround further fragmenting approaches. He helps himself by 
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carrying print outs on his clipboard, as well as merging them into one big Word file which he 
would be able to open on a phone. 
Despite all the problems with BOLOs, some detectives rely on them efficiently transporting 
information. One detective at headquarters even calls BOLOs “one of the advancements in the 
technology”. Some are probably aware of the issues as they affect them in similar ways (see 
the detective above who could not find a BOLO he remembered), but the convenience of just 
sending out an email together with the pretext of officers’ duty to read them makes them con-
tinue using it. Other detectives prefer to speak to officers in person. Communication, in person 
or in the form of BOLOs, between detectives and officers is important because it represents a 
way for detectives to tap into the tacit knowledge and everyday observations of frontline offic-
ers. A homicide detective describes how he would hope for more information after making 
officers personally aware of what he is looking for,  
“[…] let's say I have a murder in a certain area. I will kind of tag maybe the 
general assignment, the task force, and explain to them basically what I'm 
looking for, so they'll kind of be in that area, see if they see something. Let's 
see they see a car that kind of fits that description, they'll stop it, and they 
will give me a way more detailed FIC then maybe somebody who's just ran-
domly stopped the car” (Homicide Detective 2). 
FICs are field information cards filled out after persons and vehicle stops and containing infor-
mation on observations the officer makes (these are addressed further in sections 5.3 and 6.1). 
The detective’s quote underlines the importance of communication between detectives and 
frontline officers, albeit this is hindered by a BOLO system that gives the illusion of effective 
communication in addition to gaps in hierarchy as described above. 
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4.3.4. Priorities in investigations – between crime counts and crime types 
The way crimes are counted also influences how investigations are distributed among detec-
tives and which cases are prioritised. Institutionally cases are split into bigger investigations 
carried out by detectives located at headquarters and day-to-day investigations pursued by dis-
trict detectives. At headquarters these are further split up into different units focussing on crime 
types, such as homicide, sex crimes, or drug trafficking. In the districts, detectives work either 
on property or violent crimes. These crime types separating detectives are largely the same 
types that are used to count crime. Crime types compartmentalise investigations into investi-
gation types and determine priorities as categories through which crime increases are moni-
tored. Especially district detectives’ priorities in investigations can be driven by day to day 
crime changes rather than the necessities of individual cases. This is described by a detective 
at headquarters,  
“Oftentimes, there might be situations where you would like to be able to 
take this further, but you just can’t because there’s another burglary […]. 
[The detectives] get more time to investigate […] but even they sometimes 
get to a point where you know, you may have this case and you’re working 
it and you’re getting somewhere but you know what, now you’re tied up in 
the rotation again. So, now you’re catching whatever this next thing is […]” 
(Major Case Narcotics Detective).  
The district detectives’ priorities would be set by crime trends,  
“Let’s say there’s been a rash of burglaries in a certain area, right? Well now 
that’s the focus in that district, is clearing out these burglaries. But […] the 
drug deal that is going on a couple of streets over is kind of put on the back 
burner” (Major Case Narcotics Detective).  
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While in district B the caseload seems to decide if multiple detectives would work the same 
type of crime, District A detectives are regularly assigned cases of a singular type. This goes 
so far as to one detective only dealing with vehicle burglaries and thefts. This detective seems 
somewhat dissatisfied with his job as a lot of these cases are impossible to solve given the lack 
of evidence. Beyond the individual detective’s job satisfaction, this type of assignment again 
renders the connections between cases invisible. This detective would not be able to explore 
connections to other types of cases. He might miss the relation between guns stolen from glove 
boxes and the shootings that follow, as it is observed by detectives in district B. Categorization 
for counting can, as discussed above, render connections that cross categories invisible. This 
is especially the case when these categorizations are institutionalised in job roles. 
4.4. Supervision through data 
The department has two mechanisms by which officers are held accountable through data. The 
first is compliance management that is part of the CompStat meetings. Here, officers from the 
compliance department review, for example, body worn camera footage and based on pre-
defined score cards check whether officers comply with policies. Violations, such as failing to 
start a recording, are counted and published on the department’s data visualization platform. 
This process centralises supervision and adds another level of supervision beyond the direct 
relationship between officers and their direct superiors. The second mechanism is a program 
called INSIGHT in which officers are compared against departmental averages for various per-
formance categories such as the number of arrests or uses of force. These numbers are then 
used by direct supervisors for management purposes. In the first case the instructions for offic-
ers follow directly from the numbers. In the second, supervisors are less clear about what ac-
tions to take based on the numbers and some question the comparisons hardwired into the pro-
gram. Although both arrangements could be described as centres of calculation and translation 
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(Callon, 1986; Law, 2003), only the first successfully translates into effects on the periphery in 
the form of compliance and reprimands. 
While the crime statistics need to be translated into actions, the link is often significantly clearer 
for compliance data as it counts (in)actions. An officer takes too much time writing reports? 
Ask them to write the reports sooner. In contrast to the competition introduced by crime num-
bers the consequences of competing for compliance are clearly also more positive.  
Compliance monitoring is an addition to the classical CompStat process made in the context 
of the consent decree. The idea is to go beyond holding officers accountable to just crime sta-
tistics in their area:  
“[…] it’s like a […] more enhanced CompStat I guess. So, what we wanted 
to look at was not just crime […]. […] You know, how well our office is 
performing on a bunch of different levels not just on being able to have effect 
on crime. You know, are we wrecking cars? Every time we wreck a car, it 
costs money. […] How do we measure use of force? […] How do we meas-
ure our response times? How do we measure public complaints? How do we 
measure satisfaction? A whole bunch of different things. So, that’s why we 
kind of try to dive into with our [data platform] a little bit. When before we 
only looked at crime” (Chief). 
At headquarters, commanders report their statistics on compliance measures such as correctly 
uploaded and labelled body-worn video, time to fill reports, and use of force incidents. These 
presentations then give members of the internal investigations unit a chance to highlight re-
viewed cases that were handled well or that do not comply with policies. For example, the 
commander of the internal investigations unit highlights officers in one district not introducing 
themselves by name during traffic stops. In the districts, commanders check the compliance 
data and instruct lieutenants and sergeants to talk to their officers when they identify issues. 
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For example, in district B, two officers are singled out for their number of pending reports. The 
officers are then later talked to by their direct supervisors during a roll call. Where compliance 
may have been left to direct supervisors in the past, the data platform together with digital 
recording devices such as body worn cameras and field interview cards allow for a centralisa-
tion of supervision that adds to the supervision by direct supervisors. 
The supervision of officers and detectives has always a technologically mediated element to it: 
the filling of forms and reports that are reviewed by superior officers (see section 5.3). Through 
these documents a centrally positioned supervisor can see what their subordinates are doing. 
For platoon sergeants, this system is supplemented with a live computer aided dispatch dash-
board on which they can see which unit is responding to which call, how long they take to 
respond and how long it takes for them to handle the call. Apart from this direct monitoring of 
officers’ actions, Insight is a data analysis tool that is available to supervisors to spot officers 
that may need interventions by highlighting those that deviate from the department average. 
The department’s policy describes Insight as follows:  
“INSIGHT is [the department’s] Human Resources and Personnel Management system 
and data warehouse which can be accessed by Department supervisors to receive and 
integrate member information in order to facilitate close and effective supervision of 
members as well as identify any patterns or series of incidents that may indicate at-risk 
behaviour”.  
Insight tracks information about, among others, arrests, uses of force, citizen complaints, civil 
lawsuits, and accidents – but also about awards received as well as commendations. 
The program enjoys mixed uptake. A sergeant in district A would only pay attention to the 
email alerts she would receive from time to time when someone in her unit deviated from the 
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department mean. Otherwise she would not have the time to look at Insight. A sergeant in 
district B, on the other hand, sees the program as a good way of checking officer’ “productiv-
ity”. However, for this supervisor, as for others, the counts need careful interpretation and the 
main supervision is carried out in person.  
The main problems supervising officers identify with the system mirror in many ways the is-
sues relating to crime counts identified in the previous sections. The numbers underlying IN-
SIGHT fail to take qualitative differences into account equate officers in different roles and are 
at times erroneous. For instance, supervisors would need to carefully interpret outputs because 
expectations for officers within the same role could differ and the comparison to means would 
fail to take these qualitative differences into account: 
“[…] an average is technically looking at everyone and just kind of finding 
that middle point. But that doesn't mean that it's going to apply equally to 
everyone with that same title. There are some districts where people have to 
get into use of force situations more often, or certain watches, like the night 
watch […] versus the people who are working at 8 AM. And, so, if the same 
average is applied universally, it doesn't always work out that way” (Homi-
cide Detective 3). 
Here, the categorization necessary to make things countable creates a problem by equating 
those within the same category – a grouping that in some areas would be near impossible: 
“[…] we all do narcotics. But [this detective’s] job is very special. I got a 
guy that’s a K9 operator, alright? I got a guy that investigates strip clubs and 
stuff. So, although we are all part of the thing and we all go to do the en-
forcement part, we’re all working together as a team, but we have very dif-
ferent jobs” (Major Case Narcotics Sergeant). 
Apart from issues with categorization, the data used for scoring officers can be flawed. As a 
major case narcotics detective cautions, 
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“[…] since it’s a database that the information still has to be put in by a per-
son, it still has those same limitations of data being put in incorrectly, you 
know? It happens because people make mistakes. And some people are in-
competent” (Major Case Narcotics Detective). 
Similar to the knowledge of crimes maintained through direct communications, supervisors 
stress the importance of in-person interaction for supervision. For example, 
“[…] you still need to be there and have that human interaction because I’ll 
be able to see him on his days and see that he’s not himself. […] It’s one of 
those things where, you know, you can look at somebody that you see every 
day and you can tell whether something’s bothering him. Something’s 
wrong. Even if to somebody else they seem perfectly fine” (Major Case Nar-
cotics Sergeant). 
Finally, the more specialised the officer’s role, the more direct the supervision would be – 
rendering the technologically mediated supervision at a distance superfluous. As a homicide 
detective describes, 
“[…] our sergeants, our supervisors, actually go out on the scene with the 
people. So, they're not reading a report sitting on their desk that they don't 
have working knowledge of. […] Where, in a District, and a detective may 
go out and their supervisor's off. So, they really just reading what they say” 
(Homicide Detective 2). 
4.5. Summary 
Crime statistics as well as compliance numbers are produced in a complex process that involves 
negotiating access, integrating disparate systems, and cleaning data. A process that also, as the 
idiosyncrasies in different districts show, comes with a multitude of decisions on how to count, 
all of which affect the count and its use for different decision-making practices. Yet, through 
the social setting of the CompStat-style meetings, the statistics carry power: they set priorities 
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in what crimes are addressed, they inform strategies on how to deal with repeat calls or domes-
tic violence, they drive competition between districts, and commanders perceive of them as 
measures of performance. 
Patterns in the crime data, spurious at times, have to be translated into strategies and actions. 
In the case of compliance this could be a straightforward instruction to an officer to keep up 
with writing their reports but it could also be borderline impossible when the statistics to be 
acted upon are based on misleading comparisons with a cohort of officers in distinctly different 
roles. In the realm of criminality, a gap between two epistemologies has to be covered: an 
epistemology of crime represented in crime rates and an epistemology of crimes represented in 
the commonly maintained tacit knowledge of locations and individuals related to incidents. 
The translation from the first, setting the priorities, to the second, finding reasons for the sta-
tistics, is achieved with accounts of details about individual crimes as well as maps as transla-
tion device. However, these translations are not always made or left to frontline officers without 
access to an overview of recent incidents. Spatial patterns are translated into patrol strategies 
supporting a territorial approach to policing that many officers discredit because of the strain 
it causes (and has caused in the past) to the community and the department’s reputation. 
The underlying segmentation of crime types necessary to make crimes countable risks obscur-
ing links between crimes. This segmentation is institutionalised in the division of labour among 
detectives specialising in investigations of certain types of crime. Patterns across categories are 
easily missed while those within categories drive priorities. In this way, crime statistics as they 
are used in CompStat meetings undermine to some extent more targeted forms of policing fo-
cussing on serial perpetrators and networks of perpetrators active across different categories of 
crime. While crime numbers give room for subjective and instrumental interpretations, they, at 
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the same time, shape subjectivity by confining it to the same categories that are the basis for 
their production. 
Relating the findings in this chapter back to the concepts of ‘biopower’ and ‘centres of calcu-
lation/translation’ as introduced in the literature review, the contribution here is two-fold: First, 
it renders the knowledge created in these centres complex. Different priorities, or ‘orderings’ 
such as targeted investigation and police presence intersect with different ways of knowing in 
the form of crime and crimes. Perhaps the centre is too close to the action to solely rely on 
statistics and ‘biopower’. Second, the translations from the centre to the periphery by them-
selves interact with other knowledges and often become precarious or side-lined by other or-
derings. Similarly, the creation of representations as detailed at the start depends on constant 
work by the analysts and is still fragmented through parallel efforts. In the end, there is a plu-
rality of orderings that ‘sort of’ work in creating somewhat unstable ‘pools of order’ (Law, 
1994). 
5. Use of technology during patrol and calls-for-service 
In contrast to the previous chapter, this chapter looks towards the periphery, towards the offic-
ers patrolling the streets. On patrol or responding to calls-for-service, officers have two main 
sources of information: the dispatcher and other officers over the radio, and the department’s 
databases accessible to them through their on-board computer. Adding to the precarious control 
over where police officers patrol described previously, the first section demonstrates that even 
the central ordering principle of answering calls for service – the ‘reactivity theme’ of policing 
(Manning, 2008) – does not direct officers without friction. The second (and main) section 
investigates the extent to which the department’s databases inform officers’ decision-making 
– particularly during stops. Just as there is friction in delivering instructions to officers, there 
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is friction in officers reporting information towards more central positions despite electronic 
forms designed to simplify the process. A continuing theme in this chapter are the breakdowns 
and workarounds officers find in their use of these technologies. 
5.1. Dispatch and navigation – breakdowns and duplication of efforts 
The main task for districts’ platoon officers is to respond to calls-for-service. This section high-
lights the various technical breakdowns that occur in the communication of information relat-
ing to an incident and how officers arrive there. These breakdowns are due to a) the fixed nature 
of the technological solutions, that is free text boxes that are too small for their content and 
rigid, inadequate scripts for call operators, and b) the lack of technology for navigation. Where 
these technologies fail in their task, efforts are duplicated on other pathways such as radio 
communication, personal phones, or maps on the on-board computer. Yet, these workarounds 
cause further problems some of which officers perceive of as endangering their safety. 
When a member of the public calls 911, this call is received at the department’s call center. 
Here, an operator goes through an automated script of questions to collect all the relevant in-
formation concerning the incident. This information is directly entered into a computer and 
officers receive the information on their on-board computers regularly referred to as the “CAD” 
(computer aided dispatch). This happens as soon as the most fundamental information is gath-
ered, that is location and type of incident codified in a radio code. Whenever there is a new call 
a sound cue alerts the officer and they can check the details of the call on their screen. When 
an officer takes the call another sound cue alerts the others that it has been taken up. Taking 
the call means telling the dispatcher, who is also located at the call center, over the radio. The 
call operator successively adds more information to the call as the script of questions pro-
gresses. This information is then updated live on the officers’ screens. This is where the first 
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instance of technology breakdown occurs: the box in which this text is displayed is fixed to 
roughly 2 by 10 cm. This makes it almost impossible for officers to read the information while 
driving towards an incident – particularly because all cars except one are operated by single 
officers. Not only do they have to scroll down within the box, they have to scroll down every 
time the dispatcher adds something to see the new information. Together with frequent con-
nectivity issues of the on-board computers this means that some officers resort to asking the 
dispatcher for details over the radio instead. The radio steps in where the CAD fails, with the 
consequence of officers asking for further details taking away ‘airtime’ from other communi-
cations (the consequences of which are described further below). 
Apart from being difficult to read, some officers are also discontent with the quality of the 
information relayed to them by the dispatchers. The call handlers follow a strict protocol which 
is automatically enforced by software that prompts them to ask specific questions in a pre-set 
order. To the officers, these questions would often not cover the information they would need 
about an incident. An older platoon officer says that in the past a former police officer had been 
taking calls and provided them with more relevant information. He highlights the experience 
necessary to ask relevant questions which contrast with the formal logic of the software. As a 
workaround, he would often ask the dispatcher to call back and ask further questions if possible. 
However, this is yet another way in which ‘airtime’ is taken up to support a struggling techno-
logical process. 
Given their ubiquity, it may come as a surprise that police cars are not fitted with navigation 
systems. Consequentially, all interviewees describe how they sometimes struggle finding the 
location of an incident. Sometimes it would be the direction of a one-way street forcing the 
officer to drive around the block, sometimes they would just not be familiar with an area. As 
one of the officers describes:  
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“[…] there’s these little, you know, quiet little neighborhoods that we never 
go into. […] the street might go this way one part. But you cross over the 
street and it goes this way […]. […] you’re trying to get up there in a hurry 
and […] these streets make no sense in this city. […] Your computer gets the 
cross streets. Those are fine and all but […] when all those streets start zig-
zagging and going diagonal, then those cross streets aren’t really that bene-
ficial anymore” (Platoon Officer 7, District A).  
Similarly, street names can be confusing: “Once side is South and the other side is North. […] 
sometimes you hit the wrong address” (Task Force 4, District A). To avoid these issues officers 
help themselves by pulling out their personal mobile phones, open a street map on their screen, 
or ask the dispatcher, who can see the car’s GPS signal, for orientation. The first two solutions 
make driving difficult as they take the eye away from the street and, in case of the phone, the 
officer only has one hand to drive. Asking the dispatcher when lost, again takes up ‘airtime’. 
With the radio duplicating efforts of the computer aided dispatch and standing in for the lack 
of a navigation system, the resulting increase in communications over radio would take up 
capacity officers would rather dedicate to more relevant communications. Officers are con-
cerned that they may not be able to inform the dispatcher that they are taking action and in case 
something goes wrong no one would know where they are. A task force officer in district B 
describes this concern of needing to alert others of taking action: 
“People need to know where you are. Even if you’re doing something silly. 
Something like a little traffic stop can turn into a foot chase, can turn into a 
use of force, can turn into a deadly use of force. So, you want people to know 
where you are in case…” (Task Force 1, District B).  
Another task force officer in district B expresses how sometimes a ‘crowded’ radio can frus-
trate relaying this information leading to the officer to have to weigh the risks of engagement, 
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“I can’t tell you how many times I’m like ‘I can’t get out’ [because others 
speak over the radio]. You know what you say? Fuck it, I’m going anyway” 
(Task Force 5, District A).  
The duplication of communication efforts on the radio because of breakdowns of the computer-
aided dispatch system and a lack of navigation systems, brings radio communications to the 
limits of their information transmission capacity. As a result, officers fear information flow 
perceived essential to their own safety may be interrupted. 
5.2. Databases during stops and calls-for-service – complicating suspicion 
formation and discretion 
Whether on a call for service or stopping a vehicle or person, officers regularly search the 
police force’s databases for persons, vehicles, and addresses. This section analyses in three 
parts the role databases play during stops and calls-for-service extending existing literature that 
has mostly focused on officers’ direct observations and biases. It first explores how the data-
base moderates officers’ suspicion from the initial decision to stop a person or vehicle to the 
interaction with the stopped person. The second part interrogates the role previous police en-
counters recorded on the database play in officers’ discretionary decision making on the con-
sequences of a violation – e.g. whether to hand out a ticket or just a verbal warning. It highlights 
the consequences databases can have in amplifying deviancy, both during stops and in response 
to calls-for-service. Finally, the third section addresses the malfunctions of databases from in-
complete or imprecise search results to breakdowns of information flow, their consequences 
for the interaction that unfolds, and the individual workarounds that officers find. The analysis 




To initiate a stop, officers need to meet a threshold of reasonable suspicion. The department’s 
policy defines this in the following terms: “Articulable facts that, within the totality of the 
circumstances, lead an officer to reasonably suspect that criminal activity has been or is about 
to be committed. The standard for reasonable suspicion is less than probable cause but must be 
more than a hunch or a subjective feeling”. For violations of traffic laws the standard is in-
creased to probable cause which the policy defines as: “The facts and circumstances known to 
the officer at the time that would justify a reasonable person in believing the suspect committed 
or was committing an offense”. The policy further states, “The stop must be based on what the 
officer knew before prior to the stop. Information learned during a stop can lead to additional 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause that a crime has occurred, but it cannot provide the 
justification for the original stop”. Officers must articulate the specifics of their probable cause 
and reasonable suspicion on field interview cards filled after each stop. These are checked by 
supervisors and the internal accountability section. It is within this reasoning on reasonable 
suspicion and probable cause that information from databases can have an influence. However, 
it is one source of information among many. 
In a review of the literature on police stop and search practices, Johnson & Morgan (2013) 
identify four interrelated processes through which police officers develop suspicion: 1) officers 
would base their assessments on stereotypes relating to persons and vehicles. These would 
often be young men of low socio-economic status, in high crime neighborhoods, and from a 
minority ethnic group, or vehicles with tinted windows, certain bumper stickers, or vehicles in 
poor condition. 2) ‘Known criminals’ and locations such as drug houses are targeted more 
frequently. 3) Persons, vehicles, and behaviours that do not ‘fit in’ with the usual observations 
are observed more carefully. Often this suspicion is developed procedurally through longer 
observation and, during a stop, further questioning. 4) The authors also describe nonverbal 
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cues, such as stutters, as contributing to officers’ suspicion. Particularly the use of stereotypes 
would violate the police department’s policy. However, Quinton (2011) finds for police in 
England and Wales that broad generalisations and stereotypes have the strongest influence on 
suspicion formation. With interpretations of situations being elastic, they could often be rein-
terpreted in a way that conceals the use of stereotypes.    
While the subject of this section is the influence of police databases on officer decision making, 
any biases in who is stopped will necessarily be reflected in the databases. A look at the de-
partment’s public dataset of police stops can help to develop an idea of these biases. As Figure 
2 shows, Blacks make up a higher proportion of stops relative to their proportion in the city’s 
population while the relation is reversed for Whites, Hispanics, and Asians. Blacks are 2.26 
times more likely to be stopped than Whites (p = 0.000 in a Fisher exact test). However, this 
does not necessarily mean that skin colour is used as a signifier to form suspicion for stops. 
Not only may for example the driving population be different from the city’s population (see 
McCabe et al., 2020), racism intersects with and is part of structural inequality which means, 
for example, that Blacks in the city are overwhelmingly more likely to be poor. Figure 3 demon-
strates this with the city’s distribution of household incomes by race. If probable cause is the 
policy threshold for a traffic stop, this means that those without the income to maintain their 
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Moreover, there seems to be no difference in the number of stops of Blacks during daylight 
and darkness. Following the logic of the ‘veil-of darkness test’ (Grogger and Ridgeway, 2006; 
Pierson et al., 2020), if vehicle stops were biased towards blacks, their share of stops would be 
lower during hours of darkness when police officers cannot determine skin colour as easily. As 
Figure 4 demonstrates, the rates remain very similar even if the light conditions change over 
the year (p = 0.404 for a proportions z-test, all times combined). This would suggest that, at 
least for vehicle stops, it is not immediately apparent that race would inform the decision to 
stop individuals, or to a degree small enough not to produce a significant finding. 
 
Figure 4 Percentage of vehicle stops involving Blacks out of all stops involving Blacks and Whites for periods of light and 
darkness. This makes use of the change of light conditions throughout the year. Light refers to hours till sunset and dark re-
fers to hours after dusk. Hours of twilight are excluded. Based on 897 stops during 2018. 
The question of racial biases in police stops is clearly complex and goes beyond the scope of 
this research, not to mention other possible biases. Just like the crime data discussed in chapter 
4 cannot reflect the qualitative differences between crimes, stop and search data cannot tell 
anything about the qualitative differences between stops from simple things like the respect 
afforded by officers, the type of questioning, to the appropriateness of use of force. The police 
















covered up, evidence destroyed, and paper trails changed. Up until the ‘90s the department’s 
officers were organised in cliques along racial lines. The Department of Justice’s investigation 
within the context of the consent decree found deep mistrust of police in the city’s minority 
communities. African-American residents reported discourtesy, harassment, and unwarranted 
stops, arrests, and use of force – particularly in the context of the ‘jump-out’ tactics described 
in section 4.3.1. Hispanics reported being regularly questioned on their immigration status. 
Yet, the consent decree forced the department to make major changes to strategy, training, 
policies, and accountability mechanisms – some of which are reflected in the policy quoted 
above. Many police officers had to leave the force and have been replaced by new recruits 
according to new hiring policies. The department has made progress as reported in regular 
reviews by the consent decree monitor. Yet, previous to this study, four years after entering the 
consent decree, 20% of stops still do not fully comply with the new policies. Infractions range 
from officers not properly introducing themselves, to the use of “boilerplate” language in the 
justification of stops, to unwarranted stops. In one briefing, as observed during this study, of-
ficers are ordered to “round up those shemales” referring offensively to the city’s transgender 
prostitutes – a group singled out in the Department of Justice’s investigation as one of the 
groups targeted by discriminatory police practice. In one interview a white officer is nostalgic 
about the past when he and his partner would put people up against the wall and search them. 
On the other hand, the DoJ’s investigations were based on officers being forthcoming about 
racial biases, and the senior officers in the armed robbery task force denounce the ‘jump-out’ 
strategy as a cause to mistrust in the communities. Without a much larger qualitative analysis 
of police stops, and as internal investigation officers were unavailable for interviews, it is im-
possible to speak to how much change has occurred and what the 20% of non-compliant stops 
are composed of. In the end, whether it is racism by the police, the policing of racist laws, or a 
structurally racist society, policing affects Blacks disproportionately. Given the history of racist 
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policing in the city and the deviancy amplification of recorded infractions as discussed further 
below, it is perhaps fortunate that the databases discussed here were only created in the context 
of the consent decree. 
Observations and ‘gut feelings’ described in the literature, such as someone being out of place 
or behaving strangely (or ‘gut feelings’ in the form of stereotypes), regularly form the initial 
motivation for a stop. As the policy quoted above stresses, this gut feeling still needs to be 
made explicit in the field interview card. When asked about the relationship between those 
observations and information from the database, a task force officer describes:  
“I mean, your observations and your gut feeling is going to come before you 
get to that anyway, before you get to running that name or anything like that, 
so your gut, I mean, for the most part you go with your gut” (Task Force 6, 
District A).  
The aim of this section is to go beyond the human factors of discretion and add another factor 
to the list of influences on officers’ suspicion: databases. To get a better idea of how databases 
inform officers’ decision-making during different stages of these stops, the following analyses 
some situations from two ride-alongs with a task force officer. Although this is by no means a 
representative study of how officers build suspicion, the observations provide an insight into 
the ways in which the database comes into play during a traffic stop. 
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Table 1. Decision-making during patrol. 
ID Initial Observation Direct Contact Searching Databases Action/Outcome Analysis/Comment 
 Vehicles     
1 • Coming from outside the city 
• One front light broken 
• Taking time to pull over 
• Smell of (old) weed 
o Passengers explain that owner of the 
car and themselves smoke, but no 
weed in car 
o Officer does not believe them 
• “The passenger was very nervous”. 
• As they seem cooperative, officer decides not 
to handcuff them but asks them to exit the car.  
• Officer questions if car is brown as reg-
istered on database 
• Traffic attachments for the passenger: 
“Not worried about the traffic. There’s 
something else going on”. 
• Nothing to go on for the officer 
• Does not find any-
thing in the car 
• “It’s not against the 
law to be nervous. I, 
if a cop pulled me 
over, I mean, I might 
be nervous or any-
thing like that if I’ve 
had a bad experience 
in the past. And I 
know, I’ve had a bad 
experience […]”. 
• FIC 
Initial suspicion translates 
into interpretation of data. 
I.e. officer is sceptical 
that the beige car would 
be classified as brown. 
Keeps observing, maintains suspicion from 
passenger being nervous. Officer decides to 
search the car given perceived smell of can-
nabis 
2 • Tinted windshield 
• Upon driving behind the car: Smell 
of Marihuana 
• Driver is videotaping, seen as confrontational 
by officer 
• Father with son: “What makes it hard is ‘cause 
he’s there with his kid. I don’t wanna put both 
of ‘em in the back of the cop car […] or trau-
matize the kid”. 
• Since driver is cooperative and with kid, officer 
asks them to exit car and puts him in handcuffs. 
Does not sit them in the back of the police car. 
• Officer searches the car and finds a small bag 
of Cannabis and a grinder, which he confis-
cates. 
• “You can see he’s had two misdemean-
our arrests in the past, had a traffic ar-
rest, no warrants, suspended driver’s li-
cense”. 
• “This is his old address. He’s from the 
neighbourhood here […]”. 
• No consequence 
Confiscates Cannabis and 
grinder. “That’s all it is. 
He gets a municipal sum-
mons and goes on his 
way”. 
 
FIC, police record 
Database search without 
extra suspicion since of-
ficer has already found 
something. 
3 • No license plate • Driver tells the officer that he had just gone to 
jail for driving without insurance and that the 
police had taken his license plate 
• Officer: “And I was like, ‘they don’t take you 
to jail for that man’.” 
• “So, he’s been arrested for nine felo-
nies, twelve misdemeanours, […] three 
traffic, […]. No warrants on file. […] 
failure to appear out of [different 
county], speeding”. 
• Checks the passenger without result. 
• Clarifying date of arrest to search FIC 
database: “There you go, that’s why he 
went to jail [, traffic arrest]. And the 
reason he didn’t have a license plate, 
‘cause it was a fraudulent license plate. 
[…] now I know this car isn’t stolen 
[…]”. 
Issues a warning as the 
passenger is on her way to 
work and they are un-




Use of database to figure 
out what had happened to 
the driver and if the car, 
since it had no license 
plate, was stolen. 
116 
 
4 • What first appears to be no license 
plate turns out to be a covered plate 
to avoid red light cameras 
• Illegal lane change 
Retrieves passengers’ details. “So, he doesn’t live that far. […] They might 
be heading to his house. She lives on [street 
name]. That is way over there. Give him a 
warning. They have a temp tag […]. […] it 
comes back to the same number. It’s still 
correct”.  




Home address and license 
plate check satisfy officer 
that everything is ok. 
5 • Expired license plate (hence, search 
of license plate gives no result) 
Retrieves details. • Runs the plate again with different year 
and finds the car. 
• Verifies address and insurance 
• Checking her name also gives no re-
sults. 
“[…] she checks out. I’m 
just gonna give her just 
the warning of… ‘Cause I 
mean writing her a ticket 
for that is not…”. 
 
FIC 
Database search confirms 
what officer saw at a dis-
tance. 
6 • Tinted windshield and driver tex-
ting 
  No action as shift ends. There were multiple situ-
ations like this. 
7 • Illegal U-turn   “[…] that lady did that il-
legal U-turn? We would 
have felt it out, but I saw 
the kid […] in the back 
seat. So, I figured she 
probably just did that 
picking her kids up and 
being lazy. It wasn’t 
worth the stop”. 
Time and paperwork for 
unlikely result. 
8 Beat up car with ‘stuff’ in back window 
and on dashboard. “I like this car in front 
of us”. The officer searches the license 
plate. “This is an area known for drugs. 
People come over here and buy drugs 
[…]”. 
 • “His address comes back to [a different 
city]”. 
• Search comes up with a warning that 
owner can carry a gun. 
• Some attachments from other areas. 
• “He doesn’t have any traffic attach-
ments, like unpaid tickets or anything 
like that. So, he doesn’t really have a 
history of anything or hasn’t been on 
anyone’s radar too much […]”. 
 
No action. “[…] you have 
to also remember […] if 
it’s worth it or not. Be-
cause then I could be tied 
up dealing with him and a 
call could come out or 
something else and I’ll be 
missing that or won’t be 
able to help somebody 
else […]”. 
While the database con-
firms his suspicion that 
the car is from outside of 
[the city], the gun and 
lack of records make the 
stop seem not worth the 
effort. 
9 “You see this car backed into a spot in 
the back of the [gas] station? So, let’s 
say someone was gonna rob the store, 
their getaway would be sitting like that 
[…]. And look at it, he takes off when 
the police comes”. 
 Out of state license plate makes search im-
possible. 
Drives a short bit behind 
the car and then turns 
around. 
Cannot search for out-of-
state license plates. 
10 “[…] I got excited there for a second. I 
was like, is this a Mazda? And they had 
[…] four, five kids in there?”. 
   Officers were looking for 
a dark Mazda that was 
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involved in car burglaries 
committed by juveniles. 
 People/Houses     
11 • Officer sees two persons in a house 
that is seemingly under renovation 
or abandoned; on coming closer one 
of them previously sitting outside 
quickly goes inside and shuts the 
door 
• Officer gets out of the vehicle, knocks on the 
door, no one opens 
• Upon seeing what he believes to be a flashlight 
moving to the back of the house he walks 
around the house where he finds a screen 
pushed down. 
• He comes back to the front where the person 
who had closed the door comes out. 
• He handcuffs the person and questions him. 
• The person does not have any keys to the house 
and cannot prove their residence. 
• Gives only a nickname for the second person. 
• “[…] in his wallet, when I took his ID out, was 
[…] a good amount of money in small bills, 
like 5s, 1s, 10s […], which is consistent of sell-
ing drugs”. 
• No outstanding warrants. “I mean, we could sit here 
all night, go on to figure 
out who owns the resi-
dence, if he's supposed to 
be here, but then at the 
end of all that, all we 
would have is a trespass-
ing. […] [The second per-
son] probably had drugs 
on him, and ‘he left and 
he stayed’- kind of thing”. 
 
FIC 
Knowledge of drug sell-
ing processes, suspicious 
behaviour (locking the 
door). 
 
Information will be pre-
served in FIC. Person has 
become of interest to the 
task force as they all 
talked about what hap-
pened. 
 Suspicion 
12 “So, this is a good house right there. […] Did you see the people inside? […] they had a big security dog. We came by here once […], they were out there playing dice and 
they were smoking weed. So, we stopped the car and we went out to talk to them and they locked all the doors in that place”. 
Knowledge of history 
around places makes of-
ficer return to them. 
13 “So these are like all abandoned [houses] and [drug dealers] know that they can hide, like that door is kicked open back there, they can hide stuff inside those abandoned 
houses and they can go get stuff out of it or they can hide drugs or guns in there, or hide out in there if they are trying to hide from the police or hide from somebody else, too.”  
Suspicion towards aban-
doned houses. 
14 “So, this brick house right here, this two-storey one on the corner, supposed to be a lot of drugs”. Intelligence related to a 
place. 
15 “[This area is] for our district, it’s kind of like what you’d say the rough area. […] this is for us where all the trouble happens”. Does he patrol here be-
cause of this knowledge 
or to show me around? 
16 “I know that guy in the pink shirt. So, it’s like you look at him and see how he’s bent over, and his shirt was tighter around his back? You can see he doesn’t have any guns. 
That’s what I was looking for. If you see like their shirt snag onto something or hand in a certain way, then I could articulate [it]”. 
Knowing a person and 
seeing if there is a reason 
for a stop. 
17 “[…] a construction worker at night, isn’t that weird? You see the guy with his lamp on his head? With that ladder right there? […] we’ll see if something comes out, then I 
feel bad”. 
Person’s behaviour out of 
the ordinary. But no ac-
tion. 
18 “So, you saw that guy, just peek out the street up there and then dip back down. In front of this white van right here, we're gonna make a turn. There's gonna be a guy standing 
wearing dark clothes. There you go, this is another area known for drugs and stuff like that. So, these guys out here, he saw us parked down there for a minute. He doesn't want 
us to see his face. [The person on the sidewalk is wearing a hoodie standing with their back towards the police car. The officer tries to make out their face in the mirror.] […] 
when he saw us moving, he went back 'round those on a phone. So, you never know, maybe telling somebody, ‘Hey, the police are in the area’”. 
Suspected reason for a be-
haviour given the loca-
tion. 
19 “These people use like crack cocaine. That’s an abandoned house that they sit inside and use drugs. […] So, the old people are probably the users. The young guy comes in 
and sells to the old people. […] So, I don’t care about the old people. They are users, they have been using for years […]. The guy who is supplying them […], that's the big-
ger fish that you're looking for. You could come out all day every day and grab a homeless person or grab someone like that and find drugs on them and arrest them. It's not 





20 “So, the guy on the bike doesn't fit in. […] So, there are a bunch of old timers here and he leaves when the police come, right? […] he might be […] a middle-man, where he 
goes from house to corner to sell [drugs]. Or he might not be anything. He might just have been on the street corner when the police showed up. But that's why we have to 
investigate more, you know?” 
Knowledge of drug sell-






Table 1 gives an overview of all stops and moments of suspicion during the ride-alongs. The 
order of columns in the table reflects the order of a stop. Suspicion or a reason for a stop come 
from an initial observation, which is then followed by stopping the vehicle or person and a 
direct contact. In most cases, the officer starts searching the databases only after this contact. 
Based on observations and databases, the officer then decides how to proceed as listed in the 
“action/outcome” column. This last step is further discussed below in terms of the influence 
the database has on discretion. In the following examples from this table are denoted by their 
case numbers. 
The task force stops that form the basis to this analysis are different from those that may be 
carried out by platoon officers, especially those tasked with traffic enforcement. Task force 
officers target an area and look for reasons to stop individuals or cars that are suspicious to 
them. They engage in a tactic of escalation: stops begin with an initial reason – such as a traffic 
infringement – and officers aim to discover more serious violations once the engagement be-
gins. As a task force officer explains, 
“If let’s say I was going through that car and I found a gun and the gun was 
stolen. Like that’s how it builds up to doing more work. And it might stop 
gun violence or connect him to where that […] gun got stolen out of a car 
[…]. […] Or that gun was used in a crime and they can match the ballistics 
[…]” (Task Force 1, District B).  
Detailed ethnographic engagement with officers makes it possible to differentiate five ideal 
typical stages during which database checks contribute to persons and traffic stops: 
Before the stop occurs: 
6) Building suspicion: During the phase of initial observation an officer may seek to sub-
stantiate their hunch by searching a vehicle registration while driving behind the 
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suspected car (case 8, although not successful) or to confirm their observation (case 
5). This is impossible when the license plate is not searchable (out of state license 
plate in case 9), when it is a suspicious person, or when the on-board computer 
freezes (see below). 
During the stop: 
7) Routine check: An officer routinely checks for outstanding warrants or attachments, as 
well as car insurance and license. This search is unrelated to the reason for the stop. 
Officers also check for mismatches between the vehicle information in the database 
and the actual vehicle. Although likely a rare practice, one officer also mentions 
searching social media in some cases to inform their suspicion (see also section 6.6). 
8) Verification: Searching the database further can confirm the stopped person’s claims 
(e.g. validity of a temporary license plate, case 4) or help make sense of a person’s 
story (case 3). 
After the stop: 
9) Record suspicion: When an officer does not have sufficient grounds for holding a per-
son but maintains their suspicion, they can record this in the field interview card (case 
11). This way the suspicion can carry over into future encounters with other officers. 
10) Record: Even if the stop does not lead to a police report, officers are required to fill a 
field interview card (FIC) for every stop. This information can then be searched on 
subsequent stops and used in future investigations. 
The following further interrogates these moments of suspicion. 
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Databases contribute ‘facts’ to the officers’ reasoning on suspicion. As such they can moderate 
suspicion: On the one hand, suspicion can be increased when the information given by the 
stopped individual mismatches with the database or the database indicates a criminal record. 
In case 1, for example, the officer increases his suspicion when, at first, he perceives a mis-
match between the car’s colour and the colour that is registered on the database. The database 
provides a ground truth against which observations are compared. Furthermore, the results of 
a name search include the criminal history of a person. Multiple officers say that they would 
be more alert if the individual had a criminal history. For one platoon officer this was a question 
of both staying safe and being more inquisitive:  
“[…] it allows you to, you know, just keep a better eye on that person. Not let your 
guard down knowing that if there is something going on, you know, they've been ar-
rested for all these felonies before and you know, last thing they want to do is […] go 
to prison and you might be the one that puts him in prison the rest of their life”(Platoon 
Officer, District A). 
Knowledge of a person’s criminal history would not only influence officers’ scepticism, sus-
picion and precaution and thereby structure subsequent actions, it can also have implications 
on what actions officers would be allowed to take. As another platoon officer mentions, having 
a felony charge on the record would mean she would check for a concealed weapon which, 
given the sentence, the person would not be allowed to carry. 
On the other hand, suspicion can be decreased when there is no record on the database, or the 
database matches with an observation or the story given by the stopped person. For example, 
in case 3 the driver claims to have gone to jail for driving without insurance. The officer is 
suspicious because this is impossible. The database helps clarify that the person had gone to 
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jail for a different offense and the license plate had been confiscated because it had been fraud-
ulent. The database helps the officer to reinterpret a suspicious excuse into a misunderstanding. 
Table 2 contains a summary of all the different factors that contributed to in- or decreases in 
suspicion during observed stops (with the addition of criminal history as mentioned in inter-
views). Given the small number of observed stops this is unlikely to be exhaustive. However, 
it demonstrates the multitude of other factors that influence suspicion that are also reflected in 
the literature, many of which are observations the officer makes. 
 Reasons for Suspicion Reasons to Lift Suspicion 
Behaviour Avoiding police contact or 
identification (leaving, shut-
ting door, wearing hoodie) 
Being cooperative 
Nervousness  
Taking time to pull over  
Talking among each other 
while officer out of earshot 
 
Parked like a getaway car  
Unlikely story or justification  
Context Out of place/time: construc-
tion worker at night 
 
Young person among old drug 
users 
 
Objects Beat up car  
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Substantial amount of money 
in small denominations 
 
Smell of Cannabis  
Place Being/entering from out of 
town 
 
Area known for drugs  
“rough” area  
Abandoned House  
Intelligence Known house  
Known person  
Person or car of interest 
(BOLO) 
 
Database [Criminal history]  
(Perceived) mismatch (car col-
our) 
 
Being from outside the area Being from the area 
 Lack of warrants and criminal 
history 
 Explanation for story 
Table 2. Factors contributing to suspicion formation during stops. 
Once a stop is initiated, the database becomes influential. However, it only modulates already 
existing suspicion – however biased that may be. The database has little influence on who is 
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stopped and who is not, even if it can provide the excuse for a stop. This is because at least the 
initial suspicion stems from the officer’s observation or, in case of the platoon, a police contact 
that is already in progress. This may become different in the future when police equipped with 
license plate readers or facial recognition cameras may be prompted by technological systems 
to interfere22. As is apparent from Table 1, not every car the officer had reason to stop was 
actually stopped, yet an automated system would potentially highlight all those cars that an 
officer usually would not stop. This is unless the officer can actively deploy the reader to 
quickly check cars that invoke some sort of suspicion. In this case readers would extend the 
possible pretences under which cars could be stopped. 
The database’s influence is perhaps the greatest where it prompts immediate action or biases 
discretion. The first happens when the database alerts the officer to outstanding warrants. These 
function like a repository of orders that can be carried out by any officer once they become 
relevant. The database makes these orders available across time and to anyone with access to 
the database. Biasing discretion, on the other hand, is not as direct. Here, instead of limiting 
discretion, information on the database complicates the decision-making on what consequence 
a violation has. Does a broken taillight warrant a ticket or is a warning enough? These discre-
tionary decisions are the focus of the second part of this section. While most of the analysis is 
based on stops, the database has a similar role when officers respond to calls-for-service. 
 
22 From the police officer’s perspective, this is the major change that automated detection systems will bring about. 
They turn the officer more into a ‘marionette’ that enacts stored instructions, such as warrants and suspicions. 
Counterintuitively, rather than making everyone suspicious, they eradicate or at least partially supersede suspicion 




At first glance, it seems rather obvious: if someone already has a record of traffic violations on 
the database, the officer is less likely to let them get away with a warning. As a platoon officer 
explains, 
“I say for example, I do a traffic stop out there. Traffic violation, I run your 
plate. If I come in contact with you, I’ll run your name. Check you. See if 
you have warrants. Any traffic violations or history of driving and that may 
result in a ticket or not getting a ticket. That’s one example like that” (Platoon 
Officer 7, District A).   
However, the decision of handing out a warning versus a ticket is not as straightforward (and 
techno-deterministic) as the step from recorded warnings to ticket makes it seem. Rather offic-
ers are challenging the database and the law. As the following discussion between two officers 
with an age gap between them demonstrates, the decision when someone should receive a ticket 
is far from clear and officers make judgements on the fairness and expected effectiveness of 
the penalty seeking not to further disenfranchise those they encounter23: 
Young Officer: “I feel like it helps us because you might have a person who has 
a vehicle that they’ve failed to register, maybe don’t have insurance, which we see 
pretty much all the time, it helps in the sense of because you could, this person could 
have been stopped three times in one month and got three verbal warnings for the same 
thing, but now they’re still driving after they got three verbal warnings for the same 
thing, so now you’re just neglecting to do what you have to do to be legal. So, at point 
then I think it’s time to issue a ticket, you’ve been stopped three times this month al-
ready and got three verbal warnings, well now it’s time to give you a [ticket]”. 
 




Older Officer: “See, I don’t think hardship has a time, when you’re on hard times and 
you’re in the city, you’re a female, you’ve got three kids and you’re working at 
Walmart, OK, your resources are going to always go to shelter, clothing, food and ne-
cessities and you’re going to let what you get away with and it’s a hard thing to do when 
you know you’re going to cost someone a month’s pay in fines because for the last six 
months XYZ officers have stopped you and […] told you this, but the problem is you 
just don’t have it. So, you’re making decisions on hardships and you create hardships 
on people that really do not deserve hardships. I know you shouldn’t be driving, I know 
that could be catastrophic too, if you don’t have insurance and you hit my family, I 
understand that”. 
The discussion continued a little longer. After the interview, the older officer takes me 
by the side to tell me that the younger officers were not able to make these decisions 
yet. They would be relying too much on the systems and would not see the bigger pic-
ture. 
Motivated in the same way as the older officer above, the task force officer during the ride 
alongs decides not to write tickets where they would worsen the situation the stopped individ-
uals are already in. For example, a woman that has no car seat for her kids:  
“None of the kids wore a seatbelt or had a car seat in that car. […] We could turn around, 
we could stop that car, we could write her a bunch of tickets, […]. It would cost her, 
but we don’t have car seats to give her. Well, she can’t afford it. So, what’s gonna 
happen if she can’t afford car seats for her kids? You think she’s gonna be able to afford 
to pay the ticket and then get car seats […]? […] I’ve been stupid poor before I had the 
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job. And I know that getting a ticket […] sucks more on top of like already not having 
a car seat”.  
Similarly, the officer decides not to give a ticket to a driver without a license plate who is 
driving his wife to work at Walmart (as the officer observes from her clothes):  
“I’m not gonna write him a ticket. I could have towed his vehicle. You know 
what I mean? But that means she’s not gonna go to work. They’re not gonna 
have a means of transportation. ‘Cause you can see, since January, February, 
March of 2017, he hasn’t gone to court for one traffic ticket, what do you 
think he’s gonna do if I tow his car and write him up? […] you’ve got to pick 
your battles” (Task Force 1, District B). 
The database makes it harder not to act as it will give the history of how often other officers 
have done so before. However, as the older officer argues the concern that someone had been 
only given a warning for too many times may still be overridden by ethical considerations 
around the consequences a ticket may have for the individual. While someone may have been 
stopped before and accordingly have an entry in the database, this does not mean that their 
circumstances have changed. The database is not depriving the officers of discretion but rather 
shifting the basis on which discretion operates by supplying a history of police contact. Here, 
the field information cards designed to track stops and hold officers accountable develop an 
affordance that complicates discretion because of their function creep into stops. 
Beyond the circumstances of the individual case, recorded warnings may be contributing to 
more tickets being issued. Linking to the previous discussion of targeted policing strategies 
versus territorial policing (see section 4.3), this could have consequences for acceptance of 
police and police legitimacy. Access to records and compulsory recording of all stops (as man-
dated by the consent decree) may push the balance ever so slightly from compassion to en-
forcement – thereby commencing a process of deviancy amplification (Young, 1977). Where 
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records on the database are subject to biases in stop decisions, these biases are amplified 
through this mechanism. Future research is needed to establish the extent of this effect. It also 
raises the questions of which information officers should have access to during stops and for 
how long information regarding stops should be available on the systems. 
Whereas the record of prior warnings on the database biases the consequence of an observed 
infraction from warning to ticket, the database’s effect is perhaps even more problematic where 
it biases the assignment of guilt. Decisions from the past can influence decisions in the present 
through the database, potentially distracting from the individual circumstances of the incident. 
This is of particular importance to calls-for-service responses. One platoon officer describes 
how they would base their assessment of who would be at fault in a domestic incident on rec-
ords of previous altercations: 
“[…] typically, in those situations, they’ve called before. You might not be 
familiar with what's going on between that couple, but we have like, the re-
ports that we type, we can search people through that database as well. So, 
you can look at their history and just see that, alright this person normally is 
the aggressor and we’ve got a situation where it's like, this could go either 
way. They both have marks on them, you're not sure where the-- you know, 
who really started it, but then you look and you see you go four reports saying 
you know, the female just has been, you know, just the one that has always 
been, you know, starting the whatever physical engagement, then you can be 
like, well, based on the history, I'm not going to take you to jail today. It 
looks like you're-- we determined you're the aggressor so you're going to jail 
today” (Platoon Officer 7, District A).  
Databases inform officers’ decision making through the ‘facts’ they provide, whether these 
facts would influence suspicion, prescribe an action, or inform discretion. Yet, this important 
information is not always available: information is outdated or plain wrong and the technology 
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stops working from time to time. These breakdowns are subject of the last part of this section. 
As one example, name checks can be performed in multiple systems and would often return 
differing results. The national database would often return search results that are nowhere near 
the searched for name. The department’s own database, on the other hand, would return only 
exact matches leaving no room for variation in spelling. Sometimes this means that officers 
miss important information, as this platoon officer details:  
“Sometimes you'll run a person's driver's license number. You'll get, you 
know, A, B. You run somebody's full name, you get A, B and C. Like some-
times you'll miss a warrant. Sometimes you've already let this person go and 
then it's almost like everything catches up and it's like, Oh, crap. That person 
was wanted for like, you know, whatever it may be” (Platoon Officer 7, Dis-
trict A). 
While these issues mean that checking records can be tedious for officers and they have to 
check carefully that the results actually relate to the person of interest, errors in the system for 
outstanding warrants have consequences on how the situation develops. Served warrants would 
sometimes still be in the system escalating the situation. According to a task force officer: 
“So, now you’re looking at someone that’s wanted, say for armed robbery, 
but he just got out, but they never took it out the system. So, I’m not going 
to be as cordial to you, so to say, if you’re really a bad dude, you see.” (Task 
Force 5, District A). 
On the one hand, officers are clear that no system would ever be perfect, and a database would 
always contain errors: 
“I mean, there’s so much going in and so much coming out, there’s a large 
volume of stuff, of paperwork and entry, data entry that’s just human error, 
people make mistakes” (Task Force 6, District A). 
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On the other hand, verifying warrants with the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) 
takes between 30 and 45 minutes – time that someone is held without a reason if the warrant 
turns out to have been served already. Many officers feel that this is an unnecessarily long 
process. A task force officer blames systemic problems for this issue: 
“Standing in the rain or, you know, being held for-- because we can’t verify 
something. Now, I know there’s always room for error and I understand that, 
but it’s when something is consistent, there’s a problem, there’s a breakdown 
[…]” (Task Force 5, District A). 
The verification of warrants is not the only system that malfunctions, the on-
board computers themselves regularly break down cutting officers off from 
their databases and adding time to stops when officers wait for the system to 
reboot. Officers question the legality of holding persons for a prolonged 
amount of time in these circumstances. For example, one officer asks, “OK, 
and 20, 30 minutes pass, now have you illegally detained someone, just try-
ing to ID them on reasonable suspicion?” (Task Force 5, District A).  
Like the breakdowns of radio communication discussed in the previous section, officers are 
also concerned about how these system breakdowns affect their own safety. A slow system 
steals the officers’ attention and, in the officers’ view, gives the stopped person time to think 
about their actions. As one of the task force officer outlines:  
“It turns into a use of force situation because now they’ve gotten to know 
you, they get to see your personality, they get to read you a little bit, see if 
they think they can wiggle out of the problem, run, do whatever. So, that’s a 
big concern for a lot of officers from what I hear and from what I know” 
(Task Force 5, District A).  
And later:  
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“But everything does equate to officer safety, no matter what because you 
take your eyes off of what you’re doing […] and you’re having all these 
problems, you’re getting frustrated then you lose sight of your peripheral, 
[…] and it’s just they say 99.9% of the time nothing, zero, zero, but that one 
fraction of that one percent, it’s done, and I refuse to be that one fraction of 
that one percent” (Task Force 5, District A).  
Yet, the system’s lag and fragility not only present an obstacle to the officers’ work, some also 
employ it towards their advantage. One sergeant instructs their platoon officers to place the 
suspect in the car while waiting for the NCIC to verify a warrant. This would give them the 
opportunity for a pat down mandated by department policy. However, this pat down would 
usually not be allowed as a person could only be padded down if the officer suspects a weapon 
or can articulate a danger to themselves. Accordingly, a task force officer in a different district 
feels that such a strategy would probably get challenged in court. 
Officers find multiple workarounds to help themselves when the systems are down. Platoon 
officers in district A ask state troopers in the adjacent district for assistance as their systems 
run more reliably. Other officers would use their radio to gain the necessary information but 
sometimes with little success: 
“Sometimes it's bad, sometimes it will be down. I remember probably the longest I've 
seen this system down was almost a week. And it's really hard to do your job because 
you can still contact NCIC and try to get them to run names, like, over the radio for you 
but they're usually-- they're less than willing to like, try to assist you, I mean. So, to try 
to do that, you know, it's also coming with, you know, like a lot of push back, you 
know”? (Platoon officer, District A) 
To prevent everything grinding to a halt when the system goes down, one task force officer 
uses their mobile phone to take a picture of a person’s charge history to ensure they have it for 
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writing the Field Information Card (see below) afterwards. Again, frequent malfunctions create 
a fragmentation of technological practices. 
5.3. Forms, reports, and tickets – (un)intended consequences of digitization  
Every incident comes with several forms to fill afterwards. From tickets that are given out to 
drivers, to field information cards (FICs), to electronic police reports (EPRs), to trip sheets 
recording an officer’s attendance at an incident. Some of these forms are digital while others 
are filled by hand. Electronic reporting carries many advantages: it allows for speedy exchange 
and signing off, mistakes can easily be corrected, information can be copied and pasted, and 
fields can be auto-filled. Electronic forms can also be more insisting than paper forms: when a 
field is not filled the computer can deny the form to be sent. Yet, this is where electronic forms 
develop their own affordances and unintended consequences. Like other technologies de-
scribed in this chapter, electronic forms sometimes do not work or work poorly. In contrast to 
the mission creep of FICs used to inform suspicion as described in the previous section, in a 
double twist electronic forms may also be acting towards the goal of their design without acting 
as designed: Introduced as an accountability measure to monitor compliance with department 
policies, forms regulate police action possibly more because they are cumbersome than because 
superior officers read them. Furthermore, because they are an accountability measure, officers 
revert to paper forms – an even more cumbersome method – where they do not trust the elec-
tronic mechanism. 
To begin with the advantages, electronic forms can be sent off immediately and if necessary 
be reviewed. This replaces intricate paper-based processes in multiple realms. One example 
are traffic tickets: 
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“[…] it used to be, write the ticket, get the carbon copy, give them the copy 
and you would have to drop off a copy of the signed copy here. It would 
physically have to be brought down to traffic court. So now, it’s all on the 
computer so there’s no person picking up tickets every day to bring down to 
the traffic court and potentially losing tickets on the way to traffic court” 
(Platoon officer 7, district A).  
While bringing traffic tickets to the court may be tedious, it does not directly impact on other 
tasks. But the same convenience applies to warrants, as this detective describes, 
“It used to be where you sit there, and you type out a warrant, and then you 
call the judge, and then you're going to drive to the judge's house, or the judge 
might be somewhere else, and you meet him somewhere else […]. Whereas 
now […], you can have an answer from the judge within five minutes” (Do-
mestic Violence Detective). 
Here, the digitalisation of warrants speeds up the process from filing a warrant to its execution 
which impacts the speed with which officers can act. 
Not only can digital forms travel quicker, they are also fundamentally different from paper 
forms in offering reversibility. This means officers can, for example, amend police reports 
when their superior officer requests changes. More fundamentally, they can correct simple in-
put errors. Multiple officers tell of the frustration of starting all over with each mistake made 
on paper. A female platoon officer remembers how she broke out into tears when she took 
down the wrong vehicle identification number twice in a row, having to restart the form every 
time. Furthermore, digital forms allow for duplication or ‘copy-paste’. A male platoon officer 
recounts having to fill paper reports for every single charge of 25 outstanding charges in an 
arrest, filling the same fields with the same information over and over. Last but not least, the 
computer can auto-populate fields such as date and time. This is why a platoon sergeant insists 
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on her officers using the digital system. It would reduce the number of tickets rejected due to 
wrong dates and times. 
Like many of the department’s technologies, forms would not always work as intended. As in 
other cases, the system would break down from time to time making it inaccessible. In one roll 
call multiple officers complain that the software for issuing tickets has stopped working 
properly after an update. To fix the issue they need to take the car in for repairs. In another roll 
call officers are asked to do more traffic stops but the relevant fines are not on the system yet 
so they cannot issue the tickets as requested. While in theory offering reversibility, ‘copy-
paste’, and auto-fill, those features do not always work as expected. For example, information 
does not transition between field-interview card and electronic police report database. Hence, 
officers still need to fill the same information multiple times. The same is true for reversibility. 
In a roll call briefing the sergeant tells the platoon officers not to do affidavits on the digital 
platform for tickets because they would not be able to redact them if they wanted to turn them 
into a summons24.  
Many of the reports officers must fill have been introduced in the wake of the department’s 
consent decree to monitor officers’ compliance with the law and department policies. Hence, 
officers must fill forms, for example, for every stop they carry out. While the forms are de-
signed for monitoring, perhaps as unintended consequence, the amount of forms to fill and the 
cumbersome input provide a regulatory effect on the amount of stops officers would carry out. 
Paperwork makes it difficult to pursue a ‘jump-out-work’-strategy as described in section 4.2.3. 
It takes simply too much effort to fill all the forms that ensue from a stop, which makes officers 
 
24 Affidavits are sworn statements by complainants or law enforcement officers filed with a municipal court con-
cerning misdemeanour offenses covered by city ordinances. Summons are written notifications issued by officers 
for minor offenses in lieu of custodial arrest and require the recipient to appear in court. 
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consider whether a stop would be ‘worth it’ as one task force officer puts it. Future research 
could address the extent of this relation between time needed for paperwork and number of 
stops across different police departments. 
As an example of the hassle that forms can provide, this is a task force officer struggling with 
the stubbornness of a field information card form insisting on certain fields to be filled after a 
traffic stop for an expired vehicle registration: 
“So, then it comes down 'did I pat 'em down'? No, I did not pat 'em down. 
Did they consent to search? No. [inaudible] form completed? No. Was the 
subject searched? No. Body cavity search. I didn't; we can't do a body... I'm 
not a doctor. […] if I click no on a pat down, no I didn't touch the person, I 
gave her a warning. So, nothing else should pop up. But every time. Evidence 
ceased? No. And I gave her a verbal warning. […] It goes back to the main 
pages for vehicle. I missed something. Oh. Required to exit the vehicle. So, 
some of this stuff, the consent decree came up with. And that's their way of 
thinking” (Task Force 1, District B).  
“Their way of thinking” refers to the ‘higher-ups’ or the ‘civilians’ that developed the forms 
and are seen as being detached from the practical work. However, it is the form’s insistence 
that is making the process frustrating rather than the number of categories its authors have 
come up with. After all, many of the fields would be skipped if the form were on paper. How-
ever, it also demonstrates how the form’s authors can (or could) exert more power over its use 
by deploying the affordances of electronic forms.  
Given their use for compliance monitoring and the associated disciplinary measures, filling and 
filing forms correctly is of importance to the officers. Accordingly, when systems break down 
and forms fail to be transmitted officers can lose trust in the system and revert to alternative 
reporting methods. This leads to a multitude of different approaches between officers. As an 
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example, officers are using different ways of recording their work on so-called trip sheets. Trip 
sheets record every incident attended and every stop carried out. Officers report these via radio 
and their sergeant later compares this sheet against their own record. Some officers fill a pdf 
version on their computer, and others carry clip boards with a paper version. Curiously, no one 
seems to be using the online system for trip sheets. A story of an officer who was disciplined 
because of a trip sheet that had been lost during the upload process is making the rounds in the 
department. The head of analysis explains that the servers had unexpectedly not been able to 
deal with the load of the self-updating trip sheet system. However, the officer had been disci-
plined for multiple previous incidents. But given the resistance and technical difficulties the 
analyst had given up on it: “I’m not gonna die on a hill for that one. That battle is lost” (Head 
of Analysis). Where systems do not fulfil their purpose, individual workarounds come into 
existence, fragmenting practice. 
5.4. Summary 
This chapter explored the technologies routinely employed by officers on patrol or responding 
to calls-for-service. The theme of technology breakdowns forms the core of the section on 
dispatch and navigation, cuts across the other two sections, and indeed continues in the follow-
ing chapter. Wherever technologies fail (or lack altogether as in the case of navigation), officers 
find their own workarounds leading to a fragmentation of technological practices and often a 
duplication of efforts across multiple technologies. Sometimes, as in the case of increased radio 
traffic, this leads to problems elsewhere. The issue is amplified where power structures increase 
the dependence on the technologies’ functioning, such as the accountability mechanisms at-
tached to trip sheets described in the previous section. Simultaneously, digitalization can be 
enabling where it makes officers’ work easier as in the case of quick information transfer and 
reversibility afforded by digital forms. The affordances of technologies can also have 
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(un)intended consequences as seen in the possible regulatory effect cumbersome forms have 
on officers’ willingness to carry out stops.  
Finally, the section on databases during stops and calls-for-service grappled with the role of 
databases in officers’ formation of suspicion and discretionary decision-making. Databases do 
not take away freedoms of decision-making but rather complicate the process. During the for-
mation of suspicion, they add information to the usual factors of stereotypes, known persons 
and locations, incongruency, and nonverbal cues (see Johnson and Morgan, 2013) and, at times, 
provide a more legitimate reason for a stop. They moderate suspicion depending on whether 
information on the database matches with officers’ observations. Information from the database 
often structures subsequent action, for example when the database reveals previous convictions 
prompting a more cautious approach by the officer. In their discretionary decision-making on 
penalties officers regularly weigh the fairness and effectivity of measures taking the stopped 
individual’s circumstances into account. The recorded outcomes of previous stops complicate 
this process and possibly push the scales slightly towards enforcement where many previous 
encounters are on the database. This may have consequences for the public’s perception of 
police legitimacy. The influence of records is particularly problematic where they affect the 
assignment of guilt, that is someone becomes more likely to be guilty because they have been 
deemed so in the past. Here, databases lead to deviancy amplification and possibly create a 
feedback loop. 
6. Investigations and surveillance – seeing more and differently 
This chapter analyses the role of various technologies during investigations and for surveillance 
purposes. The technologies discussed here create, each in their own ways, new visibilities, 
whether those are visibilities of new information as in the case of social media revealing 
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individuals connections and details on how they spend their lives, or the visibilities created by 
a network of surveillance cameras and license plate recognition cameras. These new visibilities 
fundamentally transform the spatio-temporal conditions under which investigations and tar-
geted surveillance are possible. Many of these visibilities rely on the technologies’ ability to 
serve as ‘epistemic time machines’ (Waterton, 2010) rendering the past available to the present. 
As such they are of huge importance as constant, proactive evidence gatherers for investiga-
tions. Most of the technologies described here are relatively successful in becoming ‘points of 
obligatory passage’ (Callon, 1986, 1999) for investigations. That is, to successfully build a case 
that stands in court, detectives have to go through these technologies. Consequentially, the 
technologies’ affordances will sometimes impose their own constraints and timelines onto of-
ficers’ work – ‘ordering’ investigations (Law, 1994).  
As with the technologies described in the previous chapters, technological practice is frag-
mented. Sometimes this is because officers have to find their own workarounds to breakdowns, 
other times it is because officers find their own ways of best making use of what the technolo-
gies can offer and the practices vary between different units of the organisation. Finally, with 
new capabilities come new concerns for their abuse - especially where these new capabilities 
are as far-reaching as those described in some of the sections below. This chapter particularly 
discusses officers’ justifications of the use of license plate readers and social media in the con-
text of how they are employed.  
The chapter discusses seven technologies: the first section complements the previous chapter 
by looking at how detectives employ databases to connect to the knowledge created by frontline 
officers filing reports on a daily basis and how they critically evaluate this information. The 
next section discusses network charts which are created for violent crimes based on the depart-
ment’s database. It contrasts the producer’s aim of making information accessible with 
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detectives’ misinterpretations of the networks. Third, introduced to ensure accountability, 
body-worn cameras take on the role of digital witness making officers’ experiences available 
to detectives and replacing witness statements. The fourth section scrutinises how video sur-
veillance transforms conditions of spatiality, temporality, and visibility in investigations and 
targeted policing operations. License plate readers, addressed in the fifth section, provide a 
contrast between the successful automation of surveilling car movements with the organisa-
tional factors that prevent mounted readers from being employed. The sixth section interrogates 
the grey areas that come with the new extensive insights afforded by social media, as well as 
the practicalities of employing social media for police work. Finally, the section on phone data 
highlights the work and sometimes struggle that comes with the task of filtering through troves 
of data. 
6.1. Databases for investigation – connecting knowledges to the present 
What regularly forms the end of engagement for officers is the starting point for detectives. 
Not only will detectives receive the initial electronic police report from the responding officer 
and start their investigation there, adding supplemental reports in the process; reports also often 
become part of the investigation as detectives just as officers will search databases for clues. 
In this way, information recorded in the past for compliance can transform into a clue in a 
future, unrelated case. Databases connect local knowledges produced in different sections of 
the organisation and render them available for future use. Digitizing the reporting system 
means that they become searchable and filterable. With paper, as used before, the trail gets 
easily lost: “[…] you write it on a piece of paper, you put it in a box on the front desk. And it 
never got documented” (Homicide Detective 2). This section analyses the value of information 
held on databases to detectives and the trust they place in it. It also highlights some of the 
technological hiccups detectives experience when searching these databases. 
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The database of police reports connects detectives to the local knowledge that officers have 
who daily patrol their beats. This is especially valuable for major case detectives located at 
headquarters who would not have the regular direct engagement with a locality. For example, 
the information can help them make sense of tips they receive from locals:  
“[…] we'll get tips from people in the neighbourhood, ‘Oh, we heard that the 
person with the nickname of “this” is the one who's responsible for this mur-
der’. And if you don't have someone in that district who knows all the nick-
names of all these people, then you don't really have any way to look for that 
until now, with the field interview card database and things like that. […] if 
anyone ever pulled them over and they said, ‘My name's this, but my actual 
name is this.' […] If that officer records it, we can search by that field. So, 
we can make identifications or potential identifications from that as well, 
which is really helpful” (Homicide Detective 3). 
Information is recorded on every stop. Even if the officer did not find anything but the initial 
infraction the car or person was stopped for, the recorded information can become essential for 
a future case. As a homicide detective describes, 
“[Field interview cards contain] information that we never would have had 
before. […] If you pulled over somebody it was like, OK, you wrote them a 
ticket and let it go. […] I had an investigation where it was a shooting that 
happened. It was a black Honda Accord. They said the person had a donut 
on the tyre. And I went back, so randomly I looked at FIC for a black Honda 
Accord, and there'd be like five or six of them that pulled up. And I'm going 
through them, and lo and behold, one of them had a donut tyre. It was pulled 
over two days later with the guys that wound up being my shooters. So, it's 
useful. If that technology wasn't around, I would've never even known about 
that” (Homicide Detective 2). 
In contrast to searching databases to establish suspicion, as discussed in section 5.2 on police 
stops, detectives use the database to identify suspects for a crime that has already happened. 
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While the first use could be problematic where it is used to conceal illegitimate reasons for 
stops, the detective’s use of databases appears less problematic. Differential access to data-
bases, for example regarding records of minor offenses and inconsequential traffic stops, could 
address this difference in uses. 
Department records are by far not the only data source detectives consult. They use a long list 
of tools to conduct background checks on individuals (registered names, addresses, and phone 
numbers), vehicles (license plate searches, collisions, repairs, towed vehicles), registered guns, 
alerts for credit cards, pawned items, and more. All these data points can add valuable clues to 
an investigation. However, detectives stress that records on their own would not suffice: “[…] 
you have to still do boots on the ground, because this database is just a starting point. We have 
to verify. Some of the information is old” (Homicide Detective 2). Generally, detectives see 
these data sources as aiding their investigation and supplementing ‘good old detective work’.  
While often useful to detectives, the problem of retrieving files that existed with paper forms 
is not completely solved with digitalization. When searching databases, detectives often come 
up against the same issues that platoon and task force officers face as described before. For 
example, detectives are also unable to search or filter BOLOS. To filter electronic police re-
ports detectives in District B help themselves by copying them into Excel. Searches would not 
always retrieve the expected results. A detective in district B, for instance, tries to find reports 
mentioning a specific gun. He starts the search looking for “Taurus” and “9mm” yielding some 
results. Yet, “Taurus” and “9” does not return any reports. So, he tries multiple combinations 
of search terms to try and find a relevant report. Clearly, even in a digitized format, finding 
relevant information can present a challenge. 
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6.2. Network charts – mistranslation of meanings 
Perhaps because information retrieval can pose a challenge as described in the previous section, 
the department has another way of consolidating and delivering information particular to in-
vestigations of serious crimes such as shootings and homicides, as well as conspiracy investi-
gations. An analyst runs a script to extract names from electronic police reports and field inter-
view cards. Based on co-occurrence these are then added to a network chart which is sent to 
the investigating detective. The chart is interactive and links to the underlying files. This chart 
comes together with a report written by the analyst who reads through all the files that the script 
uncovers. As further analysed below, the chart curiously makes little use of its network prop-
erties. Even more so, detectives read unwarranted meaning into the connections and, conse-
quentially, warn of the legal consequences of including these charts in an investigation. The 
analyst’s formal definition of a connection (being named together), collides with detectives’ 
operational definition (conspiration). This highlights the multivalence of charts, their need for 
interpretation, and the potentials for mistranslation. Not adding information beyond what 
would be in the files, other detectives find the charts of little use. 
The network graph includes all names that are mentioned in reports related to an individual 
under investigation. This could be mentions as co-offenders, co-victims, passengers of a 
stopped car or even witnesses mentioned on file. Graphs would rarely contain more than 15 
individuals. The analyst would not go beyond first-degree connections (i.e., only direct contacts 
with the person of interest, not contacts of contacts) unless one connection was related to a 
criminal group. Network nodes would be colour coded depending on the type of report or field 
card they refer to – unless there are obvious groups such as family members or cliques.  
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Social networks, or in most cases here ego networks, are a way to visualize a matrix of con-
nections between listed nodes. The pattern of connections distinguishes a network graph mark-
edly from a list of individuals related to the central (ego) node. Yet, the analyst judges the 
network’s structure uninformative: “The structure often does not say anything” (Analyst 1). 
She argues that the visualisations would be more about efficient display of information rather 
than analysis. The graph should only render all the relevant files more accessible to the detec-
tive. However, this underdetermination of the graph’s connections leads to misunderstandings, 
which the armed robbery task force’s lieutenant fears to impact legal proceedings. Not only the 
detectives, but also prosecutors and defence attorneys could misinterpret the connections as 
proven links. As he describes, 
“[In the network] the analyst basically laid out the fact that because a gun 
was connected on these crimes and it was found in possession of this guy, 
that this guy committed all these crimes, it’s very dangerous to say that, you 
cannot say that, […]. […]. You cannot say that because Brian was arrested 
with a gun that was used in the murder of him, him and him, that he murdered 
him, him and him, right, because I could take a gun and murder somebody 
as easily as he can. […] the analysts have to be up to date on law enforcement 
enough to know that they can’t say certain things, because in this country we 
have, you know, a precedent, it’s called Brady material, anything that we 
gather in the course of an investigation is Brady material and the defence is 
entitled to all of it […]. […] when [the case] gets to court, it’s all going away 
because if you don’t turn that over, you lose the case. […]. But right here, 
there’s this analyst that works in the police department said that the gun that 
Brian had killed him, him and him, and therefore it must have killed him, 
him and him, and, Christine, my client, Christine killed nobody” (Lieutenant, 
Armed Robbery Task Force).  
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Perhaps because of these complaints the analyst started sending the network charts with a dis-
claimer that it should only be used as a starting point for investigations. She also stresses that 
the graphs would not be court ready. 
As the network charts mostly provide another way to access files detectives can search for by 
themselves, some detectives are sceptical about their usefulness. While speaking positively 
about them and hoping for the analyst to work within his unit, the armed robbery task force’s 
lieutenant concedes, “When we get [the social network analysis], that does sometimes assist 
us, but to be honest with you a lot of times we know about it already because the analysis comes 
from cases that we’ve made […]” (Lieutenant, Armed Robbery Task Force). A detective in 
district A cannot recall any case where the tool would have been useful: “[…] in my day-to-
day investigations, I find it not very useful. […] I haven’t had one case that it was useful” 
(Detective 3, District A).  
6.3. Body-worn cameras – from accountability tool to memory aid and evi-
dence collector 
Body worn cameras were introduced as a measure of accountability. However, the cameras are 
another example of mission creep. While possibly serving accountability, the main use officers 
and detectives describe is retrospective in reviewing footage as a memory aid or as evidence. 
This applies both to criminal cases, as well as investigations into complaints against officers. 
The ongoing collection of digital evidence transforms cases that otherwise hinge only on ac-
counts of witnesses. This section provides an overview of these functions before pointing to 
the technological hiccups that exist with body worn cameras where the design tries to take 
control out of the officers’ hands presumably to increase accountability. Because of their ret-
rospective use, the cameras are grouped here with other technologies used in investigations.  
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On every call and for every interaction, officers turn on both their dashboard camera and the 
body-worn video camera. Afterwards, the footage is automatically uploaded to an online plat-
form footage where officers then label the video with the incident’s identification code. On the 
platform, senior officers can review the footage and the compliance team samples some videos 
for checks. This is where the cameras function as a tool for compliance. A district lieutenant 
makes clear that the cameras are about the officers’ behaviour. His officers could not just go 
out “motherfuckin’” people anymore. Similarly, lead officers in the armed robbery task force 
credit body worn cameras as one of the factors in ending ‘jump out work’. Despite this (opti-
mistically, within the spirit of cultural change), the cameras seem to be generally well-received 
with officers displaying a ‘nothing-to-hide’ attitude as reflected in this statement: 
“So, I don’t mind them. I didn’t come on this job to violate people’s rights 
or […] do any wrong to people. So, to me, you know, it’s not a problem 
having […] every interaction I have recorded, you know?” (Platoon officer 
7, district A). 
This is not to say that officers would not miraculously ‘loose’ the camera, or it would ‘fall off’, 
or ‘somehow’ not record. However, to what degree officers would avoid scrutiny in these ways 
is beyond the scope of this study. 
Perhaps one of the reasons for officers’ acceptance of body worn cameras is that they discov-
ered their use. After all, not only those who ensure accountability would be able to re-watch 
the footage but also the officers and detectives themselves. Rather than being a measure of 
accountability, officers refer to mainly two functions of body worn cameras: providing an ev-
idential record and protecting them from complaints25. Officers and detectives refer to the ev-
identiary use of camera footage in three different situations: 1) searchable by officer, date, time, 
 
25 This finding is congruent with research by Koen and Willis (2019). 
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location, item number of the incident, and category, camera footage can make responding of-
ficers’ experiences available to detectives. They provide more detailed information than a po-
lice report written after the incident could contain. For example, a homicide detective describes 
how the footage can sometimes provide crucial additional evidence for closing a case:  
“There was a murder that happened, and right when the officers arrived on 
the scene, a lady walked up to one of the officers. And the officer didn't re-
alize how important this was, because she was kind of scrambling around, 
trying to secure the scene. Somebody basically told them, ‘Hey, I saw the 
guys. I think they went to a warehouse around the corner, but I'm not sure.’ 
That's all she said. And come to find out, there is a warehouse around the 
corner, and right after the murder, they drove right into it. And I was able to 
find that person's body camera because they didn't get any of the person's 
information or anything, and I was able to see who the person was. And, later 
on, I was able to find the person, because it was actually a neighbour, some-
one who stayed in the neighbourhood. So, I was kind of able to go around 
and kind of find that person. So, that's something that if that wasn't around, 
that information would've just been lost” (Homicide Detective 2). 
2) More than clues for an investigation, the footage can become critical evidence. For example, 
in district B’s CompStat meeting, officers discuss recorded footage as an option to pursue a 
case in which the victim does not want to press charges anymore. This use of video footage 
raises questions regarding the role of the victim where prosecution can continue against their 
will. On the other hand, it may prevent the victim from having to testify and relive a traumatic 
experience as further described in the context of social media data as evidence below (section 
6.6). 3) The video can help officers recall more details from a situation they attended them-
selves. One officer, for example, uses the camera footage to write her reports and quote from 
the recordings rather than relying solely on her memory. Other officers say that it helps them 
to revisit a case before testifying in court, which would often be a long time after the incident.  
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Just as footage could serve as evidence in a criminal case, it can contribute to investigations 
into complaints against officers. Officers and detectives highlight the cameras’ use in exoner-
ating officers. The following statement by a platoon officer seems to represent this widely held 
view: “And also too it’s for protection from frivolous complaints, because we get a lot of those” 
(Platoon Officer 7, District A). While judges would usually believe officers under oath, they 
would still expect video evidence. In both uses, the cameras serve as a form of ‘objective’ 
memory that serves as evidence supporting the officer’s view. It would be interesting to know 
how the cameras came to be seen as tools for exoneration rather than investigation into com-
pliance. Perhaps the evidentiary use and cases where officers were acquitted highlighted the 
cameras’ practical use. This quote from a Homicide Detectives supports this perspective: “At 
first, I’m not going to lie, I did not like body cams. But now, I understand why they’re useful” 
(Homicide Detective 2).  
Although mostly working fine, even the cameras would have their technical problems. In the 
newest vehicles, all cameras turn on whenever the car’s sensors notice police lights. The new 
feature of automated recording led to a recording deluge – an increase in non-event videos to 
be tediously labelled by officers:  
Officer 6: “[…] if their lights are activated, any officer that comes in within 
20 feet of my vehicle with that camera will automatically activate it” 
Officer 5: “Even if they’re not on scene”. 
Officer 6: “You know, if you activate the lights, it automatically turns on all 
your cameras, in-car, our two body cameras, so sometimes you got to turn 
the lights on just for traffic control or to get through. Who’s going to label 
an accidental video or non-event video—“ (Task Force, District A).  
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Since labelling videos on the in-car computer was somewhat cumbersome, officers use – 
against policy – their phones. 
6.4. Video surveillance – transforming spatio-temporality and visibility 
This section addresses two separate uses of video footage: detectives use camera footage ret-
rospectively in their investigations, while task force officers use live-CCTV feeds for pro-ac-
tive operations. Cameras and the associated recording devices are limited in terms of where 
they are, what can be seen, whether they record anything at night, for how long they extend 
into the past, and the types of video formats they save their files in. All these limitations affect 
the spatio-temporality of their use and what is visible to who. This first part of this section 
reviews the politics that underly access to cameras determining the spatiality of camera avail-
ability. It analyses how the reliance on video footage for investigations shapes the timeline of 
investigations – including a failed attempt to streamline the discovery of cameras and an out-
look into how artificial intelligence is about to speed up video review. The second part analyses 
the use of cameras in pro-active operations in which task force officers aim to record an offense 
on video. This strategy, mostly aimed at drug crimes, transforms fundamentally what would 
otherwise be a stop and search strategy targeted at known individuals or stereotypical suspects: 
officers wait for an offense to happen within range of the cameras, they see from a different 
perspective, they are seen differently, and they can instantly review footage allowing for new 
observations given a committed offense. Again, video changes conditions of spatio-temporality 
and visibility. 
Video footage plays an important role in investigations and surveillance. Especially detectives 
investigating crimes that happen in public would rely on video footage to solve their cases, 
and, according to a task force officer in district A, juries would often expect video evidence as 
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an effect of TV shows like CSI. The property crimes detective sergeant makes this reliance 
very clear: “We all know with property crimes, unless we got a camera, [often] we ain’t got 
fingerprints, it’s extremely difficult to solve” (Detective Sergeant, District A).  
The department is correspondingly keen on expanding its capabilities. In addition to its own 
recent roll out of 300 cameras spread across the city, complete with blue lights on them, the 
department together with the city aims to increase the number of cameras by incentivising pri-
vate installations as well as attempting to legislate for mandatory cameras on alcohol serving 
premises. Private owners are offered to link their cameras to the department’s network for a 
fee of $25 per camera. In exchange, they are promised increased security. For example, a bur-
glary alarm could create an automatic alert at the ‘Real-Time Crime Center’ (RTCC) that pro-
vides terminals for officers to review and monitor video footage and is managed by Homeland 
Security. The city’s drafted ordinance to mandate cameras outside of alcohol serving premises 
promises to add about 1500 cameras to the network. However, some opposition has formed, as 
one commander explains: “[…] people don’t want to be seen with somebody else’s lady” 
(Commander, Major Case Narcotics). Not everyone wants to live in the vicinity of a police 
camera, even more so when it is equipped with a blinking blue light. Hence, it is not difficult 
to find newspaper reports of protests against the introduction of video cameras and complaints 
about the lack of civil engagement in the process. The placement of video cameras is clearly a 
political process. Given the influence camera placement has on whether and how crimes are 
possible to investigate, the political and economic factors in camera placement, and conse-
quences for the community such as chilling effects26 need further attention but are outside the 
scope of this research.  
 
26 See e.g. Murray and Fussey (2019). 
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The use of video footage sets conditions on the timelines of investigations. Acquisition, han-
dling, and review of video force priorities on detectives and take up a considerable amount of 
time. As the detective sergeant above states, property crime detectives rely on video evidence. 
Accordingly, a detective in District A describes his job as going out to find video from the 
scene. He would spend considerable time driving to the locations of incidents, locating cam-
eras, and soliciting the footage from owners. The immediate collection of video footage would 
be important, as detectives in District B explain, because many cameras would quickly over-
write footage. Here, the technology forces prioritisation.  
Because detectives are often unsuccessful in finding cameras, the department tried to stream-
line the process through an online map of cameras. This map includes all cameras owned by 
the police and private cameras integrated in the network. However, as a detective in district A 
explains, not only does this not include all cameras, the direction cameras are facing would be 
unclear form the map so that detectives would have to check the location anyway. This renders 
the tool useless to detectives. 
Once a camera is located, the handling of the video itself can pose challenges taking time away 
from the investigation. Detectives encounter camera owners that do not know the passwords to 
their cameras, video codecs are difficult to obtain and playback can be limited to real-time 
view, the video quality itself could turn out to be inadequate, and detectives have trouble shar-
ing video files due to size restrictions in emails. To bypass this last issue detectives in District 
B set up a Google Drive account to which camera owners could upload the video. Here, the 
technical difficulties lead to a workaround that could be problematic in terms of data safety. 
Finally, reviewing the footage, especially when it is impossible to speed up the playback, takes 
significant time. While on one evening detectives in district B kill this time eating chicken 
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wings in front of their screens, a new technology that is so far only available in the Real-Time 
Crime Center aims to shorten the process significantly. BriefCam Analytics uses object recog-
nition technology to speed up hour long video footage into minute long sequences by overlay-
ing multiple events. That is, all the parts of the footage in which nothing happens are cut and 
the remaining ones are overlaid. Cars that drove past in a 10-minute space now follow each 
other within the same frame. Because it is based on object recognition, it can also filter footage 
by object. It produces, for example, a short video sequence or a list of photos of all men walking 
through the frame or of all red cars driving in a certain direction across a junction. The resulting 
video presents a fascinating view: “It’s so cool […]. I’m looking for a guy in a red shirt between 
this time and this time and all you just see is people in red shirts. Like, it’s crazy” (Major Case 
Narcotics Detective). Yet, perhaps this kind of software is also creating a new kind of insecu-
rity: what if the software misses something? How does the software compare with detectives 
who may easily miss a crucial moment when watching sped up video? 
The use of video footage in investigations requires time and prioritisation of tasks. It is limited 
to locations where cameras are installed but allows a view into the past and is therefore crucial 
for many investigations. Another area where video is transforming police work is pro-active 
policing. Video has played a role in the department in covert surveillance for some time. Now, 
this is extended by using live monitoring of the recently installed cameras’ video feeds. At the 
forefront of this, task force officers in District A check locations they know to be likely loca-
tions for drug deals. This approach is markedly different from stop-and-search strategies de-
scribed above in section 5.2. Instead of looking for a minor infraction to uncover a different 
offense, officers seek to record the offense itself, that is a drug transaction. Consequentially 
dealers could be charged for the transaction rather than just simple possession of drugs and the 
associated higher sentence could help in reaching a plea deal. However, while this strategy may 
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seem less invasive than widespread stop and search, it not only comes with the invasion of 
cameras installed all over the city, it is also concentrated on those areas predetermined by the 
location of cameras. Furthermore, it can lead to questions of legality where officers misjudge 
an observation as probable cause.  
Beyond these consequences, the use of video cameras in pro-active policing has direct impacts 
on the police actions themselves. The cameras change conditions of spatiality (limited to where 
cameras are), visibility (for and of the officer), and temporality (longer duration of observa-
tions, delayed sense-making). Based on an observation of an operation of District A’s task 
force in the RTCC, the following compares these changes to a patrol strategy and to physical 
covert surveillance (for example, sitting in an unmarked car). 
1) Spatiality: With the cameras being in fixed locations, the camera strategy is obviously 
fixed to the cameras’ locations. This means that officers are waiting for something to 
happen in a space. This is similar to covert surveillance where officers may pick a 
spot to watch, just that the choice of locations is more limited for cameras. This 
tempo-spatiality is very different from patrols where officers’ observations cannot ac-
quire the same duration, but they can encounter suspicious behaviour anywhere. The 
effect of duration is analysed further below. All three strategies contain a bias towards 
drug transactions in public spaces. With the camera strategy this bias is focussed on 
areas where cameras have been installed (Norris and Armstrong, 1999). 
2) Visibility of the officer: On patrol, an officer looks for suspicious behaviour while 
driving past a group of people. This suspicious behaviour would often be a reaction to 
the officer’s presence. This visibility effect does not exist in the same way for the of-
ficer in the RTCC (or for covert surveillance). However, in the observed operation the 
officers’ initial strategy is to combine a visible, police-owned camera and a less 
153 
 
visible private camera at a construction site. In past instances the dealers had moved 
around the corner and out of sight of the police camera but still being in view of the 
second camera. Similar to covert operations, officers are keen not to be detected27. 
Hence, they try to arrest dealers and users at a distance of the cameras – a precaution 
one of the officers thinks may not be necessary: “It’s a big camera, with lights, with 
flashing lights, and they just continue to do it” (Task Force 7, District A). 
3) Visibility for the officer: The camera influences how the officer perceives the situa-
tion. The camera is tiltable, panable and zoomable. However, all motions are delayed, 
resulting in step by step movements. Sometimes the officer zooms in too far, losing 
the person they are following. In the observed operation, the camera’s fixed position 
means that the officer is unable to identify a person sitting behind a pole until the per-
son finally moves. 
4) Yet, while limiting the view in terms of positioning, the camera also enhances the 
view in terms of how far it can see. The exchange the officer observes, for instance, 
happens at a distance at which she would have been unable to see details in person. 
Furthermore, seeing from above allows the officer to spot what suspected buyers have 
in their hand when they would check themselves, palm upwards, after a purchase. The 
high vantage point also puts the officer at the RTCC in a position to direct the officers 
‘on the ground’ to stop individuals moving away from the suspected drug deal – in the 
observed case describing the clothing and naming the street they turn into. The cam-
era operator can coordinate multiple police officers stopping multiple suspects. All 
these aspects are unique to operations using installed surveillance cameras.  
 
27 See also Fussey and Sandhu (Fussey and Sandhu, 2020) and Loftus et al. (2016). 
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5) Temporality: The camera does not change who is deemed suspicious: persons known 
to the officer as drug dealers or users, and those who ‘look like’ drug users, as well as 
those ‘hanging’ at a corner. The officer would follow these with the camera, looking 
for transactions. However, the observation’s duration would allow for a transfor-
mation from initially unsuspicious to suspicious. The person next to a car with a tool 
filled trailer turns from what would have appeared to any passing police patrol as 
someone working in the area into a drug dealer as soon as he is approached by a drug 
user known to the officer. “We were just thinking he is a working man cutting the 
grass” (Task Force 7, District A). Furthermore, known persons which often could not 
be stopped for lack of reasonable suspicion could now be observed until they give 
cause for suspicion.  
6) While this aspect of duration is available to officers conducting covert surveillance as 
well, officers in the RTCC can also immediately review the recorded video feed fur-
ther changing the operation’s temporality. The officer can skip to any moment in the 
footage previously recorded and back to the live feed, without affecting the recording. 
With the recording being instantly available, it would be easier to argue a probable 
cause for search. Usually, during a persons stop this would be impossible and they 
could only perform a pat down during which it would be difficult to locate drugs. The 
recording also allows for delayed sense-making: With the stopped person having 
turned from a local worker into a drug dealer, the officer goes back in the footage and 
tries to identify where they had hidden their drugs – going back further than the mo-
ment of her initial suspicion. She is also able to slow the footage to identify fast hand 
movements. She then directs the other officers to check any places or pockets she 
identifies as possible stashes. As a task force officer in District B explains, this con-
nection between the drug dealer and their stash is almost impossible to make 
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otherwise: “[…] they know that if they don’t have it on ‘em, let’s say they have it in a 
bush next to ‘em or in the mailbox or something not on their person, it’d be hard to 
prove in court possession of that” (Task Force 1, District B). 
6.5. License plate readers -successes and frictions in the deployment of auto-
mated surveillance 
License plate readers are cameras that, as their name indicates, can read the license plates of 
cars. All plates are recorded in a database with a picture and a timestamp. If a database matches 
with a list of “hot” plates of sought for cars, an alert is created and sent out via email. The 
department employs two types of readers: stationary readers that are installed at strategically 
chosen intersections and record all the plates passing by, and mobile readers mounted to patrol 
cars used primarily to recover stolen cars. Stationary readers focus on movement while 
mounted readers focus on detection. Especially the stationary readers are often central to in-
vestigations. They provide a record of the past that is available at a distance. This section first 
examines the considerations that went into the placement and therefore the spatiality of fixed 
license plate readers. It then considers the use of these fixed readers in detective and task force 
investigations before addressing the mounted readers’ incompatibility with organisational re-
quirements. As with other technologies presented here, license plate readers would not always 
be reliable. Officers need to be vigilant for regular false reads. Finally, license plate readers 
record everyone’s movements and, hence, pose a threat to people’s privacy. Consequentially, 
officers feel a need to justify their use highlighting their usefulness in targeted employment for 
serious crimes. Presently, the system’s extent is mostly limited by technical and budgetary 




The locations of license plate readers split the city into multiple zones for which the readers 
register every incoming vehicle on major in-routes. The positioning reflects a combination of 
technically mediated knowledge in the form of hotspot maps for shootings and situated 
knowledge of major routes in the city. The commander who set up the system still has two 
prints of yearly heatmaps of shootings provided by a “GIS guy” from Homeland Security hang-
ing on the wall. He explains that the pattern of shootings was helpful in dividing the city be-
cause it would be relatively stable over time. Similar to the maps described in section 4.2.3, 
these maps provide an important interface between the statistical knowledge and the com-
mander’s situated knowledge of the city. On their basis, he identified travel routes, intersections 
and choke points demarking hotspot areas.  He had put stickers all over the map denoting the 
location of cameras and the direction they were pointing in. As he puts it, “[The person setting 
up the system] gotta be somebody who has a feeling for the geography. […] I grew up in this 
city, [so I know] you gotta take this street to get out” (Commander, Major Case Narcotics). 
Additionally, some of the readers are placed to be in the same location as existing surveillance 
cameras allowing for the reader to take a picture of the back of the car while the camera covers 
the front – and with it potentially the driver. 
The process of placing license plate readers (and sensors more generally) is imbued with con-
tingency. A different commander might have chosen a different crime, seen different choke 
points or based the placement on traffic flows instead of crime. Was it just that shootings were 
stable or is there an implicit assumption that shooters travel between areas, that they signify 
area-based conflict? What other implicit assumptions flow into the placement of sensors? And 
perhaps most importantly what consequences does one chosen placement have compared to 
another? Which crimes become easier to investigate, who is more likely to become a suspect? 
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These questions go beyond the scope of this study but, especially given the increased dissemi-
nation of sensing technologies, will need to be addressed in future research.  
Investigations focus on any movements between the zones created in this manner. In its sim-
plest form this could mean checking a car’s presence in an area during a time of interest in the 
past. For example, this could be checking the alibi of a suspect in a homicide investigation. 
Here, the license plate readers operate as a record of past movements – a record that otherwise 
would not be available or relies on witness statements. This record can also be searched to 
reveal a pattern. The Armed Robbery Task Force, for instance, uses the readers to draw con-
nections between crimes. As the sergeant describes, 
“We get a suspect that’s using a red Honda and we know that car is stolen 
and we have four armed robberies with that and then all of a sudden we hit 
another armed robbery, we may look at their cameras and see if a plate 
tripped anywhere around there and if it does, it gives you another say, ‘Hey, 
he’s probably the suspect in that one, too’” (Sergeant, Armed Robbery Task 
Force). 
Beyond checking if a suspect’s car was in the vicinity of other crimes, the officers from the 
Armed Robbery Task Force also use the records from license plate readers to track the move-
ment of stolen cars in the city, identifying areas of interest for covert surveillance. 
All the above uses start out with a number plate that officers have a (legitimate) interest in – a 
suspect’s car or stolen cars. In theory, the technology can also work the other way around by 
cross-checking all cars in the vicinity of likely related incidents. In this manner, the database 
created from license plate reads can create a list of possible suspects that were present in the 
vicinity of multiple incidents. This kind of filtering is a new capability. However, none of the 
interviewees describes such a use; perhaps because the system does not include enough 
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cameras yet to demarcate areas small enough for any meaningful filtering, or because the de-
partment’s policy requires searches to be justified and based on specific license plates. 
Finally, officers can set up alerts for ‘hot plates’. This is used when investigations are interested 
in present movements of a person. For example, detectives in Major Narcotics have set up 
alerts for cars related to drug trafficking to notify them when they enter the city. Similarly, 
detectives searching for a ‘fugitive’ would add license plates of persons that might be in contact 
with a wanted person. More generally, these alerts are of use where investigations are interested 
in the movement of a car and a related person. What would have in the past required extensive 
physical surveillance is now possible at a distance and employing little resources.  
‘Hot plates’ are also central to the use of mounted readers. Rather than alerting an officer to a 
car’s movement, officers use the readers to detect cars of interest. These could be, for example, 
stolen cars. Alerts generated through this system can be interpreted as pre-recorded prompts 
for officer action. The process by which an officer becomes suspicious of a car before checking 
the plate in a database as described in section 5.2 is skipped. In theory, this could mean that 
patrol officers focus their efforts on vehicles of interest rather than looking for suspicious be-
haviour thereby eliminating some of the biases that come with the latter. Discovering a stolen 
car could also entail an investigation into the driver by stopping the car or, in case of a parked 
car, waiting for the driver to return. However, in practice, the way readers are deployed pre-
vents these uses of the mounted license plate readers. Each district has one police car equipped 
with a reader. When this car breaks down the reader cannot be used, which happens frequently 
as this officer states, 
“The one car we had in the district with the license plate reader, it was down 
for a while. That's an issue we have. Our cars are always going down. And 
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this one, specifically has had a lot of issues. So, you know, we haven't been 
able to utilise it as much” (Platoon Officer 7, District A). 
Furthermore, the readers are mounted on platoon officers’ cars who have little time to patrol 
outside of answering calls for service. And if despite these issues platoon officers get to employ 
the readers, they have either difficulty stopping the car: 
“[…] with our policy, I mean, if it's actually moving, chances are if you try 
to pull it over, you're very limited of what you could do except watch it drive 
away” (Platoon Officer 7, District A)28. 
Or, if the car is parked, they do not have the time to investigate further and just repossess the 
car: 
“You really don’t have time to sit there and sit on a car. You know, just 
recover and go on to the next call” (Platoon Officer 7, District A). 
Consequentially, the readers get little use. Asked by the commander if they made use of the 
readers, the detective sergeant for property crimes in District A replies with an evasive ‘some-
times’. In district B the platoon sergeant and lieutenant do not even know who uses the car 
equipped with the mounted reader. They contact the officer they think should have the car. But 
the officer informs them that he stopped using it months ago as he does not know how to op-
erate it. 
Not only does the readers’ placement on platoon cars collide with other uses of those cars, it 
also interferes with other investigative uses. For example, members of the Armed Robbery 
Task Force are unable to employ the districts’ cars carrying readers: 
 




“I’ve requested on big cases, big investigations, where we can’t quite find 
the vehicle although we’re hearing or receiving information a vehicle goes 
certain places, to have them deploy those cars in a certain area to help us, but 
we’ve run into a roadblock because each individual District, we have eight 
of them here, each District has one car and they are basically dispatched out 
on a daily basis, based on the command of that District […]” (Sergeant, 
Armed Robbery Task Force).  
Mounted license plate readers conflict with the call-for-service function of policing that is 
firmly attached to the same cars. This, in some cases literal, misplacement results in low utili-
zation of the readers29. 
License plate readers do not always work reliably. Officers and detectives stress the need for 
verifying that the plate read by the reader is correct. For example, 
“[…] you may get a license plate where somebody’s one number off or the 
numbers are inverted. And then you look it up, and you say, I’m looking for 
a red Cadillac, and the license plate might come back to a blue Chevy. So, 
you have to verify” (Homicide Detective 2). 
Reads could be off by one number or the numbers could be inverted. Sometimes it is the correct 
number but from a different state. And sometimes the reader would read something else than a 
license plate. White cooler boxes branded “Yeti” and carried on flatbed trucks, as a commander 
explains, would reflect the light in a similar fashion to license plates resulting in a lot of “Yeti” 
entries on the database. Verification is not much of an issue for detectives, whereas officers 
may have to react quickly. By policy they must verify the output. However, in another 
 
29 This issue is not unique to the studied police department (Lum et al., 2019). Koper and Lum (2019) argue, “Our 
sense is that many agencies deploy their LPRs with no particular strategy. LPR technology is often treated as a 
resource that has to be divided equally among administrative units (e.g., districts or divisions) within the agency, 
rather than allocated based on needs assessment. Assignment of LPRs to officers might similarly be made with 
no particular strategy nor any guidance for the officers”(Koper and Lum, 2019: 529).  
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department a misreads has led to someone being wrongfully stopped and held at gunpoint (Fa-
rivar, 2014). 
Not only can license plate readers produce potentially dangerous misreads, they are also a threat 
to privacy as they record everyone’s license plates. With this, patterns of behaviour, such as 
doctors or lawyers visited, or an affair, can become visible (see ACLU, 2013; Merola and Lum, 
2012). Aware of the criticisms around the technology officers defend its use as targeted and 
based on existing suspicion, as well as highlighting its usefulness for investigations. For exam-
ple, this is the Sergeant of the Armed Robbery Task Force: 
“And I know there’s a concern that police are taking just everybody’s stuff 
and they’re fishing it but it’s not like that, it’s used for us, it’s used in specific 
crimes with specific perpetrators or specific suspects to help direct us to iden-
tify and catch them and help us collect the evidence” (Sergeant, Armed Rob-
bery Task Force). 
Similarly, the commander who planned the readers’ placement stresses the “historical” use as 
evidence in cases with existing suspicion. He further points to their main use in investigations 
of violent crimes. According to him, the technology had proved so useful that the department 
had stopped tracking the number of murders, shootings, car thefts, and other crimes solved with 
the help of license plate readers because they became too many to track. Finally, the com-
mander argues that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for license plates: “[…] eve-
rything that you can see with your naked eye, […] we’re not invading your privacy” (Com-
mander, Major Case Narcotics).  
However, despite this apparent focus on certain crime types, the department’s policy does not 
put any limits on the use of the readers apart from them being used for public safety purposes. 
Generally, the system’s limitations are mostly due to the way it is implemented: a) mounted 
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readers’ placement on platoon cars entails limited use as described above, b) budgetary limita-
tions determines the limited number of available cameras, and c) the system’s storage capacity 
limits data retention to six months. The commander illustrates this limit with an example: In 
one location, three cameras cover six lanes coming down from the interstate highway. “You 
couldn’t even imagine. [There are] 20,000 cars in an hour [that] drop off the interstate” (Com-
mander, Major Case Narcotics). 
6.6. Social media – fast-paced insights and new grey areas 
This section first analyses officers’ use of social media for intelligence and evidence gathering 
looking at publicly visible information, creating fake accounts, and asking third parties to pro-
vide access, as well as applying for warrants. It details the importance this type of information 
has in establishing profiles, networks, and locations of suspects as well as evidence gathering 
on illicit activities carried out on social media. It then addresses the practicalities in terms of 
time pressures and skills needed before discussing officers’ justifications for the easy, at times 
problematic, access to information on social media. 
There are two main ways in which task force officers and detectives employ social media: a) 
they use social media to gather intelligence about individuals’ activities, their personal net-
works, and the locations they are in. Some of this information is collected from public profiles, 
some by asking third persons for access, and some through fake accounts. b) They use data 
obtained from social media companies through warrants as evidence. This happens often after 
gathering intelligence or when officers cannot access information otherwise. Note that while 
practically these two approaches go hand in hand, logically the first circumvents the second – 




The most prominent example for intelligence gathering through social media is the strategy of 
the Armed Robbery Task Force. It is central to their targeted strategy (see also section 4.3.2). 
As the lieutenant describes, they use social media to identify suspects’ locations: 
“[…] the robbers would get on social media too and […] they’re talking from 
a location, so we’re able to look at the background and say, […] ‘[…] I know 
exactly where that house is’. So, we go out there, we find the house. So, now 
we know an area where they’re hanging […]” (Lieutenant, Armed Robbery 
Task Force).  
These locations can then be physically surveilled.  
Another officer also outlines social media’s use in exploring a suspect’s personal network and 
thereby widening the pool of suspects:  
“[…] a lot of guys go by nicknames, so it’s kind of easy for us to find. The 
names that they go by in the street is their Instagram nickname, so we just 
type that in and then, sure enough, they’ll pop up and then we’ll kind of have 
an idea of who he hangs out with […]. So, you’re pretty much into the gang 
now without really working that hard […]” (Officer 1, Armed Robbery Task 
Force).  
Information that would have needed intensive physical surveillance efforts in the past is now 
available to officers within a few clicks – without any hurdles. On the one hand it enables a 
strategy that avoids the constant harassment of citizens with stop and search, on the other, 
persons become suspects by association potentially exposing them to more severe interferences 
with their lives. 
This issue is exacerbated where officers use social media for ad-hoc intelligence to inform their 




“I might have a suspicion so let’s say I look you up on social media and […] 
then one of the guys in the picture might be somebody on this wall [of BO-
LOs]. Someone DIU [District Investigatory Unit, i.e. district detectives] are 
looking for. So, now I know that y’all are affiliated or y’all are a rap clique. 
And so, then I start looking up your rap videos. I start looking up on YouTube 
and now I see y’all have guns and drugs in this video. […] So, now we start 
putting together a picture of who these players are and also what kind of 
activity they might be into” (Task Force 3, District A). 
Here, the stop becomes a ‘fishing expedition’ where whatever (biased) observation leads to a 
search for actionable information. This highlights the need for regulation of police access to 
social media. 
Not all intelligence gathering on social media brings up only networks, locations, and some 
idea of the ‘character’ of those targeted, it could also uncover crimes that are committed via 
social media. This is where intelligence gathering bleeds into the evidentiary use of social me-
dia. Whether naked pictures posted without consent, or chats of drug and gun deals, some of 
the examples given by detectives and task force officers would not be solvable without this. 
An example of such an operation is given by the Armed Robbery Task Force’s lieutenant:  
“[…] when they get cars, when they get guns, they take those and eventually 
they sell them off to guys who go out and commit robberies or shootings or 
murders and they do that on social media. You know, we had one kid, he was 
sixteen years old, we had him on seventeen gun transactions on Instagram 
[…]. […] he actually went on Instagram one day, we found the location of 
where he was, […]. […] it was all done on social media and that’s the only 
reason we were able to make that one particular case, that particular day […]” 
(Lieutenant, Armed Robbery Task Force). 
In the case of child sexual abuse, evidence collected from social media helps detecting and 
evidencing crime. As a child abuse detective explains,  
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“[…] we get up on social media, when we want to […] corroborate different 
information in child abuse cases, because again children don’t report. And 
then sometimes we’ll try to look, did the child tell anybody? And sometimes 
we’ll get that information from their social media pages” (Child Sexual 
Abuse Detective).  
Both examples underline the importance social media can have for investigations as a space 
where crimes are committed and recorded. Whereas the gun sale may have been investigated 
with a lead starting in the physical world followed up with a warrant for data from social media, 
the child abuse case raises the question of if and how detectives should seek to detect crimes 
on social media where perhaps there is no prior information that could be used for a warrant. 
The police department has decided not to undertake any blanket monitoring of social media as 
long as there is no caselaw (see further below). 
Part of why social media proves so useful for officers is because of criminals posting infor-
mation relating to their crimes – a fact that multiple interviewees find surprising. Their expla-
nations include lack of awareness, bragging, and, perhaps most convincingly, a new form of 
street credibility. The word-of-mouth street credibility of the 90s, claims the Armed Robbery 
Task Force’s lieutenant, is todays’ visibility on social media. His sergeant illustrates, 
“He is constantly on Instagram and every time he’s on Instagram, he has a 
mini AK47 with him and it’s on Instagram. Now, unfortunately, he’s not a 
convicted felon, but we also know he’s a mid-level heroin dealer and he is 
constantly posting on here, ‘You all come and get me if you want but I know 
you’re scared.’ And in this section of the city […] nobody will go near him 
or mess with him and he’s a suspect in multiple homicides, but no one wants 
to come forward and testify against him because they’re terrified of him. 
And, like he said, he’s all over social media and anybody can see him, and 
they know that he’s got an AK47 with him at all times” (Sergeant, Armed 
Robbery Task Force). 
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Again, does this use of visibility on behalf of criminals justify police searching for these cases 
given their effect on feelings of security in the wider community? Or should the investigation 
begin somewhere else giving access to social media through a warrant only when other evi-
dence is available? The position of police officers on the conditions of access is analysed fur-
ther below.  
Gathering information from social media influences the timing of intelligence gathering and 
investigations. In intelligence gathering, staying up to date presents a challenge that requires 
time and commitment from the officers that is tendentially only available to those in special 
units or major case detectives. As the Armed Robbery Task Force’s lieutenant describes,  
“[…] you’ve got to be on social media every day, because the one day you’re 
not up on the social media is the day they decide to go shoot somebody and 
they’re telling you right there on social media, you know. So, there’s a lot 
of… you really have to buy into it completely and it’s a lifestyle” (Lieuten-
ant, Armed Robbery Task Force).  
Not only does monitoring social media require constant attention, once an officer finds some-
thing and wants to preserve it as evidence, they are presented with a short time window to 
complete a warrant. Particularly Snapchat is mentioned multiple times. 
“I think Snapchat is probably the most difficult one, because everything 
erases right after one day. So, once you find a Snapchat, you have to hurry 
up, get a perseverating letter, then send it, get the warrant, and try to get it 
within a small timeframe. So, I think that's probably the hardest one. […] 
With Snapchat, it’s gone. It’s just crazy” (Homicide Detective 2).  
Even if it is not the social media company deleting data by default, the user could destroy 




“Instagram, Facebook, Twitter. If they delete these things, we can’t see what the content 
is after the fact. They’ll have a record for us to say, ‘At this time, something was posted, 
and then at this time it was deleted’. But they can’t give us what that actual content was 
after it’s been deleted” (Sex Crimes Detective).  
Apart from highlighting the prioritisation necessary to obtain warrants, the resentment dis-
played by both detectives above at evidence having been deleted reveals an underlying expec-
tation of accessibility of records. A similar sentiment is present when detectives speak about 
social media companies returning warrants. For example, this detective complains, 
“They return warrants if there’s a tiny mistake like a missing period in the IP 
address and you have to start the whole process again” (Detective Sergeant, 
District A). 
He continues pointing to the power differential between detectives and those big companies, 
“What am I going to do? They’re bigger than us, more powerful than the 
government and have an army of attorneys” (Detective Sergeant, District A). 
The option to delete, standard deletion cycles, and social media companies’ scrutiny of war-
rants seem to provide more hurdles to data access than any oversight mechanisms within the 
justice system. Because of these hurdles, officers need to be quick in applying for a warrant 
but then may need to wait for a comparatively long time to receive the evidence – which coin-
cidentally creates another incentive to access social media through other channels. 
The extent to which social media is used in intelligence gathering and investigations varies 
between units, and dissimilarly from many of the other technologies described previously, by 
age. This leads to knowledge gaps within the organisation and consequentially divergent use 
of social media across the organisation. Younger officers seem to be more comfortable with 
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using social media. For example, a task force sergeant highlights this shift from physical sur-
veillance to social media surveillance by age group, 
“Young officers will jump on social media and dig around, while my bread 
and butter was physical surveillance. I could stake out a house for 10 hours, 
no problem, I’d be the guy in the tree, in the bush, in a car” (Task Force 
Sergeant, District A).  
Similarly, the Armed Robbery Task Force’s lieutenant credits younger officers with introduc-
ing social media to their strategy:  
“[…] I give credit to a lot of the younger guys because I don’t know Insta-
gram. I don’t think [the sergeant] does, […] but the younger guys know the 
social media better than us ancient guys, right?” (Lieutenant, Armed Rob-
bery Task Force). 
With the increased use of social media comes expert knowledge in writing relevant warrants 
and obtaining court orders, something “[…] that a lot of the guys in the unit become proficient 
at doing […]” (Lieutenant, Armed Robbery Task Force). Some of this knowledge in the Armed 
Robbery Task Force has been developed in a close working relationship with the assistant dis-
trict attorney. 
This knowledge gap between the special task force and other units also becomes clear in how 
much officers do or do not struggle with the data they receive from social media companies. A 
homicide detective describes the painstaking process of piecing together information from 
these reports: 
“You would think you're sending a search warrant to a social media platform; 
they'd send it to you in a format that looks something like the user format for 
that? But, no, it comes in like a very plain text kind of format. And it's hard 
to sort through; you have to read every line just to find what you're looking 
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for. And even then, if there's a message that's sent, it won't show you if there's 
a photograph attached. It will give you this long string of letters and numbers 
that you then have to go into another folder and match those exactly to find 
the photo and bring it. So, it's just, there's a lot of steps to get what you're 
looking for” (Homicide Detective 3).  
A member of the Armed Robbery Task Force on the other hand knows where to look: 
“Sometimes it will be a 12,000-page report from Instagram, but the thing is 
that we’ve learned that they’re using the inboxes and direct messages to con-
duct criminal transactions. They’ll sell guns; they’ll trade stolen cars; all 
through their inboxes. So, that’s where we get a lot of these, a lot of the 
evidence from is there” (Officer 2, Armed Robbery Task Force).  
Here, the lack of knowledge and training causes somewhat of an information overload for some 
officers possibly resulting in delays of investigations.  
The discussion above raised concerns around police uses of social media and the manner in 
which officers can access it. On the one hand, officers can easily go on ‘fishing expeditions’ 
on social media trying to come up with reasons for suspicion against a person. On the other 
hand, some criminal activities take place online and it would be difficult for officers to know 
where to look before they start looking. And then there are varying shades of grey between 
these poles. Legally, as a task force lieutenant explains, police have a lot of leeway in monitor-
ing social media, including the creation of fake accounts: 
“[…] in the United States, we have precedent from our highest courts that 
basically say if we as law enforcement create a fake Instagram account and 
we send a friend request to Daniel and Daniel accepts that friend request, 
everything that he posts from now on, we can utilise, we can do legally. With 
that being said, so we do that, we have multiple guys, multiple detectives and 
multiple accounts and they’re watching guys all the time […]” (Lieutenant, 
Armed Robbery Task Force). 
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Circumventing applying for a warrant by befriending a person of interest with a fake account 
or asking a third person is described as a “creative” strategy by major case narcotics detectives: 
Detective 1: “[…] I can fully understand those rules, […] and those checks 
and balances […] to combat police overreach but it does make you have to 
be more creative”.  
Detective 2: “Creative. Yes. You got to invite the devil in” (Major Case Nar-
cotics Detectives). 
While these detectives accept the dubiousness of some of these methods as necessary, another 
detective sees officers’ easy access as potentially more problematic: 
“[…] when you identify somebody, you can pretty much, for lack of a better 
term, stalk them. And then when you do it from a law enforcement perspec-
tive, it could become problematic” (Homicide Detective 2). 
Similar to the justifications for the use of license plate readers (section 6.5), the justification 
for the use of social media is apart from the use cases described above its targeted application. 
As officers of the Armed Robbery Task Force argue, 
Officer 1: “Typically, people we target. If we develop a suspect in a crime or 
a string of crimes, we will look into him and try to find his specific social 
media page and then that’s… we don’t, we’re not just on social media look-
ing for someone saying they’re doing something, it’s very target specific”. 
Sergeant: “Based on evidence, based on a suspect, on a crime, or a group of 
guys that we have been… we might look at two or three guys involved in a 
crime, we get into them and then we realise that there’s a lot of crime being 
committed in here and that it may grow slightly too. We’re not like kind of 
just searching, waiting for somebody to do something, there’s too much work 
just following the evidence to lead us to the guys rather than just openly 
searching, you know” (Armed Robbery Task Force). 
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However, if the action were always targeted like the officers insist, having a formal process to 
provide safeguards and oversight to social media searches would be completely feasible. In-
stead, as mentioned before, officers rely on publicly visible information, fake accounts, and 
third persons to access much the same data they would receive through warrants. This is where 
a defence claiming the information is publicly accessible anyway becomes questionable. The 
chief of police, for instance, argues, “People put stuff out there. It’s not like we’re doing any-
thing deceptive to get it. When people put things out on a public domain, it’s on a public do-
main” (Chief). However, fake accounts and third persons are deceptive and do provide access 
to private information. 
Finally, the department does not employ blanket social media monitoring – for now. As the 
chief argues,  
 “[…] I’m kind of trying to stay away from all that right now. […] let the 
mess get sorted out. […] There’s no use to having a sense of something that’s 
really controversial when we’re not quite ready” (Chief). 
Homicide detectives have however encountered software used for this purpose in the neigh-
bouring department’s fusion center and with the FBI. The tool alerts to the occurrence of pre-
defined keywords across multiple platforms. They had used it in the past during special events. 
These tools raise new questions, especially when combined with AI, of how individuals should 
come under scrutiny of police. 
6.7. Phone data – data overload, filtering, and curation 
There are two types of phone data detectives and task force officers analyse: phone records 
from the network provider and data called ‘phone dumps’ directly downloaded from a phone. 
Both types of data provide officers with rich sets of data detailing communications, contacts, 
172 
 
locations, and diverse media files. This section focusses on the disparate practices associated 
with phone data and the resulting data overload for some. It also considers the consequences 
this amount of data has for compiling court cases. 
Data from phones can be acquired with a warrant given the officer articulates a reason why 
there might be data associated to criminal activities on a phone. A task force officer gives the 
example of a drug dealer, 
“So, I can write an arrest, […] I believe you are selling drugs […]. And I also 
have to say that, you know what, commonly used for […] distribution of 
drugs, they have contacts in their cell phone […]. So, I can take your cell 
phone as evidence. As part of that case, and I can rip that cell phone, they 
cellebrite it, they plug that in, and it takes all the data off the cell phone and 
puts it into like a PDF file. And I mean it’s thousands and thousands of pages. 
[…] But I can look at everything you’ve had in your cell phone. Get infor-
mation, contacts and location and stuff” (Task Force 1, District B). 
A person’s mobile phone contains a lot of detailed information on a person’s life: contacts, call 
records, messages, location data, and more. The second type of phone data – phone records – 
contain similar information on contacts and meta-data on communications, as well as details 
on locations visited. However, by contrast, it does not include any information on the content 
exchanged in messages. A homicide detective describes this information,  
“The phone records will tell us which cell phone tower their cell phone 
pinged off of at a specific date and time. And, so, that won't give us their 
exact location, but it will give us a general area where they were at the time. 
And then also the people that they communicated with, the different phone 
numbers. So, it's a lot of data to comb through, in terms of latitude and lon-




Again, phone records contain a lot of information. The sheer amount of information presents a 
challenge to officers. Some detectives tell of their struggle analysing the data while others are 
surprised anyone would find it difficult. The challenge, as it presents itself to some, is the 
amount of information in always changing formats. As a detective describes, 
“[…] say I call Verizon, and I ask them specifically for the phone records 
between this phone, the victim's phone, and then this phone, the offender's 
phone, just those two numbers. I just need their numbers, all contacts, text 
messages, any electronic communication, photographs, digital photographs, 
whatever the case is from. Let’s say, July 10th to July 20th. They will send 
me their dump from the whole month of July, both of them, whose phones 
they called. I get everybody's number. It's overload” (Sex Crimes Detective).  
Not only would they receive more information than needed, the information would also be 
structured differently from carrier to carrier. For those struggling with the analysis, this impacts 
on the timeframes of their investigations: 
“[…] once these phone records and everything come back, you look like 
you're in a rat's nest. Everything's just stacked up around you, and you're 
trying to just keep order on everything, each individual-- 'OK, this goes with 
this case, this goes with this case, this goes with this case.' And we have time 
frames. With domestic violence, if they're arrested, we're supposed to have 
10 days to follow up. And if they're not arrested, we have 14 to start making 
contact with the victim and get some type of supplemental report” (Sex 
Crimes Detective). 
While some detectives are overwhelmed with the amount of data, others are not – a reflection 
of disparate data practices. The sex crimes detective quoted above reads the files line by line 
(as do others):  
“It’s a lot of coffee. […] every once in a while I’ll have a cigarette and take 
a break […]. And a highlighter’s my best friend” (Sex Crimes Detective).  
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Other detectives, however, are surprised because the digital files would be easily filterable. As 
a homicide detective describes, 
“For me, it doesn't bother me, because I know what I'm looking for. A lot of 
times they send things in Excel, so I'm pretty good with just finding the spe-
cific cells that I'm looking for. And then I'll take those and put them in some-
thing more readable, and then just plug the coordinates in Google Maps and 
figure out exactly where I'm looking at. I just kind of make my own spread-
sheet, to have it be a more readable format. But I can see, it's so much data 
when you first get it, that if you don't know what you're looking for it could 
be very overwhelming” (Homicide Detective 3). 
In absence of a software solution (mostly probably due to cost, as one detective speculates), 
some units try to solve the issue organisationally. The Major Case Narcotics detectives have 
one detective tasked with analysing data for everyone in the unit. However, multiple detectives 
insist that the person analysing the data would need to know what they are looking for and 
therefore it could often be only analysed by the detectives themselves. Local detectives recount 
how they had been overwhelmed with data in a past case and had asked for assistance form 
two interns at the district attorney’s office. Being unfamiliar with the people, their slang, and 
the area the interns missed a lot of information. One of the detectives stresses, “Nothing can 
beat local intimate knowledge. This is institutional knowledge that you can’t package” (Detec-
tive Sergeant, District A). This highlights the need for software to render information accessi-
ble to officers as those to who it may be accessible despite its presentation may not be in a 
position to understand it. 
The amount of data, as well as individual detectives’ struggle with it also become issues in 
taking cases to court. For those having difficulties wrapping their heads around the information, 
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this can result in feeling unqualified to testify based on their findings30. For instance, this is 
how one detective feels, 
“[…] when I’m getting to court, I’m trying to explain this, but I actually, 
technically, really haven’t been trained to evaluate this kind of stuff” (Hom-
icide Detective 2). 
Beyond the capability to explain the data, the data itself could pose a challenge. Some detec-
tives are concerned that it can endanger their narrative in court. As a child sexual abuse detec-
tive explains, 
“I just want to know the conversation between these two people […]. […] 
Because I’m not interested in the kid’s pictures. Yeah, she might have taken 
pictures of herself in the bathroom, but the defence will use that to discredit 
the child […]. I’m not interested in that. She’s doing what teenagers do. […] 
But […] you give it to me; I have to disclose it” (Child Sexual Abuse Detec-
tive).  
Consequentially, some detectives prefer to employ screenshots as evidence rather than whole 
phone dumps. This allows them to both avoid the information overload and curate the data sent 
to court. 
6.8. Summary 
On their own, many of the technologies discussed here have brought significant changes to the 
character of police investigations. But it is only in placing them side by side as in this chapter 
that the extent of this transformation of investigations by digital tools begins to become visible. 
Moreover, in contrast to uniform, technologically determined practices, examples like some 
 
30 Lack of technical proficiency can have serious consequences. For example, Denmark had to free 32 inmates 
over flawed geolocations from phones used as evidence in court (Henley, 2019). 
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detectives analysing phone records as printouts with a highlighter versus others filtering Excel 
sheets illustrate the diversity of digital practices. One common denominator of the technologies 
discussed in this chapter is that the records they provide render the past ever more accessible 
to investigations. This includes recording infrastructure set up or integrated by the police, such 
as CCTV, license plate readers, and body worn cameras, but also police tapping into recordings 
not necessarily made for law enforcement purposes, such as phone records and social media 
data. These records that are increasingly taken for granted and relied upon could however be 
described as ‘selective memories’: databases only cover police interactions as does video from 
body worn cameras, license plate readers record movements in and out of large parts of the 
city, and CCTV is restricted to camera locations. The spatio-temporality of police activities 
and infrastructures conditions the new visibilities afforded by these technologies and thereby 
shapes the possibilities of future investigations. Particularly social media not only becomes a 
new ‘location’ for criminal actors and acts, but also provides investigators with a wealth of new 
information including individual’s social networks, whereabouts, and activities. 
This chapter further interrogated the temporal affordances of technologies in day-to-day inves-
tigatory practice. The fast pace of social media updates and the speed at which some platforms 
delete records requires task force officers to remain engaged with the medium during proactive 
investigations. Similarly, the speed at which video recordings overwrite informs the urgency 
of detectives retrieving CCTV footage. CCTV also shapes the temporality of investigatory 
practice where officers can instantly review footage to re-evaluate their observations, or where 
BriefCam condenses the otherwise time-consuming search of retrieved video. 
Many of the capabilities described in this chapter raise legal and ethical concerns in their facil-
itation of unprecedented access to private lives. A common justification given by officers is 
that the use of these technologies is targeted and effective. Much of the information like social 
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media profiles and license plate would be public information visible to anyone – an argument 
that is based on the ‘plain view’ test for reasonable expectation of privacy established in Katz 
vs United States31. The constitutionality of license plate readers remains still unclear (see Díaz 
and Levinson-Waldman, 2020; Lynch, 2020). Especially in case of the investigatory use of 
social media, lines become blurry quickly. Using fake profiles or asking third persons enables 
officers to access information for which they would otherwise need a warrant. More guidance, 
for example in the form of departmental policy, could be necessary in this area. Another ques-
tion for criminal justice procedure arises from detectives, with best intentions, seeking to curate 
evidence by collecting it only in limited ways (such as screen shots instead of phone dumps). 
Against the background of an unprecedented amount of potential evidence to be collected, the 
question here is how much evidence is necessary for the legal process and who decides where 
the limits should be. More positively, the example of slow updates on license plate reader hits 
also demonstrates how technology can contribute to enforcing departmental policy, in this case 
the prohibition of car chases.  
Finally, continuing themes from previous chapters are the breakdown of technologies and the 
fragmentation of technological practice: license plate readers not only record false reads, those 
mounted on patrol cars are also rarely used because the vehicles are driven by platoon officers 
responding to calls-for-service; some information on databases is irretrievable because of a 
poor search function; social network maps get misinterpreted; detectives struggle with the 
wealth of video formats and resign to sharing video files on Google Drive because they have 
no other means of exchanging them; and some detectives wrestle with the data overload in 
phone records while others find filtering the data trivial. These observations not only highlight 
 
31 See also California vs Ciaraolo, and for an indication of possible limitations Kyllo vs United States. 
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the multiplicity of technological practice but also its constant evolvement brought about by 
practitioners finding workarounds to problems or new uses for tools available to them. 
Interlude – (in)coherence of order and technological affordances 
This section revisits some of the key insight provided by the US case study to lay the ground-
work for the analysis in the following case. As set out in the introduction to the US case study, 
a multiplicity of ‘orderings’ (Law, 1994) prevails in the police department. With responding to 
calls for service, investigations, proactive policing (or intelligence gathering), patrol (with un-
clear purposes between deterrence, chance encounters and demonstrating presence), and com-
pliance and accountability, there are at least five organisational priorities that criss-cross 
through the previous chapters and that are not always clearly distinguishable. From afar, some 
of these configurations resemble ‘centres of calculation/translation’ (Callon, 1986; Latour, 
1987; Law, 2003) - particularly the CompStat meetings that collect and aggregate information 
on crime to allocate resources for patrol, investigations, and proactive policing. Considering 
Law’s (1994, 2003) argument that the stability of orderings stems from their material hetero-
geneity, the department’s data dashboard could even be read as the materiality supporting such 
an ordering. Yet, there is no such central order controlling both representations (surveillance) 
and translations (domination) to the findings of the US case study. Instead, there is social com-
plexity – ‘mess’ (Law, 1994) – with a multitude of locations in which representations are 
formed and decisions about how to organise action are taken, supported (and at times failed) 
by a multitude of technologies. Representations laboriously assembled by the department’s 
analysts (section 4.11 and 5.3) are sidestepped in parallel systems (section 5.3), turning them 
into weak ‘obligatory points of passage’ (Law and Callon, 1992). Once assembled, the pro-
cessing of these representations is also hardly straight-forward, with crime statistics and ac-
counts of crimes needing to be aligned with a variety of priorities and strategic options (section 
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4.2). While the crime statistics would allow for a form of ‘biopower’ (Foucault, 2009), for 
example by patrolling areas with abnormal crime counts to deter further crimes, the mixture of 
a logic of ‘aggregation and reaction’ and one of ‘attributing causes’ reflects an empirical en-
tanglement of different forms of governmentality (see section 2.2). Even more so, once an 
action is determined based on the centrally available knowledge, the translation of this into 
effects on the periphery rarely works. Rather every step is precarious and often adds new in-
terpretations and priorities. Examples of this are the various strategic priorities in section 4.3 
including the failure of roll calls to pass down instructions for patrol, and even the smaller 
hiccups in relating details for calls-for-service described in section 5.1.  
The analysis of the UK case study described in the next part of the thesis also rubs off against 
(and sits awkwardly with) the conceptual framework of ‘centres of calculation/translation’. 
Here, the data visualisation platform multiplies analysis and interpretation by tasking the pe-
riphery with it, while simultaneously shaping this analysis in institutionalising a focus on indi-
vidual risk and ‘problem-solving plans’ (particularly chapter 8). Becoming an ‘obligatory pas-
sage point’ (Callon, 1999) as the centre of discussions on resource allocation and subsequent 
recording of activities, the platform also turns into a vehicle for managerial surveillance. 
The coming chapters further continue the second main focus of the previous analysis: the tech-
nological practice of police officers. Chapters 5 and 6 have highlighted the diversity of this 
practice and how it is often shaped by breakdowns and workarounds. On the one hand, tech-
nologies like video surveillance, license plate readers, or social media have become ‘obligatory 
passage points’ (Callon, 1999) for detectives if they want to solve cases – just as they are often 
collocated with passage points like major street junctions or an access point to online commu-
nities. As such, technologies change the spatio-temporality of police work (chapter 6). On the 
other hand, this relation is not deterministic. For example, section 5.2 demonstrates how 
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databases do not replace, but rather complicate officer discretion during vehicle and persons 
stops. This relation of ‘affordances’ (Hutchby, 2016) that technologies have in police work is 
foregrounded again in the coming chapter 8 which analyses the co-construction of risk between 
officers and the automated individual risk scores produced by the data dashboard in the UK 




Data Part 2. Demand-driven policing in the UK: How risk scores and 
data visualization shape policing. Preface to the UK case study 
As a result of austerity measures implemented by David Cameron’s Conservative government 
following the financial crisis of 2008, police forces in the UK have suffered from budget cuts 
and increasing demand associated with reduced provisions of social services (see e.g. BBC 
News, 2017; Dodd, 2019; National Audit Office, 2018). One of the interviewees describes the 
situation as following, 
“So, kind of the reason of that, and this would apply to any UK police force, is we're... 
demand has increased, complexity of demand has increased on all UK police forces. At 
the same time budget cuts have come in. We've taken like 60 to 70 million pounds out 
of the organisation since 2010, like 20 to 30 percent reduction in our budget line. When 
our actual demand has probably increased by 20 to 30 percent in that time period” 
(Business Intelligence Manager). 
Under these conditions, the UK force studied here introduced a new data visualisation platform 
(DataVis) to better allocate its resources. In this, the goal associated with this platform is very 
similar to many predictive policing applications. However, the platform has a significantly 
larger range of functionalities from identifying businesses that call unusually often and areas 
where ‘anti-social behaviour’ requires ‘problem-solving plans’, to risk scores for prioritizing 
offenders and victims, to a large number of performance management features. Prevention is 
not only the goal for analysis pointed outwards of the organisation, but also for the analysis of 
workloads and the prediction of burnouts.  
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DataVis32 is a data visualization platform that combines multiple, previously separated, data-
bases and provides officers with various dashboards called ‘apps’ that supply them with pre-
configured views of aggregated data. These may be related to information about crime and 
suspects like maps of recent crimes, crime trends in an area, risk ratings, times when certain 
crime types occurred, or peaks of demand; or performance information like number of out-
standing reports, time frames of victim contact, or number and variety of cases worked by a 
team. The underlying database architecture is relational and allows officers to click through 
different levels of aggregation from force level to a specific patrol beat or individual case files. 
They are provided with multiple options to filter the data according to their needs. DataVis 
provides a “self-service environment” in which officers can do a lot of the data analysis that 
was previously provided centrally. Even more so, it provides them with data analysis that pre-
viously would not have been available due to constrained resources for human analysts. 
The software comprises of around 30 ‘apps’ for different tasks. To give an idea of the types of 
tasks encompassed, the following are some of the more central functions: The Crime Intelli-
gence App comes with a number of different ‘views’, that is a collection of diagrams, lists, and 
maps. It visualises crime trends as number of incidents compared against fortnightly averages, 
puts offences on maps, lists linked individuals, and associated modus operandi. It allows filter-
ing, for example, for burglaries in a certain area, over a certain time range, with a certain modus 
operandi. It can be a starting point for identifying crime series. It also shows forensic recoveries 
made at crime scenes allowing officers to identify promising cases. It links in intelligence re-
ports and a special Anti-Social Behaviour View enables officers to link ASBs to other possibly 





underlying issues. An Offender Management App gives a risk score to, at the time, 218386 
offenders on the system. It outputs a list of wanted individuals, recent prison releases and in-
telligence gaps on individuals. The counterpart is a Vulnerability App that gives risk scores to 
victims. DataVis also includes a Supervisor App, and, as a counterpart, a MyWork App that 
display workloads, demand scores for officers, open tasks and cases linked to each officer. 
The following two chapters analyse the simultaneous standardisation of practice and pluralisa-
tion of decision-making afforded by the software. The first chapter interrogates how patterns 
in the data rendered visible by DataVis and particularly individualised risk scores are inter-
preted and translated into actions. It contributes an empirical perspective on the co-construction 
of risk between officer and software as a counterpoint to common techno-deterministic per-
spectives on predictive policing. The second chapter investigates the effects the software has 
organisationally in institutionalising a ‘threat-harm-risk’-approach through the risk cores, re-
distributing knowledge, and re-ordering performance management. It thinks through the ways 
the software assumes power. Particularly in comparison with the previous chapter this high-
lights the difference in affordances that police information systems can have, which only be-
come visible through detailed empirical engagement. 
The analysis here is based on conversations with seven interviewees in six different roles. 
These are the Business Intelligence Manager with the main responsibility for DataVis’ contin-
ued development, a Tasking Coordinator using DataVis to allocate resources centrally, a Chief 
Inspector and a Neighbourhood Sergeant covering neighbourhood policing (engagement with 
the community in a specific area focussed on proactive prevention), a Detective Chief Inspec-
tor, and two Offender Managers. 
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7. DataVis in practice 
This section focusses on risk scores and crime patterns as ways in which DataVis represents 
the ‘outside world’, that is criminals and crimes. The goal is to show the process of co-con-
struction of risks between officers and software. In a far more complex way than the often-
assumed techno-determinism, officers add their own priorities and practical considerations to 
how they use and interpret information displayed in DataVis. The first sub-section deals with 
the prominent feature of individual risk scores and their interpretation and enactment, while 
the second sub-section describes the identification of crime patterns as starting points for in-
vestigations and ‘problem-solving plans’. 
7.1. Risk scores 
While risk scores are clearly not the only use of DataVis, they form an integral part of the 
strategy for reducing demand. The logic of this approach is rooted in a criminological discourse 
on ‘chronic offenders’ and ‘career offenders’. Beginning with Wolfgang et al.’s (1972) cohort 
study on offending in Philadelphia, criminologists have pointed towards a small share of fre-
quent offenders causing a large proportion of crimes (see e.g. Blumstein et al., 1986; Cohen, 
1983; DeLisi, 2005; Falk et al., 2014; Piquero et al., 2003; Weiner and Wolfgang, 1989). This 
insight has propelled programs of selective incapacitation, for example through ‘three strike’-
laws that seek incarceration for repeat offenses (Visher, 2016; Weitekamp and Herberger, 
1995). Critics have questioned the effectiveness and appropriateness of individual-focussed 
policies based on selective incapacitation (Blumstein and Moitra, 1980; Gottfredson and 
Hirschi, 1986; Kovandzic et al., 2004; Stolzenberg and D’Alessio, 1997; Visher, 2016; 
Weitekamp and Herberger, 1995). Parallel arguments were made a little later in the ‘danger-
ousness’ debate among UK criminologists (Bottoms, 1977; Bottoms and Brownsword, 1982; 
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Conrad, 1982; Floud, 1982). In the 1990s and early 2000s, the legal framework for actuarial 
risk management procedures for offenders comprising of restrictions, conditions, sanctions, 
and enforcements organised through agency cooperation between police and social services 
began to take shape in Britain (Kemshall, 2010; Kemshall and Wood, 2008; Wiliams and Nash, 
2014). This approach integrates actuarial risk assessments of reoffending with assessments of 
‘harm’. More recently, Sherman et al. (2016) distilled these norms into the ‘Cambridge Crime 
Harm Index’ which in turn Liggins et al. (2019) use to attribute the majority of harm to the 
‘felonious few’. The risk scoring discussed here builds on similar assumptions combining of-
fending patterns with a numerical index of ‘harm’. A statement of one of the offender managers 
reflects the ‘chronic offenders’ discourse:  
“So, the concept is really simple. When it comes to sort of burglary, car theft, 
used to be shoplifting. If you take the top 20% of the offenders, […] they 
will commit, roughly, 80% of the crime. So, if you go after that 20% […], 
then, hopefully, you're taking your biggest bite of the cake. You're really 
having the most opportunity to influence and reduce that 80% of crime” (Of-
fender Manager 2).  
However, as the Business Intelligence Manager insists, the focus is not supposed to be on in-
capacitation,  
“[…] we’re not in the business [of] just locking [people up] […] ‘cause we’re 
gonna [be] doing that forever and a day with some of these individuals and 
it’s just non-sensical, and quite frankly, […] we can’t afford it. So, we need 
to be reducing demand […]” (Business Intelligence Manager).  
The ways in which officers interpret risk scores and try to act on them to reduce this demand 
will be the subject of the next two sections.  
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The Business Intelligence Manager, in charge of DataVis’s development, explains how previ-
ous offending and harm scores are combined,  
“[…] this is breaking down those offenders into risk categories. So, high, 
medium, standard risk. […] basically we have a daily model that scores about 
two million people33 in our database every day. So, we have a likelihood of 
offending model that is very similar really to the OGRS, the probation ser-
vices’, OGRS risk modelling34. […] And then, what we do, we, for that ten 
years’ worth of offending, we link it to this concept of harm. So, for every 
Home Office crime classification we've given it a harm value. […] So, what 
we do, we have the likelihood of them offending and then the aggregated 
harm. We kind of put those two together to determine the risk” (Business 
Intelligence Manager).  
The risk scores are then additionally qualified by whether individuals have been ‘escalating’ in 
their offending:  
“[…] if […] harm has been front-loaded around the more recent [events], 
then we have a trigger that actually we're saying that they're escalating. You 
know, so this person has gone from shoplifting, kind of low-level volume 
crime, actually now we're seeing […] serious violence and threats and all the 
rest […]” (Business Intelligence Manager). 
The risk scores, while including an element of prediction, clearly entangle ‘objective’ predic-
tion with normative priorities encoded in the ‘harm’ score. What is apparent here – particularly 
in the visual separation of columns for harm score, reoffending risk, and the combined score 
on DataVis –, is that opposed to ideals of mechanically preventing objective predictions of the 
 
33 It is unclear where this number comes from as it contrasts with 214000 offenders he mentions later, as well as 
218386 offenders mentioned by the Tasking Coordinator. It may include victims for which a harm score is calcu-
lated but who would not appear in the list of offenders. 
34 See Howard et al. (2009). 
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future, the risk scores aim at the standardization of normative priorities. The evolving and 
vague language of risk and harm in laws and statutory guidance35 is translated into simple 
numbers. Whereas calls for transparency in the literature and public discourse regularly aim at 
unmasking the ‘objective’ veneer of the data analysis, here transparency is required to enable 
public debate on these explicitly encoded weightings of normative judgements. 
Furthermore, anyone who has been linked to a case as a subject over the last ten years is in-
cluded in the risk ratings. The Business Intelligence Manager makes clear that individuals 
would not need to have been convicted as “[…] obviously the proportion that gets through to 
conviction is quite small” (Business Intelligence Manager). This raises questions of due pro-
cess and who the final arbiter of guilt should be in the criminal justice system.  
Although the scores are targeted at standardising practice across the organisation, the risk 
scores at first created new uncertainty by highlighting all those individuals that could require 
attention but were previously unknown to officers. In this sense, the logic of risk scores follows 
what the literature review in chapter 2.2 identifies as ‘algorithmic discovery’ (albeit the con-
figuration that DataVis entails does not quite match with that of a ‘centre of calculation’ as 
detailed in chapter 8). As the Business Intelligence Manager recounts, risk scores were ac-
cepted only with the introduction of DataVis because it would enable officers to quickly review 
relevant case files:  
“[…] when we first started doing predictive risk modelling outputs, before 
we had, before you could interact with it, it was just seen as, ‘Oh great, there's 
loads of risk lists flying around the constabulary, which I've got to research 
every single one of them’. Which they can do really quickly now, but they 
 




couldn't back then. […] the organization was quite uncomfortable with see-
ing all the risk” (Business Intelligence Manager). 
Now, instead of arguments of effectivity and objectivity discussed in the literature on predictive 
policing, the standardization of risk assessments and its application to all files without the pos-
sibility of missing a case are the arguments for the adoption of automated risk scores. As the 
Business Intelligence Manager describes,  
“[…] when you start running predictive risk models you've got a really pow-
erful torch and you can see it and it's kind of like, ‘Ooooooh myyyyy 
goooooood’, like quite scary, but you will need to embrace it because you 
can make better resourcing decisions. Appreciating that you can't do it all, 
but you'd rather be able to see it, to make the decision, rather than have that 
lighter, […] where an officer said this person is high risk. Well, hang on, 
what about all these other people we've got a shed-load of data and infor-
mation and intelligence on? You know, we shouldn't just be seeing risk 
through a referral mechanism” (Business Intelligence Manager). 
The notion of risk employed by the Business Intelligence Manager and other interviewees 
seems to point to three separate ideas of risk: First, there is the question of probability of 
reoffending, which does not seem to be the main logic operating here as it forms only part of 
the final score which includes also recency and harm. Second, the disquiet caused by risk made 
visible described in the above quote resonates with Mary Douglas’ (1992) theorisation of risk 
as the moderns’ logic of apportioning blame which then structures action towards avoiding this 
blame. Here, the visibility of risk renders blame attributable to the police where they fail to 
prevent it. On an individual basis, some interviewees fear that the risk scores introduce a new 
professional risk in being held accountable to acting on the scores. However, as section 7.1.2 
demonstrates, the risk scores are far from the only priority for officers who consider other non-
quantified ‘risks’ such as perceived public disorder. Which leads to the third and possibly main 
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meaning of risk: Rather than identifying cases that pose the highest reputational or legal risk to 
the organisation, the risk scores are one of the prioritisations of police work. Functioning as 
priority scores they are believed to reduce crime by focussing police interventions on those 
causing most of the crime. Thus, risk is less related to dealing with future consequences of 
present action, as in the thesis of the ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991), but rather with 
prioritising action to bring about a different future. 
The following sections will look at how the officers using DataVis interpret the risk scores and 
how they act or do not act in response to them. 
7.1.1. Interpreting risk scores and deciding to act 
“What [the Business Intelligence Manager] has said all along is that DataVis is an aid. 
We shouldn’t hold our eggs in that basket, you’ve got to have professional judgement 
as well. You’ve got to have someone looking at that individual, saying, ‘Right, this is 
what he’s suspected of, this is what he’s convicted of’” (Offender Manager 2).  
The goal of this section is to address the new choices officers face when they are presented 
with risk scores, to understand what the risk scores mean to officers, and how exactly they 
interact with the professional judgement mentioned by the Offender Manager. 
Oftentimes critiques of predictive policing paint a techno-deterministic picture in which the 
software decides, and the officer blindly follows – something which under section 49 of the 
Data Protection Act 2018 would be illegal in the UK36. What will become clear in this section, 
 
36 Section 49 contains the right not to be subject to automated decision-making; it states, “(1) A [data] controller 
may not take a significant decision based solely on automated processing unless that decision is required or au-
thorised by law. (2) A decision is a “significant decision” for the purpose of this section if, in relation to a data 




is that the relation is more complex than that. The perceived risk is co-constructed in the inter-
action between officer and software. This is not to say that the software is not ascribed values 
of science and fact. Indeed, the Tasking Coordinator asserts that DataVis would give a better 
assessment of current issues and risky offenders than officers’ “knee-jerk”-assessments in the 
past and the Chief Inspector refers to it as “putting a little bit of science into that”. However, 
all interviewees stress the importance of professional judgement. In fact, the Chief Inspector 
reels back his claim a little later in the interview: “You always have to bear in mind that how-
ever good an algorithm is, it’s not absolute science. It is a guess. That’s all it is” (Chief Inspec-
tor). 
Professional judgement plays not only a role in assessing if an offender that is flagged by Data-
Vis poses a risk, it also encompasses practical considerations around resources, risk scores 
being ‘actionable’, and other strategic priorities. DataVis is helping to “put people on the radar” 
(Tasking Coordinator). However, once on the radar officers have to decide what to do with 
those individuals that are brought to their attention (section 7.1.2 will further elaborate on the 
Figure 5. Schematic of the co-construction of risk. 
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decision making around which actions to take). While the decision risk/no risk may appear 
binary at first, the professional judgment in which DataVis is embedded constitutes a more 
complex process (see Figure 5). In this process the officer decides to filter the risk list according 
to their priorities. This may, for example, be offenders within their catchment area. The soft-
ware then suggests a list of risky individuals, some of which would possibly not have gained 
the officer’s attention otherwise. Unless the software reaffirms the names of offenders known 
to the officer, the officer would then check the individual’s record to decide if the individual 
warrants further attention. This means on the one hand scrutinizing the offender’s file, and on 
the other hand, tracing the algorithm’s reasoning of harm and recency. If the officer finds an 
error in the score, the score is ignored or the error rectified. Beyond this, officers weigh the 
scores against their own mental ‘lists’ of risky offenders that reflect different strategic priori-
ties. While the officer is selective about the risks presented by the software, the software pro-
vides reassurance not to miss risks given the high demand on officers, and draws attention to 
an evaluation of offenders through harm and recency of offending (section 8.2 will address the 
power relations that emerge from this in more detail). The following addresses this process 
along the outcomes displayed in the cross-table of Figure 5: correction or dismissal, affirmation 
and/or action, overruling, and no consideration. It then considers limiting factors that inform 
the prioritisation of individual’s deemed risky because or despite the software’s risk rating. 
First, the necessity of professional judgement becomes quite clear in cases where officers are 
confronted with an unknown offender at the top of the list whose rating is ‘erroneous’ because 
of issues with the underlying data. The software functions quite unlike the ominous ‘black box’ 
in that it allows officers to trace errors. The Chief Inspector describes such a case: 
“[..] we had one person that featured on the most wanted list a few weeks 
ago. It was a female and she was, I think, second highest score; no one knew 
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her. When they looked back on why she was on the second highest score, 
she’d been arrested as part of a murder inquiry, but that was over 20 people 
arrested to probe that murder inquiry. We charged a person; it was a different 
person. Whatever her involvement was, probably fairly minimal, and they 
were not charged, but that has raised their risk score. That's always the danger 
if you just use data alone, you have to apply human intelligence, and you 
have to question, ‘Well if I'm not aware of it, what is there in the back-
ground?’ At least, the system does enable us to look at that background very 
quickly through all the records, […] and then we've removed them from that 
list” (Chief Inspector). 
Spotting and amending errors require an understanding of the factors that go into the risk 
scores. One of the offender managers, who is very aware of how the scores in DataVis are 
dependent on the data held in the force’s record management system, points out that the differ-
ence between being a suspect in a case or solely being mentioned was just a tick in a box. But 
being recorded as a suspect, wanted, or charged would count towards the score. Officers also 
have a sensitivity to the underlying data being flawed. As the Chief Inspector, points out, mis-
takes in filling forms – that is, entering data into the system – are difficult to avoid:  
“So many systems are so complex. You have to do this box. You have to do 
this box. You have to do that. When you are tired, or when your adrenaline 
is flowing, you don’t think about all these things. That’s where we have the 
problems” (Chief Inspector).  
In consequence, officers check where the scores come from and amend errors if necessary. 
Paradoxically, the effort to reduce uncertainty through automated risk monitoring creates new 
uncertainty in its reliance on ‘good’ data. Data quality gains in importance as errors that previ-
ously would have inconsequentially collected dust on a paper file in the archive now cause 




Second, the software’s risk ratings could be in accordance with the officer’s professional judg-
ment, in which case the offender is either already known to the officer or they come as a sur-
prise. In the first instance the risk ratings reaffirm officers’ assessments, in the second they may 
require a readjustment of priorities. The Chief Inspector gives an example of such a change in 
course of action: 
“I don't think DataVis has necessarily shocked me. In one or two occasions 
where someone's brought something to my attention. I can think of one in-
stance. I had a domestic incident: […] It was the sort of thing where a neigh-
bour phoned saying, ‘This has happened. I'm really, really concerned’. […] 
Officers had gone out and said it was two brothers. […] Somehow, randomly, 
that incident had come up on DataVis and it had a really high risk score, and 
someone had the common sense to look at why. They brought it back to me 
and said, ‘I'm a bit concerned about this job’. I looked at it and, actually, 
when we saw the history of the young kid that made the threat, he was a 
person that could go and grab a knife and stab his brother. That information 
was there. You could understand how officers wouldn't have picked it up at 
the time, but that really surprised me. […] We put in place much more rig-
orous safeguards as a result of that. […]” (Chief Inspector). 
Despite such ‘surprises’, most of the times the individuals at the top of the risk rankings would 
already be known to the officers. That is why DataVis has “not shocked” the Chief Inspector 
in the quotation above. But even if the majority of risk ratings is not surprising, these ratings 
fulfil a number of functions: They a) ensure officers do not miss an escalating risk, b) reassure 
them in their own assessments, and c), because officers at higher levels of the organisation have 
access to the same information, hold them accountable to knowing the top offenders in their 
area. Section 8.2.1returns to the issue of accountability. The following quote from the Neigh-
bourhood Sergeant illustrate these three functions:  
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“there was one person, the top offender I think it was, who came up to me, I 
had no idea who they were, but it made us make the inquiries to go, ‘Actu-
ally, who's this person?’ Actually, it was just for one thing from about just 
under 12 months ago that was an attempted murder, but it puts them right to 
the top of the list. But it made you question, why don't we know them? 
Should we know them? It could have easily been someone that we just 
missed. 
Similar occasions really, you get to see, it brings together emerging patterns 
quite easily, without you having to always be on top of everything. What you 
find, so [name] sat next to us now, she'll know the stuff. She'll know the stuff 
before we raise it, frankly. But that to some extent is exactly what you want 
it to reinforce the fact that the guys know exactly what they're doing. 
That's what this does really, so if a question comes down to us about what's 
DataVis showing this person's causing us issues. I would bet my house on 
the fact that all the beat managers here would know all about it, know what's 
going on, the vast majority of them. And would already be doing something 
with it. But if that wasn't the case then you'd need to have to be worried about 
what they were doing” (Neighbourhood Sergeant).  
Third, officers were very aware of types of cases and strategic priorities that would and could 
not be picked up by the software’s risk rating. In cases like these their professional judgement 
would overrule the algorithm and they would keep track of these offenders themselves. For 
example, risks of offenders from outside of the force’s geographical boundaries would be un-
derestimated due to missing records, or cases that escalated quickly but without historical prec-
edent would escape the ratings. As the Detective Chief Inspector explains, 
“Where you've got a bucket, which is empty because you've not offended 
before and you haven't got that history of risk, to go high-risk is harder to 
spot sometimes. I think sometimes ... The example there would be a lady 
who started receiving things through the post, and that escalated to be notices 
around that she was gonna be killed, animals left. There was an incident 
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where she was then stabbed. That wasn't quite so clear on DataVis because, 
one, it was fast-moving, but secondly, there was no precursor […]” (Detec-
tive Chief Inspector).  
In consequence, officers would have to keep track of these cases themselves and rely on their 
professional judgement.  
“It certainly doesn't replace professional judgment because sometimes risk 
is based on your history. Sometimes there are circumstances where some 
person doesn't particularly got a history, but for whatever changes, mental 
health or [other] changes, they're very risky. Sometimes the analytics doesn't 
pick that up because they haven't done anything yet. It doesn't score as a 
high-risk. Your professional judgment and understanding the job and reading 
the victim is still really important” (Detective Chief Inspector).  
Even more interestingly, risk scores sometimes do not reflect the same priorities officers deem 
important. The Chief Inspector, for example, believes a paedophile would pose a risk regardless 
of the amount of information the police would hold on them and hence regardless of the risk 
rating. For the Neighbourhood Sergeant community priorities are as important as the high-risk 
offenders that DataVis highlights:  
“We also have people that we know are high risk in the centre. But the way 
it might be reported, and the way stuff’s done, they’re not necessarily Data-
Vis priorities, but they are community priorities, especially the street com-
munity people here. We got lots of people who are involved in drugs, sort of 
low-level offending, regular low-level offending. They don't hit the marks in 
the same way necessarily. Some do, some don't. […] You got to have that 
[…] professional judgment […]. There's no substitute for the people, and you 
really see that when you've got good beat managers and good PCSOs that 
they can tell you immediately, not just say it's wrong, but why the data 
doesn't collect it” (Neighbourhood Sergeant).  
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It is clear from this statement, that attending to these other priorities also means having to 
justify this decision against the risk scores. 
Fourth, offenders outside of those rated risky by the software and those added through profes-
sional judgement in the cases described above receive no further consideration. “The idea is 
with DataVis, that we’d never miss [anything]. Nothing would slip through the net with what 
you know and what they know” (Neighbourhood Sergeant). After all, DataVis was designed to 
help officers manage their high demand and the related limits in resources. One of the offender 
managers highlights this function, 
“What DataVis is really good for is that we, as our team, we can't keep an 
eye on everyone arrested for burglary or robbery all the time. It's just not 
possible. We're not here 24/7. […] So, what DataVis is really good for is 
bringing up people that we might not have seen before. Might think, ‘Haven't 
seen that thing before. That's a high score. They're escalating. They've got a 
previous for burglary. Let's take a closer look through it’" (Offender Manager 
2). 
So far, this section has portrayed the decision between risky and not risky in a somewhat binary 
way. However, priorities, as in including individuals the software does not rank high, and re-
source limits, as in ignoring those that are not in the ranking or of another priority, indicate a 
more complex process of co-construction of risk. The list of risky offenders is not a static object 
that officers can either agree or disagree with. On the contrary, risk ratings change over time 
and officers have multiple options to filter the lists according to their priorities. As a result, the 
decision of which risk scores to choose and which risk scores to act on is dependent on other 
considerations of resources and priorities that inform the officer’s professional judgement. 
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Against the background of limited resources, the risk scores present officers with new choices 
of who to focus on. The following quote from the Chief Inspector exemplifies the dilemma of 
this decision as well as the flexibility in creating a relevant list of offenders to begin with, 
“[…] we don't have capacity. Our highest risk offenders will produce thou-
sands. If I narrow it down to my area, I could still have several hundred. So, 
then I might want to look at category of risk, I'll just look at my high risk. 
Well, then I can exclude those in custody. But do I exclude the ones that are 
being shown as [being in offender management]? One hopes that they are 
doing the right thing, so maybe I'll exclude those. Then I still have 30, 40. 
Well, with everything else I know people have got going on, I could say 
you're right one per beat manager, but that beat manager is stacked up, that 
beat manager's away, so I've got to take those off. It's a very arbitrary list and 
if I did that today, I can guarantee you next week or in two weeks’ time, 
when my next task meeting is, there will be a couple of different names in 
there. So, do I stop doing these because working with them is going to be 
three, six months? Do I now bring in other people, but then that's adding to 
my list, and I've just said capacity is an issue? Or do I take one point in time 
and say, ‘No, we're going to do these, screw anything else, we'll just focus 
on that.’ There's no policy, there’s no procedure, it's done on gut, gut instinct, 
it's done on a sense of knowing what people are committed with, and just 
trying really to manage maybe the top one or two. If I can do that, well, I'm 
doing one or two more than I was doing, not because I'm not doing anything. 
If I've got capacity to do more, I will try but as I'm sure everyone has said, 
‘constant balancing act’. […]" (Chief Inspector).  
Not only do officers have to decide who of those ranking high to focus on, but, as is clear from 
the quote above, they also decide who not to focus on anymore when someone else has become 
more important. “Occasionally, we have to say, ‘no, sorry. I know they’ve offended but I’m 




Strategic priorities can not only prompt attention to offenders outside of the risk ratings pro-
vided by the software, as described above, they can also inform the way the software’s risk 
ratings are produced in the first place. The Chief Inspector is filtering the list by area and of-
fenders being out of custody, the Business Intelligence Manager mentions filtering by age when 
focussing on minors, and filtering by type of offence. The Offender Manager also suggests 
filtering those that are escalating in their risk versus those that have a high risk score that is 
fairly static. Filtering is a key component of the co-construction of risk. In contrast to a techno-
deterministic view, the software makes the officer consider new risks as much as the officer 
makes the software reflect their own priorities. 
Beyond deciding what the ‘actual’ risk is, the Neighbourhood Sergeant points to another di-
mension that informs the tasking decisions: do officers know what to do about a risk. Even 
further: do they judge it to be the right moment to do something. These professional judge-
ments, which will be addressed in more depth in the following section on what steps officers 
take based on the risk ratings, shift the decision to a set of considerations that are outside the 
software’s scope. 
The co-construction of risk allows for a tension between risk ratings being merely about aware-
ness and the accountability that comes with this awareness. The awareness perspective makes 
sense given the limitations of resources, the arbitrariness of picking the top offenders of differ-
ently filtered lists, the open question of when police attention should stop or be reallocated, 
and, finally, the complexity of what actions would be appropriate for ‘managing’ an offender. 
Consequentially, the Neighbourhood Sergeant sees a high risk rating as “[…] a standpoint for 
you to have to pay some attention and find out what’s going on” (Neighbourhood Sergeant), 
and the Chief Inspector welcomes the added awareness even when no action is taken:  
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“Even if we assess [the score] and say, ‘Okay, we can see where it’s gone 
up, but it’s all because of historical stuff and, actually, there isn’t anything 
happening. They have that high score, fine at least we looked at it and made 
that decision’” (Chief Inspector).  
The police force made the strategic decision not to have procedures that would dictate who to 
focus on based on the risk scores. As the Business Intelligence Manager explains,  
“[…] we didn’t want to go down the route of saying, ‘right, everyone who 
comes in the top twenty needs to do something […]. […] this is a tool, you 
know. So, actually, ‘I didn’t do anything with this one because I was dealing 
with this one as a high-risk referral that came in’. […]. […] on the whole it’s 
not that regimented. Because I think, we’d get into problems if we did. And 
I think, […] it would almost take away that judgement element to it […]” 
(Business Intelligence Manager).  
Yet, the Tasking Coordinator argues that DataVis helps in creating accountability for those that 
ignore the ratings of high-risk offenders. In a complementary way, the Chief Inspector fears  
“[…] the time when we go to something, the information is on DataVis say-
ing this is a really high risk, we’ve got to do something. We’re not aware of 
it. And someone turns around and says, ‘It was there. Why didn’t you do it’? 
and someone is then held to account” (Chief Inspector).  
Especially the public would have not much understanding for limits in capacity and capability 
that could have undermined the necessary actions.  
The individual responsibility of deciding who poses a risk is diffused through local tasking 
meetings that review the top risk offenders and locations. In these meetings other priorities that 
are not picked up by DataVis can be discussed and prioritised. Section 8.2 will return to this 
issue of governance.  
200 
 
7.1.2. Actions from risk scores 
“Take the carrot or we’ll beat you with the stick” (Offender Manager 2). What the Offender 
Manager describes are the two basic options officers have in dealing with offenders: enforce-
ment or assistance in areas like housing, drug rehabilitation, or finance. As mentioned above 
the decision of acting on a high risk score is partly informed by the officer’s assessments of 
how and when best to interact with the individual. This assessment seems to differ with an 
officer’s role: for the DCI and for Central Tasking enforcement seems to be the focus, for the 
offender managers it is more assistance, while the neighbourhood policing officers bridge the 
gap between both poles. A fourth use of risk scores exists in providing ad-hoc intelligence 
during emergency-call handling. The following will outline these four different approaches to 
risk scores.  
The Detective Chief Inspector stresses the reactive use of DataVis in prioritizing who to arrest 
and which crimes to investigate.  
“[…] so just say it’s a GBH [grievous bodily harm] outside in the street. 
Basically, with DataVis, we should be able to see actually the offender is 
high-risk. So, the review should be, okay, I’m the Sergeant, I recognize that 
the offender is high-risk for these reasons, I’m prioritizing this investigation. 
[…] I can see the victim is of high risk, so I’m gonna safeguard the victim. 
We can’t deal with everything as a priority. We can’t. It’s too much work. 
DataVis must be part of that prioritization along with that professional judge-
ment. […]” (Detective Chief Inspector)37. 
As the Chief Inspector puts it: “[…] who is it we need to go out and arrest that will have the 
biggest impact?” (Chief Inspector). Similarly, the Tasking Coordinator points out how DataVis 
 
37 DataVis includes offender risk scores as well as risk scores for victimization.  
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would be used to identify the top twenty offenders with outstanding warrants or offenses on 
the record management system to task operational support teams with arrests to make. Not only 
would DataVis help in prioritizing these, it would also help in filtering out those who were in 
custody already as DataVis drew on data from multiple data bases. At the time of the interview, 
14 of the cases with outstanding warrants according to the system were also recorded as being 
already in custody. In the past, officers would have still been knocking on doors looking for 
these persons.  
Prioritizing by risk scores, the Business Intelligence Manager explains, changes the focus from 
solely looking at the severity of a crime to taking the offender into account. Now, a shoplift 
that is committed by a high-risk offender would receive more attention. “[…] it’s all about the 
person, not necessarily the offense in terms of that perspective” (Business Intelligence Man-
ager). DataVis institutionalises a prioritisation of enforcement around the dangerousness of an 
offender including the value judgments encoded in the risk score. 
A second use of risk scores is the prioritization for offender management. The Business Intel-
ligence Manager is quite keen on stressing that “enforcement is what we do”, he laughs, “but 
it’s not in a vacuum. Where we need to do the doors in or all the rest of it, we will do, but 
ultimately we’re wanting to reduce demand” (Business Intelligence Manager). And in another 
part of the interview: “’cause ultimately, we’d be doing that forever and a day. This is about 
getting upstream and resolving and, like, managing offenders, rather than just targeting them” 
(Business Intelligence Manager). While the Business Intelligence Manager suggests that de-
mand is reduced through management programs by solving underlying issues and thus prevent-
ing any reoffending, the two offender managers, more realistically, highlight the success of 
merely extending the period of not offending.  
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Offender Manager 2: “Somebody that's so entrenched in crime, it's unlikely 
that you're gonna stop them offending forever and turn their lives around. 
[…] But the best thing for us to do, is if we can extend that period of not 
offending to three months, six months, 18 months, then we've prevented all 
that harm and unpleasantness to all the members of society. Which is, for us, 
what it's really about”. 
Offender Manager 1: “Yeah, for someone who's committed a hundred bur-
glaries of... to have six weeks crime free, that is 150 less victims in the area 
that you're working in, which is an incredible success”. 
Extending the period of no offending for a few months would not only prevent some of the 
harms caused but also reduce the amount of resources invested in attending and investigating 
crimes. 
There are multiple “management programs” that provide the organisational structures for 
providing offenders with assistance. Based on public reports, there are two main management 
strands: MAPPA and IOM. MAPPA stands for Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements 
and deals with registered sex offenders, violent offenders sentenced to 12 months or more, and 
those that ‘pose a serious risk of harm’. The arrangements exist for every police force in the 
UK and are led by police, probation and prison services with Social Services, Health Services, 
Youth Offending Teams, Jobcentre Plus and Local Housing and Education Authorities under 
duty to comply. Representatives of these agencies meet, at different intervals depending on the 
risk, to discuss and share information about an offender38. As of March 2018, the force has 
more than 2500 MAPPA eligible offenders in its area. However, the majority of these would 
be managed under ordinary arrangements. The second strand is IOM, which stands for 
 
38 Previous research suggests that there is resistance to this form of cooperation and information sharing among 
participating agencies resulting in police and probation services being the main participants (see e.g. Nash and 
Walker, 2009; Reeves, 2013). 
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Integrated Offender Management. Integrated Offender Management is like MAPPA in that it 
brings together police, probation, prison, and recovery agencies. It targets serious acquisitive 
crime. Within IOM sit IRiS and IMPACT. IRiS focuses on ‘domestic abuse, domestic extrem-
ism, sexual offending, criminal groups, and serious organised crime. While IRiS focuses on 
‘the most serious and high-risk individuals’, IMPACT targets those at high risk of reoffending 
but with a lower harm risk, such as acquisitive crimes. It comes with nine pathways along 
which offenders are offered support: drugs, alcohol, accommodation, children and families, 
finance, benefit and debt, mental and physical health, attitudes, thinking and behaviour, educa-
tion, training and employment, and for women: domestic abuse and sex work. Finally, the force 
has a version of the Troubled Families program which supports families in cooperation with 
local councils. Problems that are addressed are crime or ‘anti-social behaviour’, irregular 
school attendance, children at risk, individuals at risk of financial exclusion, domestic abuse, 
and various health problems. 
The purpose of the meetings as described by the offender managers is to gather information on 
where the offender is in their life. Are they using methadone, what was the result of their latest 
drug test, do they have access to housing, or have they split with their partner? The agencies 
would meet on a bi-weekly basis to discuss offenders and possible ways of keeping them on 
the ‘pathways’ by providing opportunities like educational training or voluntary work. How-
ever, if the offender managers judge the individual not be following the right path, for example 
having relapsed into drugs or being linked to a new series of burglaries, they arrange for sur-
veillance teams or capture units to eventually re-arrest them. The carrot is hanging very close 
to the stick:  
“[we] say to them, ‘Alright, if you reduce your offending, we will help you. 
We'll help you with your drug or alcohol abuse, we'll help with your housing, 
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we'll help you with issues with your family, with finance. All these different 
pathways, we will help you. If you don't take my help, then you go to number 
one on the list, or you go up the list, and we will prioritize arresting you and 
locking you up’” (Offender Manager 2).  
The decision making around who is kept in a management program, who does not require the 
same attention anymore, and who should be prioritized for arrest instead, is again dependent 
on professional judgement of the offender’s progress. These judgements are translated into risk 
categories of red, amber, and green, which are then used to decide, for example, the frequency 
of meetings concerning an offender. DataVis helps in making these judgements by making 
information on an offenders progress along the ‘pathways’ easily accessible. 
Offender managers may decide that the management program is not working when an offender 
does not accept any help. As one of the offender managers explains:  
“They say this is what I do. I'm happy doing this. When I get caught, I'll go 
to prison, I'm not going to change my life. It gives me what I want, it ticks 
all my boxes, go away. So, they go. And they go constantly through that. 
They go to court; they go to prison. They come out of prison after a very 
short stint because it might be hundreds of shop thefts. We cannot really 
change them unless they're ready to be changed so we have to put all our 
efforts into the right people. The ones that we can help to change” (Offender 
Manager 1). 
What is clear from this statement is that the decision to prioritize arrest when there is no en-
gagement also speaks to the limited resources for managing offenders and the resulting need 
to prioritize those that are more promising to be successful. This is similarly true for the second 
way in which offenders may leave the management program: engaging with the support and 
not offending for a while.  
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“If we look at them and we say, ‘all right, for the last three months they've 
been engaging, they're in employment, no signs of drug use’, we'll probably 
take them off, because it's important that we keep it fresh, keep bringing 
those on that really need our scrutiny at that time. Be it positive scrutiny or 
negative” (Offender Manager 2).  
Instead of being due to a decreased, computed risk score, this is the result of professional judge-
ment of the offender’s progress. 
The neighbourhood policing function somewhat bridges the gap between the prioritization for 
enforcement and the prioritization for support. The Neighbourhood Sergeant describes both 
activities, the prioritization for arrests as well as close cooperation with ‘safeguarding partners’, 
private rental teams, housing association and street community meetings with a group of agen-
cies. However, his focus are powers instated by the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing 
Act 2014. These powers, an iteration of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, set limits to individ-
ual behaviours and, therefore, are neither supportive nor immediately punitive. He gives an 
example of their usage:  
“[…] one of our guys who's wreaking havoc in the centre […]. The work 
went in to getting some form of control over his behaviour and it was only a 
couple of weeks ago, [a second officer] managed to get a CBO [Criminal 
Behaviour Order] on him. The new form of ASBO [Anti-Social Behaviour 
Order]. So that excludes him from the main areas [where he has been] of-
fending. Putting conditions on, really controlling his movements and what 
he can do, because he was that problematic, he needed that element of con-
trol. […] it’s generally orders, injunctions, CBOs, we got community protec-
tion notices and warnings that they dish out here like confetti at times, but 
anything that will just give us a little extra control over their behaviour. […]. 
So, when somebody is raised as a problem, we look at how to put the work 
in to stop them being a problem going forward. […] I think [second officer]’s 
vision is to see him locked up” (Neighbourhood Sergeant). 
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There are three things to note about this: First, without going into all the details of the legisla-
tion, five of the seven powers instated in the 2014 Act are supposed to restrict an individual’s 
actions and prevent so-called anti-social behaviour39:  
• Civil Injunction:  
o Issued by a County or High Court on conviction for any criminal offence, 
o can include prohibitions and positive requirements, 
o penalty for over 18s is unlimited fine or up to two years in prison for civil con-
tempt of court. 
• Criminal Behaviour Order (CBO): 
o Issued by a Criminal Court, 
o can include prohibitions and positive requirements, 
o penalty for over 18s is a fine and/or up to five years in prison, 
o breaching the order constitutes a criminal offence. 
• Dispersal Power: 
o Issued by a police officer in uniform or a Police Community Support Officer 
(PCSO), 
o requires individual to leave an area for up to 48 hours, 
o penalty is a fine and/or up to three months in prison, 
o breaching the order is a criminal offence. 
• Community Protection Notice: 
o Issued by police officers, PCSOs and others, 
o can include prohibitions and positive requirements relating to issues like graf-
fiti, rubbish, or noise, 
o penalty is a fine, 
o breaching the notice is a criminal offence. 
• Public Spaces Protection Order: 
o Issued by councils after consultation with the police and other agencies, 
o can include restrictions or requirements, or target behaviours of certain groups 
at certain times, 
 
39 More detail can be found in the legislation and the statutory guidance (see Home Office, 2017). 
207 
 
o can also restrict access to public spaces, 
o penalty is a fine, 
o breaching the order is a criminal offence. 
While the Neighbourhood Sergeant is unspecific about what the controls on behaviour and 
movement are, the Crown Prosecution Service’s guide to the relevant case law can paint a 
clearer picture (see Levy and Hall, 2019). Cases that have been approved by the courts institute 
restrictions on individuals such as prohibiting begging in a specified area, wearing clothing 
with an attached hood, carrying spray cans in public, being drunk in a public place, associating 
with or contacting specified individuals, entering a specified area, being in possession of drug 
paraphernalia, carrying a mobile phone not registered under their own name, entering a list of 
car parks, congregating with a group of a certain size, carry a knife, being somewhere else than 
a specified place during a specified time. These are just some of the examples that have been 
tested in court. What becomes quite clear is that these restrictions can be far reaching.  
This leads to the second point to note about the quote above: The Neighbourhood Sergeant is 
relatively sure that the individual will breach the criminal behaviour order eventually and end 
up back in prison. The orders lower the evidential threshold and increase the likelihood of arrest 
for actions that would otherwise be legal. The Sergeant notes that community protection notices 
and warnings are “dished out like confetti”. This suggests that they are used frequently and are 
easy to obtain. Particularly in a context of resource deprived social services due to the same 
austerity conditions that motivate the use of risk scores, the use of ASBOs/CBOs as a fast route 
to re-incarceration confirms some of the fears from when ASBOs were first introduced by 
Blair’s government; namely, ASBOs circumventing prosecution under criminal law through 
the use of civil law and eroding principles of due process, proportionality, and protections of 
young people (see e.g. Burney, 2008; Crawford, 2009; Squires, 2008). 
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There is another application of risk scores which the Chief Inspector mentions, that is ad-hoc 
intelligence when interacting with an individual. The Chief Inspector describes the use of mo-
bile access to DataVis and its integration into emergency call handling:  
“Yes. They got mobile access, so if they're out and about and they're stopping 
someone on the street, what is the history of this person? Or going to go to a 
domestic. Someone sent us some risk factors, what are they? What is this 
person threat or risk score? Very quickly see there's a warning for weapons, 
violence. […] I think it does a lot more dynamic risk assessments. Intel cell, 
headquarters, 24/7 linked in with prompts, so when a job comes in, there 
immediately at, who is this person” (Chief Inspector)? 
Unfortunately, given the functions of officers interviewed here, the interviews do not provide 
more information on how this ad-hoc information may change officer decision-making. How-
ever, as the discussion for the US department suggests, the information held on police databases 
is a) not neutral and contains errors, and b) becomes part of officers’ discretionary decision-
making. 
In summary, detectives and tasking unit employ the risk scores to prioritize investigations and 
arrests, offender managers use them to decide who to prioritize for support as long as this seems 
fruitful, and in addition to arrest and support, neighbourhood policing prioritizes individuals 
according to their score for setting limits to their behaviours, and ultimately conditions for their 
arrest. Given that the different options come with different legal thresholds that have to be met, 
as well as more general considerations on what measures may support or sufficiently restrict 
an offender, police officers have to make professional judgements not only on the risk someone 
poses, as described in the previous section, but also on what actions are appropriate. 
Even more so, the offender managers and the Neighbourhood Sergeant describe the timing of 
effective support as something that can only come from professional judgement.  
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“I think there's a lot of support that can be provided, there's a lot that’s avail-
able, and it can be really effective, as long as the person is ready. […]. I was 
in the town centre, probably about three or four weeks back, we saw some-
body trying to fill up their housing sheets in the doorway where they were 
sleeping. It was quite problematic for them, but they were trying, which for 
us would be an indicator that this person might be at that point where we can 
do something with them. But then, the next day they might not be. A day 
after they might be again, you don’t know, but that person, at the moment is 
still out and about, still doing what they were doing, still causing problems. 
But there must be something there that is a button that we could press. We 
just need to try the different things to get them there. I believe in the stuff. I 
think this is as much about timing as it is about what's available” (Neigh-
bourhood Sergeant). 
7.2. Patterns: starting investigations and addressing demand 
When it comes to data about what is happening outside of the organisation, risk scores are not 
the only view DataVis provides. Interviewees mention two more functions of DataVis: filtering 
available data to generate starting points for investigations and filtering the data to identify 
major sources of demand to then develop what the officers call ‘problem-solving plans’. Being 
able to identify starting points for investigations without the assistance of a specialised crime 
analyst speaks to what officers call the ‘self-service environment’ that DataVis creates. The 
structural consequences of this are discussed in the next section. Creating ‘problem-solving 
plans’ from identified sources of demand has consequences for the visibility of workloads 
within the organisation which will also be addressed in the following section. This section 
considers the decision making that patterns surfaced through DataVis enable. 
DataVis visualises crime trends and locations for officers and provides a whole range of ways 
to filter crime data to what is of interest to the officer. If officers become aware of a recent 
crime series in their area, through looking at crime maps or otherwise, they can try and overlay 
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these patterns with other information. For example, the Tasking Coordinator, the Detective 
Chief Inspector, and one of the offender managers suggest looking at recent prison releases and 
comparing past areas of activity with the newly occurring crimes. Cases can be filtered further 
by modus operandi or type of stolen good. One of the offender managers provides an example 
of this analysis:  
“So, for example, these are all in the last seven days. You might look at this 
map, and you might think, ‘Well, there is the [motorway]. Is it somebody 
traveling along the [motorway]? Do we want to start looking at automatic 
number plate recognition cameras to see is there a common vehicle traveling 
at the times of these burglaries?’ You might want to see who lives in the area, 
so you can overlay that map now. You could choose some impact offenders 
and see where's their home address in relation to those burglaries” (Offender 
Manager 2).  
This analysis does not have to happen within only one type of crime. Based on their knowledge 
of the individuals involved, the Tasking Coordinator suggests that officers could try and link 
anti-social behaviours to other crimes like criminal damage. He also demonstrates the ‘Forensic 
Recovery’ app that displays which crime scenes have been attended and how many forensic 
recoveries had been made from them. This could help in identifying promising cases for further 
investigation. All these tools provide basic analytical capabilities to officers across the force. 
While one could argue that officers are able to make more informed decisions given the data 
analysis they have at their fingertips, there may also be some concern that this is replacing local 
knowledges, especially given the resource constraints that make building local knowledge in-
creasingly difficult. The software’s availability in conjunction with resource constraints some-
what changes the information that goes into professional judgements from local knowledge to 
patterns in the data. Accordingly, the offender managers see the simplicity of analysing data as 
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a double-edged sword as they fear this to make officers lazy in keeping up with what happens 
within their remit: 
Offender Manager 2: “What's really important with policing, and I think 
we've lost it a little bit, I'll be honest, is having local officers in their areas 
knowing their offenders, knowing the crime times. I showed you those bur-
glaries on the map, a few years ago we had a burglary team, we had some-
body that would look at those every day. If we had those burglaries in [this 
town], he would be able to tell you who was likely to do it. Not from any 
computer program, but he would look, how did they get in? Was it through 
the cat flap? What time of day was it? Did they use a car to do the burglary? 
Did they take a car from the burglary? All of those things. You simply cannot 
replace human judgment and memory and ability with inanimate control. 
[…]”. 
Offender Manager 1: “And I think that's the same for all our agencies 
as well. We do use that sort of knowledge where people have got a really in-
depth understanding and they can almost, you say, feel it in your bones, you 
know which direction to go. And this makes you lazy to a degree”. 
The same patterns used to start criminal investigations can also be used to inform decision 
making with the goal to reduce demand. The Business Intelligence Manager discusses identi-
fying sources of demand this way, 
“So, these are like the top 20 locations in the force for where calls come in. 
So, we can visualize them. With these top 20 locations we see how many 
hours we've […] spent at the scene managing that incident and then add a 
dramatic costing to that 'cause we know how much a police hour costs” 
(Business Intelligence Manager).  
Officers could include or exclude different types of locations like hospitals, children’s homes, 
mental health facilities, or retailers. Filtering common locations like hospitals, the Neighbour-
hood Sergeant explains, could reveal drug addresses or other locations providing another 
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starting point for further investigation. Once a location is identified as causing a lot of demand, 
officers are asked to create a ‘problem-solving plan’ to reduce this demand. In the case of a 
retailer, this could mean identifying a duty manager that is more likely to call and having a 
conversation with them, as the Business Intelligence Manager suggests. Or, as the Tasking 
Coordinator says, checking if the retailer is employing enough security staff.  
A location of high demand is not always associated to a particular premise, it can also be a 
larger area. The Chief Inspector gives the example of a whole neighbourhood:  
“[This neighbourhood] is an area of social deprivation. It's the highest de-
mand area in the force, things like crime, domestic assaults, domestic abuse 
for antisocial behaviour. We've historically had lots of problems with chil-
dren from the ages of eight, nine upwards, where they are just running feral 
in one of the main areas out there […]. They will press the emergency stop 
button on buses, which then cues the bus they need an engineer to come […]. 
They will set fires. They will run into shops and deflect stuff, and run out 
again, down to a level of kicking footballs in the car park to vex people out. 
[…] Each damage has an incident, but that's just a single thing. What we're 
looking at is the whole wide picture, so we bring in and associate those in-
stances to a problem-solving plan. […] we're dealing with partner agencies, 
we've done a lot of work to engage with young people with some of the youth 
providers, bringing in outside services with the skills” (Chief Inspector).  
While this sort of area is less likely to be identified through DataVis – the Chief Inspector refers 
to there having ‘historically’ been problems –, DataVis is used to register problem-solving 
plans and, hence, renders the associated workloads visible. This internal visibility of work has 
organisational consequences discussed in the next chapter. 
Analogous to the individual risk scores, patterns that initially cause concern can turn out to be 
irrelevant. According to the Neighbourhood Sergeant, violence against the person hotspots, 
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while taken very seriously, can be anything from a cluster of low-level public order offences 
to murder. He is very clear that one would need to understand the detail and context of the 
information at hand. For example, he would be more concerned about violent offences in public 
rather than an ongoing private conflict:  
“[senior officers] were concerned about the violence against the person 
hotspot. ‘cause it was flashed up on one of our systems. But it was in a house, 
between two individuals, but in a house. The two people known to each other. 
This was being raised to a public meeting as potentially a high-risk issue. 
Actually, when you looked at it, there was only a couple of incidents. It was 
just like mad people shouting and screaming coming home drunk. It wasn't 
actually of any relevance to the wider public. The rest were very behind 
closed doors. People knowing each other’s’ issues, so you need to be careful 
how you use the information, and where you put it as well. It's a very differ-
ent picture” (Neighbourhood Sergeant). 
There is a sense of dissatisfaction with the issue being raised solely based on a high level Data-
Vis score in the Neighbourhood Sergeant’s statement above. In that case an issue had been 
raised without looking further into the data as the Neighbourhood Sergeant would have ex-
pected. The following chapter will explore these tensions between different interpretations of 
the data further. 
8. Reshaping the organisation 
While the previous chapter explored professional judgement and agency in the context of Data-
Vis’s data visualisations regarding what happens outside of the organisation, this chapter turns 
the gaze inwards, towards the effects that DataVis’s introduction has within the police force. 
In a first step this means looking at how DataVis changes the distribution and use of knowledge 
within the organisation. The second part of this chapter then focusses on how DataVis 
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institutionalises processes by turning them into a thing, as well as sources of its legitimacy, and 
the mobilisation of facts as argumentative devices. 
8.1. Redistribution of knowledge and pluralisation of decision-making 
The introduction of DataVis to the force changes the structure of how information is ex-
changed, aggregated, and analysed. Whereas before central analysts would look at crime pat-
terns and prepare briefing documents for tasking meetings, now a lot of this analysis has been 
automated so that the officers themselves can access and analyse the data. As outlined in the 
previous chapters on the use of DataVis, DataVis’s main feature is that it provides a way for 
officers to access the data at different levels of aggregation (force-wide, within a city or for a 
specific patrol beat, individual case files) and filtered to specific interests (types of crimes, 
types of locations, date ranges, etc.). Even more so, it allows officers to seamlessly move be-
tween these different aspects of the data. DataVis makes all the steps of the aggregation trace-
able, which the manual process of writing reports on crime trends or patterns would not allow 
for.  The re-distribution of analysis and decision making from central positions to individual 
officers using the software leads on the one hand to a changed role for crime analysts, on the 
other, it means changes in scale: in the amount of different perspectives from which the data is 
analysed, the amount of data itself that can be analysed, as well as the speed with which it can 
be checked. It also means that the interpretation of the data happens where officers have 
knowledge of the instances that are reflected in the data. DataVis automates a lot of the higher-
level report writing that aggregates files at different levels. But the increased accessibility of 
files also means the creation of another type of work: ‘data work’. Errors that create skewed 
risk scores as explored in the previous chapter have to be corrected. This chapter explores these 
aspects in more detail. 
215 
 
Interviewees referred to the structure of DataVis in terms of “self-service” and “democratising 
insight”. The Chief Inspector describes how it makes data insights instantly available:  
“Prior to [DataVis] if we wanted any sort of information about crime […] 
patterns, we'd have to ask an analyst. An analyst would then spend a week or 
two getting it, they would then send us a picture, which is already a week or 
two old. We were always chasing our tail; we were always responding after 
the event. What we quickly identified through DataVis, from its initial use 
was, okay, this is a great way of, we call it democratizing information. Put-
ting the information in the hands of the people that need it. At a very simple 
level I can look at my area. I can see instantly what crimes have been reported 
pretty much up to the minute. In what areas I can map them, I can look at 
type of offenses, I can look at type of victims I can look at offenders. All that 
stuff typically has historically been done by analysts, and it'd take a long 
time, and we'd have to employ resource to do, suddenly we've got it now” 
(Chief Inspector).  
Not only, has DataVis’s introduction sped up the process of aggregating data and identifying 
patterns, but, as the quote suggests, analysts are a costly resource that previously was not avail-
able to everyone.  
“There are still analysts, but to be honest, they’re such a prized resource and 
there’s not many of them. […]. You’re not gonna get an analyst for all those 
jobs. There just isn’t enough. You’ll get an analyst probably for every […] 
big threat-harm-risk job. […] I hate the term self-serve, but that’s what we’re 
doing” (Detective Chief Inspector).  
‘Self-serve’ essentially means that officers take over some of the tasks that analysts held before, 
now aided by the software. It also means that the analysts’ role is redefined and potentially 
their number decreased. One of the offender managers brings ‘self-serve’ in context with 
budget cuts and the Business Intelligence Manager mentions that the analysts’ intelligence 
function was currently under review and that the technology should allow analysts to take more 
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specialised cases, such as the high threat-harm-risk jobs the Detective Chief Inspector refers 
to. 
“When I do the rounds talking to a police officer, I say everyone’s an analyst. You know, it’s 
all of our jobs to interpret the information around us” (Business Intelligence Manager). ‘Eve-
ryone’s an analyst’ has two advantages according to the Business Intelligence Manager who 
stresses this repeatedly throughout the interview: First, it scales.  
“[Other forces] think it should all be just analysts and performance analysts 
using those tools. So, it doesn’t scale out. That performance analyst who’s at 
the centre can only do so much” (Business Intelligence Manager).  
Instead the data is interpreted where it is needed. As the Business Intelligence Manager points 
out,  
“[…] the real killer bit was creating a self-service environment. So not build-
ing tools for the privileged few or specialist roles or analysts. Building tools 
for the people out there who are making the decisions and deploying re-
sources or actually dealing with that risk […]” (Business Intelligence Man-
ager).  
Scale also means being able to deal with the amounts of data that would be too much for a 
small number of analysts. To replicate DataVis’s capabilities, the Business Intelligence Man-
ager says,  
“[…] you’d have an army of people trying to make sense of everything. Tens 
of thousands new pieces of information hit the systems every day. […] These 
people are moving around, addresses are changing. So, [DataVis]’s kind of 
doing that automatically” (Business Intelligence Manager).  
Second, he argues that, given their local knowledge, the officers are better placed to interpret 
the data than someone in a central position.  
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“They can identify all the issues that need to be prioritised and raised for 
tasking and all the rest of it. So […], our Chief Constable […] wants all 
members of staff to be empowered to make the right decisions at the right 
levels. So, we don’t want for anyone to […] go up all the chains of command 
[…], ‘cause actually that person there, as long as they are informed, they’re 
going to be the best person to make that decision” (Business Intelligence 
Manager). 
And elsewhere,  
“[the] people who are best placed to know all of that nuance are the people 
working in those areas day-in day-out, not analysts sat at headquarters, who 
aren’t connected to that” (Business Intelligence Manager).  
The distribution of knowledge to those that have the local knowledge to interpret the data also 
means that the decision making is pluralised. While the effects of a centralised structure would 
have been relatively consistent, the ways officers use DataVis can vary, as would the conse-
quences. While the term ‘empowerment’ that the Business Intelligence Manager uses here has 
the sound of an empty marketing term, section 8.2.2 further below shows how the accessibility 
of data can to some extent actually have that effect. 
The changes in scale brough about by the arrangement described here sit awkwardly with a 
description as a ‘centre of calculation/translation’ (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987; Law, 2003) and 
could perhaps be better referred to as ‘distributed centre of calculation’. On the one hand, Data-
Vis secures flows of incoming information about the periphery. This information is aggregated 
and automatically produces risk scores according to a centrally produced analysis, as well as 
pre-programmed standardised visualisations in the form of charts, maps, and tables – what 
Latour (2005: 175ff) would call an ‘oligoptic’ view. At least in the managerial phantasy, these 
‘facts’ would then have automatic consequences like the prioritisation of offenders. On the 
other hand, this translation into actions is way more complicated, as the previous chapter 
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demonstrated. Crucially, it is dependent on the interpretations of the periphery, thus relocating 
‘analysis’ away from the centre and onto the relation between centre and periphery. Although 
this does not mean that the centre is actually ‘democratised’. Clearly those that define the 
mechanisms by which risk scores are produced or the way data is displayed exert a different 
influence than the users. The network is both less asymmetric and more pervasive than centrally 
performed analysis and instruction. This is also where the structure of DataVis deviates from 
the scaling assumed for centres of calculation. As Law and Hetherington (2000) note, 
“Knowing at a distance, […] necessarily implies pretty heroic simplifications 
and reductions. And it therefore also implies pretty heroic manipulations of 
scale. This means that that which is large in the geographical sense, spread 
out over time and over space, gets reduced to a report, to a map (and the 
development of mariners’ maps counts as an exemplary case here) or […] to 
a set of figures in a spreadsheet” (Law and Hetherington, 2000: 42). 
Yet, this scaling typical for the representations produced in centres of calculation40 is not quite 
the same in DataVis where detail and abstraction are collocated and transformable into one 
another via different levels of aggregation allowing for a mixture of logics of interpretation 
similar to that found in the US case – however, without the epistemological gap between crime 
numbers and crime accounts. DataVis (and its digital precursors) have replaced a very physical 
system of paper shuffling.  
“So, going back probably 15 years ago, everything was on paper. So, in 
events of crime we would record the whole crime on a carbonated piece of 
paper. All the details, suspects, victims, witnesses, what actually happened, 
details of property. And that paper would then be pushed around the force, 
physically” (Offender Manager 2).  
 
40 See also Latour’s (Latour, 2005: 178) example of Wall Street as ‘centre of calculation’. 
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Now, officers record crimes and intelligence on laptops and it is instantly available across the 
system reducing the need for preparing briefing documents by hand. But DataVis brings about 
and distributes to its users a new kind of work: ‘data work’. Apart from inputting information, 
the sense-making process involves an element of data maintenance, spotting and fixing errors. 
The Business Intelligence Manager describes the force’s progress on data quality:  
“[…] important context is that we’ve become so much better nationally as 
for recording crime correctly. Because we were woeful three, four years ago 
and some forces still got way to go. We’re a lot better. But what that meant, 
is for kind of 30 to 40 percent of incidents that were rang into us, didn’t get 
recorded properly as a crime. And what that means is that people didn’t get 
linked to an incident, get investigated and have any victim care and all the 
rest of it. […] we’ve […] probably never been better at capturing that [than 
now]” (Business Intelligence Manager).  
However, while he mentions it as a reassurance to the validity of the risk scores, this data 
quality has only become relevant given the new accessibility of files. When before it was a 
slow physical process to retrieve a case file, most data errors were not important, the files would 
never be retrieved. Now, every file not only is retrievable in an instant, but is retrieved by the 
software to calculate a score. If the error influences the score, the software suggests a file to 
the officer that otherwise would have collected dust in the archive. If a file is brought up it must 
be dealt with, even if that means amending the error. “[…] if it’s necessary we’ll go back and 
amend Niche. So that DataVis is reading or providing a more accurate result” (Offender Man-
ager 1). From how the Offender Manager continues this, it becomes clear that having to fix 
errors at one end motivates stopping errors at the other, i.e. when the data is fed into the system:  
“As, obviously, DataVis is still relatively new, I think it’s about 18 months. 
As time’s going on, I think people can understand how it’s fed, and how 
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important it is to get that initial information right. So, it’s getting better and 
better all the time” (Offender Manager 1). 
 As the force becomes more and more reliant on DataVis as the system of knowledge vis-à-vis 
the reductions in officers on the ground given budget cuts, data quality takes an ever more 
important role. Hence, as mentioned earlier, the Chief Inspector points out that data quality is 
on the force’s ‘risk register’. Moreover, data quality becomes a criterium by which officer’s 
performance is (automatically) assessed. “This is now picking up from where there’s been er-
rors on Niche. I think this is very picky, very picky” (Offender Manager 2). The next section 
will return to this aspect. 
The focus of this section has been the consequences of the decentralisation of analysis and 
decision making enabled by DataVis. However, somewhat counter-intuitively, DataVis also 
enables a retraction out of functions that were concerned with the creation of local knowledges. 
As discussed in section 7.2, replacing local knowledge with the knowledge created by DataVis 
is of concern to the offender managers:  
“And I don’t want to speak ill of it, ‘cause it’s a great system, but that would 
be my biggest concern. Is that we become too orientated on this and we lose 
a bit of that local knowledge, that local connection with an area. […]. Now 
we’re becoming more centralised, you’re losing that local knowledge. That’s 
my opinion. Others might say different” (Offender Manager 1). 
The Offender Manager coins this new form of policing based on data insights rather than in-
depth local knowledge “faceless policing”. 
8.2. Power, management, and governance 
The obvious way in which DataVis translates power are access rights. While some of this is 
because not everyone will have clearance for all types of information, some of the access rights 
221 
 
are also there because developers make decisions about who ‘needs’ to see what. “[…] this app 
is for call handler supervisors. Clearly, if I am a police officer in neighbourhood policing, I 
don’t need to see that, so I don’t. So, there’s an element of governance of who is seeing what” 
(Business Intelligence Manager). The activated functions in the software premeditate what an 
officer can know and do. 
However, there are less trivial ways in which DataVis makes officers do things, i.e. exerts 
power. One of these has become quite clear in previous sections: While ‘democratization’ of 
knowledge has the sound of an equal distribution of powers, the access of every officer to 
DataVis comes with the responsibility to use it. In the previous section, the Tasking Coordina-
tor sees DataVis as creating a duty to look at the highest scoring offenders, and the Chief In-
spector is concerned that one day something that is flagged on the system gets missed by an 
officer. The Business Intelligence Manager points out that officers, like beat managers, are 
expected to use DataVis to know about their area and offenders. But as the views of the Tasking 
Coordinator and the Chief Inspector show, the availability of knowledge creates a double-
edged sword where the ability to know can turn into an ability to have known before something 
went wrong, consequentially resulting in an accountability towards the technology in line with 
Douglas’ (1992) interpretation of risk referred to in section 7.1. However, as previously dis-
cussed, these accountabilities are embedded in organisational power structures such as tasking 
meetings that provide an organisational mechanism relieving this individual responsibility. 
The rest of this section will explore the power relations that emerge from DataVis further. It 
will first analyse how DataVis stabilises strategies by turning them into a thing and then discuss 




8.2.1. Power of DataVis as a thing 
A central tenet of actor-network theory is the instance on the inclusion of non-human objects 
in explaining the stability of social relations over time (Latour, 1990). Based on this premise, 
this section explores how DataVis stabilises ways of approaching different tasks in the force. 
As described in the section on risk scores, DataVis makes officers think of risk in terms of the 
risk scores of offenders or in terms of geographical patterns of crime. This is not to say that 
officers do not exert discretion in multiple ways, but it institutionalises the threat-harm-risk 
approach by adding it to the considerations - repeatedly. This section identifies three ways in 
which DataVis stabilises approaches: 1) the allocation of resources given how it renders prior-
ities and workloads visible, 2) performance management and supervisor discretion, and 3) the 
structuring of workflows into tasks to be logged on the system. Here, the platform reinforces a 
kind of data-driven managerialism that relies on the constant surveillance of officer actions and 
– in establishing DataVis as an ‘obligatory point of passage’ (Callon, 1986) for the allocation 
of resources – anticipatory conformity with organisational priorities. As argued in the section 
2.2, this configuration is closer to the disciplinary power of a ‘surveillant assemblage’ 
(Haggerty and Ericson, 2000) than the data analysis targeting crime. However, far from being 
only a top-down way of institutionalising procedures, DataVis also re-distributes approaches 
outside of organisational hierarchies – in analogy to the distribution of knowledge described in 
the previous section.  
1) DataVis makes priorities and workloads visible and thereby informs logics of resource allo-
cation within the organisation. The governance of the tasking process is strongly supported, 
albeit not determined, by the software: First, the software is used to identify issues, albeit of-
ficers can argue for their own. Then, the issues are transferred into ‘problem solving plans’ and 
logged in the software. In consequence, tasking is based on these plans and their progress is 
223 
 
tracked. Neighbourhood officers are expected to know about their area. Hence, the officer app 
shows them aggregated data about the locations of recent crime and their riskiest offenders. 
Call handlers will see information on open calls, supervisors will see how their officers are 
performing. According to one of the offender managers, DataVis is informing what people 
focus on.  
“[The tasking] meeting’s driven by DataVis. So, DataVis is very much high-
lighting to us where the risk is, either from a suspect or from a victim, or in 
this particular area, and that’s what’s driving those focus and resources” (Of-
fender Manager 2).  
DataVis reifies the force’s threat-harm-risk strategy. In the words of the Chief Inspector:  
“[…] our focus shifted from dealing with priority crime types, we used to 
have burglary teams, vehicle crime teams. When we had our operating model 
changes, we decided to go for an approach that assessed every job based on 
its threshold of risk. We disbanded all those priority crime teams, and then 
we wanted to look and develop DataVis in terms of looking at threat and risk 
vulnerability” (Chief Inspector). 
The Tasking Coordinator describes how DataVis is used to manage demand in the emergency 
call centre: A view in DataVis shows how many logs have been created for calls for service, 
how many of those were active, and how many of them were on backlog. The chief officer in 
charge would use this information to re-distribute resources across the force to tackle surges in 
demand. One option to do so would be to move officer out of their back offices if necessary. 
During the interview, there are 583 open logs and 43% of the previous day’s log have not been 
dealt with yet. There is a backlog of 10496 incidents. The Tasking Coordinator asserts that the 
force was unable to deal with the simultaneous increase in calls and budget cuts: “We can’t 
cope with our demand”. Call handlers would soon have to tell callers that the police would not 
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be able to attend less severe calls. Not only, would the software help monitoring demand live, 
it would also provide a forecast of expected demand to plan resource allocation accordingly. 
Similarly, DataVis helps in the allocation of resources through tasking processes as described 
in the previous section. For example, if the Chief Inspector responsible for neighbourhood po-
licing cannot carry out a problem-solving plan with the resources at his discretion, he can re-
quest additional resources from the headquarters. Every policing area, the Tasking Coordinator 
explains, produces through briefing meetings assessments of what the main problems and driv-
ers of demand are. These are then put into relation to the force’s overall strategic goals, such 
as fighting child sexual abuse. The ratings and their trends, he continues, are then recorded in 
DataVis and discussed in force-wide tasking meetings. The use of DataVis in assessing work-
loads across the force has two consequences: the visibility of demand and workloads becomes 
important in defending priorities and the way workloads are recorded change the previous bal-
ance of workloads between different sections of the force.  
There are 55 issues that can be tasked in the software. Anything that falls outside of that scope 
means busy officers appear idle. The Chief Inspector describes how making neighbourhood 
policing’s workload visible through tasking problem solving plans has allowed them to re-
focus on some of their core activities.  
“I think for us what’s happened with neighbourhood policing is that we had 
become absorbed really into the patrol function. We were being utilized for 
the last few years really as a fallback for patrol. When they were too busy 
everything would come to us. It got to a point actually where we were doing 
just as much as patrol were, and when you look at the level of our staff com-
pared to patrol […] we were actually doing more. Having synced our data, 
we realized that things became totally skewed, patrol were tending to deal 
with some longer-term neighbourhood type jobs. We were dealing with the 
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priority jobs and needed to change that around. […] We should go back to 
the basics of actually building relationships, listening to what the community 
want, understanding their priorities, tackling those local issues, problem 
solving rather than being a slave to the radio, which is what we’d become” 
(Chief Inspector).  
He continues by distinguishing the calls for service as ‘visible demand’ from the ‘invisible 
demand’ of engaging with the public.  
“The invisible demand is the sort of stuff that is tying us up with a huge 
amount of time, you can’t see what problem-solving work we’re undertaking 
as neighbourhood officers. […] We’re actually working on ways at the mo-
ment in which we can try and capture some of that demand. So, within our 
systems, we would create say, a problem-solving plan” (Chief Inspector).  
As soon as the workload becomes visible on the system resources can be defended against 
requests from higher ranks. DataVis bridges the knowledge between parts of the organisation 
by providing an ‘object’ that can be talked about.  
“Developing [DataVis] to show some of the hidden demands and stuff that 
neighbourhood [policing] are doing, because the only thing that chief offic-
ers have looked at for the last four, five years is how many logs are on the 
screen? ‘Right, everyone’s got to focus on the logs on the screen’. We’ve 
been saying for years, ‘No, we’re busy’. ‘Well, we can’t see you’re busy’. 
Now you’re going to. That’s really useful” (Chief Inspector). 
The Tasking Coordinator further underlines the power that recorded and visualised demand has 
in meetings. He reckons that with DataVis it is not anymore the ones who argue the loudest in 
a tasking meeting that receive the resources, but those that are backed up with DataVis’s num-
bers describing the gravity of the problem. The next section will return to this power of ‘facts’. 
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Not only unrecorded, but also missing or improperly linked data can render workloads invisi-
ble. This in turn drives a process of creating these links. As one of the offender managers de-
scribes,  
“So, when DataVis was first implemented, it was very new. Lots of links on 
Niche were missing. […] if it's not linked, then it looks like we haven't seen 
them, although we could have done stuff. So, that's where the data quality 
work and the back to basics work has brought us more up to... So, when you 
log on to DataVis, now it actually reflects the true picture rather than some-
thing that's completely different” (Offender Manager 1). 
Altogether, the software coupled with the hierarchical organisational tasking process forces 
officers to a) find ways of recording their workload, to turn it into visual ‘fact’, and b) address 
data errors that cause workloads to be misrepresented. In this way the introduction of the soft-
ware causes an expanse in the extent and accuracy of data collected. 
DataVis stabilises various orderings through controlling the way resources are allocated. In 
this, it can be regarded as a successful delegation of a strategy to non-human materials ensuring 
the ‘obduracy’ of this configuration (Law, 2003: 3f). Particularly the institutionalisation of the 
‘threat-harm-risk’-approach is an example of this. Simultaneously, the platform affords some 
flexibility in allowing other priorities, even if they have to comply with the logic of ‘problem-
solving plans’. The platform thus positions logics of resource allocation as ‘obligatory passage 
points’ (Callon, 1999) and reifies them in its pre-conceived logic. Containing these passage 
points then allows for the monitoring of ‘performance’ central to the managerialism discussed 
next. 
2) While DataVis is used in the above cases to (re-)allocate resources, it can also be used more 
directly as a performance monitoring tool for supervisors. All actions on the system are tracked 
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and officers are held accountable to the data logs of their work. As the Neighbourhood Sergeant 
describes,  
“All […] they do, all of the crime reporting, the way in which they process 
stuff, what has and hasn’t been done. That’s all monitorable through Data-
Vis. Where people go, mapping that against priority areas and hot spots, how 
much time we’re spending in priority areas, that’s all viewable through Data-
Vis. […] how long it’s been since the victim has been updated, how long it’s 
been since various things have been reviewed. It’s all on DataVis basically” 
(Neighbourhood Sergeant).  
However, the interviewees are clear that this data needs as much interpretation and discretion 
as the risk scores for offenders:  
“[DataVis] has a useful function as a performance monitoring tool. I don’t 
think it should ever be used as a tool to beat people over the head with, some 
people do. Some people, you hear them, ‘You got X amount of data quality 
issues, you’re failing’. You’re busy, you’re actually doing a really, really 
good job. You did a terrific job out on the streets. That, where it’s really 
important” (Chief Inspector).  
Similarly, the Neighbourhood Sergeant has  
“[…] heard of people just sending screenshots of DataVis around to their 
staff to say ‘sort out your heads‘. And that’s about their interaction with 
DataVis and that’s not the way in which it was designed or it’s not really the 
best or most productive value you’re going to get out of it” (Neighbourhood 
Sergeant).  
On the contrary, multiple interviewees mention the perception of DataVis as a performance 
tool as one of the main obstacles in adoption. For example, “[…] it can have a real cultural 




Instead of scolding their staff for issues on DataVis a supervisor would be supposed to initiate 
a conversation. The Business Intelligence Manager explains,  
“So, if I’m managing 10 PCSOs who are the visible face of police and I can 
see that […] everyone else has spent 80% of their time over the last two 
weeks out and about in the community and this individual is being only out 
20% of their time, it’s appropriate for me to ask that question? And there 
might be a very good [reason], you know, ‘I’ve been working on this big, 
massive problem-solving plan, it’s taken up all my time. It’s appropriate to 
have that conversation and that the data is being the enabler for that conver-
sation. What’s wrong is if that supervisor doesn’t ask it in a question and in 
an understanding way and it’s like a ‘I want to see you out [on the street], 
this is not good enough’” (Business Intelligence Manager).  
Moreover, the offender managers and the Detective Chief Inspector are all clear that the rec-
orded data is not all to go by. Similar to the offender risk scores, supervisors decide to overrule 
the software’s assessment. This may either be because the indicators are dismissed:  
“No. I mean, those crimes that he's dealing with, they are fine. He's not un-
derperforming, he's not making errors out there, or ... They are admin errors. 
You know, a date might not have been entered in a certain field, or some-
thing's not quite reported properly. So, it's down to me now to scrutinize; are 
things right, what needs to be adjusted, and what we can kinda live with. Like 
[the other Offender Manager] said, that is not an indication of their perfor-
mance in the slightest” (Offender Manager 2).  
Or they may need further scrutiny. The Detective Chief Inspector explains how DataVis is used 
to review investigations:  
“It’s where, as supervisors, we believe that the role of a sergeant and the 
inspector is to, when it comes to major and serious crimes, to review the 
crime. If you review it regularly with the officer, you do get a better-quality 
investigation and get a better outcome for the victim. We use it to monitor 
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where our work [is], our supervisors, have they done the reviews or not, our 
victim contact, our suspect management. If you’ve got a suspect that you 
haven’t arrested yet, it tells you how long that arrest has been outstanding 
for. […] What we try and use it for is to drive quality” (Detective Chief In-
spector).  
As becomes apparent from the number of factors that decide the ‘quality’ of an investigation 
according to the Detective Chief Inspector, this is difficult to capture in a rating or check mark. 
Hence, the Detective Chief Inspector stresses the further scrutiny that the software’s assess-
ments need.  
“If I'm a sergeant, I put supervisor review, type in my review, save it. Our 
recording mechanism will say, ‘Ah, a review is being done’. What it doesn't 
say is the quality of that review. I could've written on there ‘As last review’. 
Save. […] Hitting the target rather than missing the point or whatever the 
expression is. […] I think we've gotta be really careful around quality with 
DataVis because I think you need the people bit of it as well. You need to 
read the reviews. You need to see the standard of the reviews” (Detective 
Chief Inspector).  
The consequence of DataVis’s records can thus be mediated by the supervisors, although it will 
not always be. 
One of the scores produced by DataVis is a ‘demand score’ that has a purpose similar to the 
offender risk scores. It weighs an officer’s cases by their associated risk and seeks to prevent 
burn-out:  
“[…] So, like same as the harm score, we can actually see that this officer is 
carrying a more complex workload. So, the sergeant can select on them, can 
get a good feel for what this individual is carrying […]. […] this is a patrol 
officer, so not a specialist investigator, they got some really nasty crimes 
they’re investigating. Hence, they are popping out as a high-complex. […] 
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the supervisors can see the teams at an individual level as well to best support 
them. 'Cause what we know is that officers don't always put their hands up 
saying that ‘I'm drowning’. What you'll see it's probably service deterioration 
happens and then that officer has got welfare, go off on stress or something 
like that. […] we've built a burn-out model. We're identifying members of 
staff that are at highest risk of going off on a long-term stress related sick-
ness. So, the areas are using that, working with their HR managers to try and 
get upstream […] or to support before that worst case happens” (Business 
Intelligence Manager).  
While the Business Intelligence Manager describes the score here as being used in a similar 
discretionary fashion as the other participants described the use of other measures before, the 
demand score has the interesting property of being aggregated for different levels of the organ-
isation. The more the values get aggregated, that is the higher the rank of the officer looking at 
them, the less likely it seems that they are used as pointers to individual files and the more 
likely it becomes that they are regarded as facts. It has to remain open at this point to what 
degree that leads to misperceptions at higher levels and subsequent arguments around the va-
lidity of the scores – especially where crimes may be categorised the same way but require 
different investigatory effort. 
3) While the discussion so far revolved around how DataVis pre-structures processes by re-
ifying the force’s threat-harm-risk strategy (highlighting persons and locations) and perfor-
mance management, it is worth noting that at a more granular level the software is structuring 
workflows and nudging officers to complete tasks logged on the system. It visualizes tasks:  
“[…] they can see their property tasks more visible. Are they getting rid of 
property or returning it back or destroying it and things like that. Are their 
tasks on Niche? Are they getting through them? Is there any there that they 
haven’t done? It’s about that efficiency” (Detective Chief Inspector).  
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One of the offender managers shows his colleague’s account which has 53 data quality errors; 
errors that officers may be held accountable for, although he reckons that many of them would 
be old crimes with no current relevance. However, as one of the offender managers points out, 
it is not the supervisor alone that creates pressure to address these issues. The software itself 
has an effect:  
“Ultimately, we all strive to be good at what we do. I think it's built into our 
genetics to do that, so when you see your data quality's less than 50%, or you 
got 59% or whatever, you want to put that right, but sometimes that's like 
you said, it's not really relevant” (Offender Manager 1).  
The Tasking Coordinator highlights that DataVis visualizes intelligence gaps for every person 
on the system and prompts users to fill information such as known vehicles (driver or owner), 
associations with others, locations, phone numbers and other intelligence. Together with what 
the Offender Manager says, it is quite clear how the software’s design by itself drives the col-
lection and processing of information. 
Given the three examples of how DataVis supports the maintenance of approaches above, does 
the power structure described here mean that the software is solely used to enforce a strategy 
top-down? The relations are certainly more complex than this. While the Business Intelligence 
Manager mentions that the central element, the risk scores, was a decision by the Chief Con-
stable, other tasks and visualisations are the result of officers at lower levels requesting them. 
The Chief Inspector speaks highly of the flexibility that is involved:  
“After 29 years of policing, I've finally got something, a computer product 
that I like, that is helpful. Everything else seems to work against what we're 
trying to do, but this is the one thing that actually seems to be trying to give 
us the right stuff, and it's quite flexible. […] the parameters it works in are 
not tightly defined. We can manipulate it. I can go to [the Business 
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Intelligence Manager] and I can say, ‘[…], this is what I want, how can you 
get it?’ […] ‘Yes, I can bring that information. How do you want it pre-
sented?’ ‘Well, actually what would be useful to me is as if it’d have this 
information.’ ‘Yes, I can do that for you’. Actually, it's not just the computer 
saying this is what you want, this is how you'll have it. […] it's based upon 
what practitioners want. I would say a good 50-75% of those apps have been 
developed as a result of what people on the ground have said. That I really 
like, and I think that's what makes it rhyme with people” (Chief Inspector).  
Consequentially, the software is reifying, and therefore stabilizing, approaches from various 
parts of the force and distributes them to organisational equivalents. If a neighbourhood polic-
ing officer in one beat has an idea for a data visualization, this can lead to another officer taking 
up the same approach through the software. In this sense, the software is harmonizing ap-
proaches. The Business Intelligence Manager believes that only by fulfilling functions for the 
officers using DataVis it gets adopted:  
“[…] inventing things that no one wants. Like we're not in the business of 
inventing things, we're in the business of solving business problems and busi-
ness is a key to that. As soon as you forget that, and don't involve [...], you 
know it's not gonna work” (Business Intelligence Manager).  
This practicality of DataVis is one of its sources of legitimacy discussed in the next section. 
8.2.2. Power of facts 
As mentioned before, the Tasking Coordinator is of the opinion that DataVis would replace 
officer’s ‘knee-jerk’ assessments and the Chief Inspector refers to it as ‘putting a little bit of 
science into that’, although not ‘absolute science’. The Tasking Coordinator also speaks of the 
offender management app providing a “so to say scientific score” for risk. Interestingly, the 
Tasking Coordinator chooses yet another formulation. He says that “DataVis factualises the 
issues” (Tasking Coordinator). DataVis does something. DataVis turns issues into facts. It 
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lends the issues an authority that the ‘knee-jerk’ assessments did not have. Perhaps only the 
Tasking Coordinator and the Chief Inspector spoke of DataVis in terms of science because the 
numbers appear more as facts from central parts of the organisation. However, given the small 
number of interviews this cannot be answered definitively. Yet, the Business Intelligence Man-
ager underlines the Tasking Coordinator’s argument: “So that’s the massive benefit here […], 
having a data-literate workforce that are operationally connected to reality, kind of real what’s 
going on” (Business Intelligence Manager). The scaling described in section 8.1 functions as a 
source of legitimacy for DataVis where every connection is traceable to the data that was en-
tered. Given the awkward fit with a description of DataVis as a ‘centre of calculation/transla-
tion’ in the same section, this section considers some of the sources of its legitimacy reflected 
in statements contrasting its use with ‘knee-jerk’ assessments and then shows how this legiti-
macy is translated into uses of its outputs as argumentative device. These sources of legitimacy 
may explain why the information displayed by DataVis drives the co-construction of 
knowledge found in section 7.1. 
Facts are complicated assemblies. Unsurprisingly, several interviewees struggle in explaining 
the technical details of what the software does. “I don’t know how all these algorithms work” 
(Tasking Coordinator). “Then, this is the one you’d have to talk to the real clever people about” 
(Offender Manager 2). Or, “I don’t know. I think it’s a combination of various things in terms 
of the history and things like that. That’s why you need to be cautious around [individual 
scores], because it may throw up Joe Blocks with a huge score” (Detective Chief Inspector). 
This is not to say that they do not have an abstract understanding of what the software is sup-
posed to do and what some of the criteria are that it takes into account. But the technicalities 
are opaque, if not considered irrelevant. Irrelevant also because, as discussed earlier and 
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apparent from the Detective Chief Inspector’s quote, the scores are considered suggestions, the 
software’s opinion so to say, the underlying case files constitute the ‘facts’. 
It is somewhat puzzling how DataVis is at the same time ‘connected to reality’ while its ‘facts’ 
can be dismissed based on various grounds as described previously. Perhaps, this is a source 
of strength; the facts are never absolute as they never hide their origin and their origin – indi-
vidual case files – can serve as a basis for discussion. DataVis also provides ‘facts’ of different 
kinds: The risk scores are probabilistic measures, while crime trends and workloads are based 
on counts. So, it is unlikely that every ‘fact’ will have the same weight. Apart from DataVis’ 
connection to ‘reality’, legitimacy may come from a series of factors: 1) As discussed above, 
apps on DataVis are based on what officers thought would be useful for their work. Being 
based on what officers do rather than an imagination of what they should do, as well as dis-
playing the information they request, probably helps DataVis’s legitimacy. The Detective Chief 
Inspector, for example, describes how DataVis helped in identifying the perpetrator of a ran-
dom stabbing captured on CCTV because it brought up a similar case from 20 years ago.  
“We would not have been able to have done that a year ago. […] The one 
where the person got stabbed in the neck, that came about from DataVis. 
That wasn’t a public appeal. That was desktop, ‘I think that’s, him, or it is 
him. Let’s go and arrest him’, and he was arrested within an hour” (Detective 
Chief Inspector).  
Part of the software’s usability and hence legitimacy may also come from the quality of its 
visualisations.  
“In my police service, I've seen lots of bits of technology come and lots of 
bits of technology go. Hand on heart, without a shadow of a doubt, this is 
probably the best bit of just even the way it presents the data, the way you 
can use it, this is by far the best that the police have come up with I've seen. 
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I know we didn't make it, but without a shadow of a doubt” (Detective Chief 
Inspector).  
2) In a similar fashion, usefulness is demonstrated in cases where the software correctly and 
unexpectedly suggests a person of interest before they commit a crime. The Detective Chief 
Inspector tells the story of stalker that was shown as escalating in risk and who later broke into 
the stalked person’s house. The Tasking Coordinator tells the story of a person rated high risk 
who later stabbed someone, as well as of an offender with a high risk of domestic violence who 
then tried to run over his family with a car. These cases of surprise build trust in the software’s 
capability to surface the right individuals. 3) For the Business Intelligence Manager, as one of 
the staff developing DataVis’s capabilities, trust comes from testing it.  
“So, we will train our models with a target set. […] So, we can tell, we know 
the accuracy, we know the precision, recall. So, we won’t let a model leave 
the desktop if we’re not happy that it’s being able to predict accurately what 
we want to” (Business Intelligence Manager). 
Beyond the quantitative measures of predictive accuracy built into these methods, the predic-
tions would also be reviewed by officers:  
“And of course, we test it. Right, ok, these people that are popping out as 
high risk, are these the right people? Great, it may look good on a desktop 
modelled thing, so we got our intel unit to test like loads of these outputs and 
they were pretty happy with it” (Business Intelligence Manager). 
4) Whether it is the Cambridge Harm Index mentioned by the Neighbourhood Sergeant that 
supports a strategy based on quantifying harm rather than solely counting crimes, or one of the 
offender managers explaining that the harm weightings are based on home office figures, or, 
as the Business Intelligence Manager points out, the risk scores being modelled after the 
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probation system’s OGRS scores: Outside institutions provide legitimacy to the processes and 
calculations used inside. 
Officers can use data held on DataVis as argumentative device, that is, use it to convince others. 
This is to an extent possible because of the legitimacy that is ascribed to it by the above mech-
anisms. Data can be used to legitimate one’s work. The offender managers, for example, use 
risk scores to defend their work with acquisitive offenders that does not constitute a statutory 
duty. As one of the offender managers explains,  
“[with] inquisitive criminals, so the shoplifters, we don’t have to do offender 
management with them, but we work in a way to try and break those cycles. 
So, we have to justify to various people why we do that” (Offender Manager 
1).  
The risk scores and their underlying data analysis is used as an argumentative device in arguing 
for the necessity of a task.  
Recording tasks associated to problem solving plans and thereby rendering ‘invisible demand’ 
visible shifts the allocation of resources between different policing functions. It is therefore 
unsurprising that the measurement of performance through DataVis incentivises an expansion 
of recording practices as discussed above. The offender managers mention that they “[…] 
struggle with this work particularly to give performance evidence of success, because we don’t 
want to work with the ones more successful [….]” (Offender Manager 1). Hence, they created 
a new scoring system.  
“We’ve created a new system now to try and give us a bit of a measurement 
tool. So, every two weeks, the offender managers will score [the offenders] 
on a scale of one to five for each of those pathways. So, on one extreme, they 
might be homeless, and then you go through the sliding scale. Homeless to 
237 
 
hostel to supported housing, until you get to the end, being in their own 
place” (Offender Manager 2).  
While potentially useful for the task itself, the scales allow for a quantification of the officers’ 
performance. 
New data also means new discussions to be had. The Chief Inspector mentions the introduction 
of staff surveys through DataVis, which consequentially offer material for arguing political 
position within the force.  
“[…] this estate is absolutely awful because they’ve crammed everyone on 
one floor, and you got two floors that are unused. Now I’ve got a bit where I 
can build a business case and I can say, ‘Well, look at the staff survey, this 
is what officers said’” (Chief Inspector).  
An open question is if the different nature of the ‘facts’ created by DataVis have different 
effects on the negotiations that take place. As noted in relation to the visibility of workloads, 
aggregation means making individual cases computable by categorizing them and, hence, mak-
ing them count equally. It is unclear what effects this has without observational data from task-
ing meetings. However, at the very least, it means that officers working at lower levels and 
possessing local knowledge will be pressed to either agree or challenge the knowledge that 
higher ranking officers in central positions will gain about their area from looking at DataVis. 
The Neighbourhood Sergeant became convinced of DataVis’s capabilities because it was able 
to give him a picture of the local situation before going there.  
“We could then do a lot of the research from our place, from headquarters, 
around their issues, around what was affecting stuff. To be able to then go 
out and start have conversations about what’s affecting them. […] so, it 
shows how much you could do in advance of trying dealing with an issue” 
(Neighbourhood Sergeant).  
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The software can bridge knowledges between different parts of the organization. But what 
happens when this picture and the local perception collide? And, what happens when the offic-
ers’ experience is supplemented with data because there is not enough funding for neighbour-
hood policing anymore?  
8.3. Discussion 
Taking the two previous chapters together, the analysis offered by the UK case study demon-
strates how DataVis straddles a position between the standardization and harmonization of ap-
proaches through a unified approach to assessing risk and features like the automated detection 
of data quality issues, and the simultaneous pluralisation of decision-making by making anal-
ysis tools widely available and providing the flexibility of aggregations that are traceable down 
to the underlying files. The redistribution of knowledge within this ‘distributed centre of cal-
culation’ allows for a multiplication of viewpoints from which data is interpreted, an increase 
in the use of data analysis previously reserved to specialist functions, an acceleration in pro-
ducing calculative knowledge, new insights from integrated data sources, and the interpretation 
of data by those who have relevant tacit knowledge.  
On the one hand, risk scores institutionalise the force’s ‘risk-threat-harm’ strategy by requiring 
justification in relation to which scores are or are not acted upon. Similarly, the recording of 
workloads on DataVis becomes a self-reinforcing process in which officers seek for ways to 
render their workload visible. Data becomes an argumentative device used in convincing su-
periors of existing workload or the need of allocating more resources in an area. This raises 
questions for future research on what arguments can and cannot be made where data gains these 
political powers. DataVis also implicates the supervisor-officer relation in ensuring officers 
adhere to workflows and complete data input, otherwise issues are automatically flagged and 
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presented to supervisors. Where it does not draw on hierarchical relations, the information on 
DataVis gains legitimacy from a range of sources, including its usefulness in supporting eve-
ryday work, surprising and ‘correct’ risk assessments, statistical testing in the development of 
risk models, and similar methods of quantifying risk used in outside institutions. 
On the other hand, the use of DataVis is not techno-deterministic. Rather it enables an interplay 
between tacit and calculative knowledge, allowing for professional judgement based on analy-
sis officers can carry out themselves. The risk scores, although designed to manage uncertainty, 
create new uncertainties in questions of who on the list needs to be dealt with, what the conse-
quences are of ignoring a risk rating, and a new necessity to prevent and correct data errors 
which otherwise become part of the scores. The empirical analysis in chapter 7 demonstrates 
that risk is better described as the outcome of a process of co-construction rather than an ‘ob-
jective’ score determined by the software and enacted by the officer. Risk is produced in a 
complex process which involves a) officers checking underlying case files where the software 
brings someone unexpected to their attention and, where necessary, correcting underlying er-
rors in the database, b) officers asserting their own priorities either in how they pre-filter the 
listed offenders, or in including individuals that are not ranked highly by the algorithm, and c) 
officers dynamically deciding whether and how they can act regarding a risk score, what re-
sources are available and how they may need to be reallocated when someone ceases to be 
deemed risky. This co-construction of risk is different from the imagined, biased, and deter-
ministic automated decision-making that for example O’Neil (2016) associates with ‘weapons 
of math destruction’. Instead of a singular approach, the risk scores are part of pluralised deci-
sion making. Nonetheless, attention on the risk scores themselves points to the need of trans-
parency around the encoded normativity of ‘harm’ that shapes the politics of prioritisation, as 
well as to the risk rating’s indifference to the individual being suspect or convicted offender. 
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Given the results from the US department, further research is also needed on the consequences 
of files being readily accessible. 
The actions officers take based on risk assessments range from enforcement to support. The 
frame for this approach is determined by the UK’s Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing 
Act 2014 and the associated relations with social services in so-called multi-agency public 
protection arrangements. Cuts to social services under the austerity regime instated by David 
Cameron’s Conservative government raise two critical questions for further research and de-
bate: a) where social services are unable to provide offenders with essential support, does police 
tend towards enforcement via CBOs as the only viable option? And b) should risk scores and 
professional risk assessments determine who receives support? Particularly on this last ques-
tion Harcourt’s (2007) elasticity argument would suggest that such an approach would merely 
help police cope with the issue but fail to address underlying social problems and only result 
in ever new individuals at the top of the risk ranking. The combination of austerity with risk 
ratings brings to the fore the normative decisions police organisations (and consequentially 
individual officers) must make in prioritising among offenders, victims, and crimes. As one of 
the offender managers stresses,  
“We have to do the things that are gonna make the difference, and there's 
quite a lot of them that believe moving forward police won't be able to do 
[those], generally. And there are other forces. There's forces that don't man-
age low-risk sex offenders. We choose to manage all of our sex offenders. 
So that there's lots of things happening, where [we have] to compete with the 
high demands that we're faced with” (Offender Manager 1). 
Finally, DataVis enables officers to explore patterns in the data to generate starting points for 
investigations (such as identifying possibly connected burglaries by modus operandi and loca-
tion) and identify sources of demand to be addressed in ‘problem-solving plans’. In the context 
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of budget cuts, this ability to diagnose problems at a distance, possibly without the necessity 
for detailed tacit knowledge especially given the easy access to case files, spurs concerns of a 
centralisation of policing and what one of the interviewees calls ‘faceless policing’ (for Scot-




9. Discussion and conclusion 
Policing has seen and still sees a push to digitize and datafy everything aiming for increases in 
efficiency, to render the organisation governable, and to increase clarity and coherence within 
the myriad of data that police collects. But in this process, new conflicts and uncertainties arise 
– an infrastructure for data collection must be built and maintained, numerical ‘facts’ need to 
be interpreted, technologies break down, discretionary decisions are complicated, and technol-
ogies have unforeseen outcomes in practice. This thesis contributes a rare, empirical counter-
weight to techno-deterministic and largely theoretical accounts of technology in policing. 
While the breadth of issues covered allows for a holistic view of digital technologies in policing 
and their interactions across different organisational sections, this means that this research can 
often only scratch at the surface of the variations of human-technology interactions that would 
become visible in studies focussed on singular technologies. However, from this emerges a 
research program that takes the practice of technologies in policing seriously. 
This section will discuss the main findings from the UK and US case studies in the context of 
the theoretical framing introduced in chapter 2 and it will locate them in the wider context of 
the discourse on technologies in policing. The discussion addresses the collection of data, its 
use in strategy meetings, the use of digital technologies in everyday policing from frontline to 
investigations, and the use of data for oversight. Finally, it discusses practical considerations 
for both research and police agencies that follow from this research. 
9.1. The politics of collecting data 
The Latin word ‘data’ translates as ‘givens’ (or ‘given things’). The word, as much as the day 
to day usage of it, renders opaque where these givens come from – who gives them? Rather, as 
Kitchin (2014b) suggests, data should be thought of as ‘capta’ (‘things taken’) to highlight the 
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underlying careful selection of information encoding human biases and subjectivities. As the 
previous chapters (particularly sections 4.1 and 5.3) demonstrate for the police, the production 
and processing of data implicate the whole organisation: from officers and detectives filling 
forms, to analysts shaping the digital infrastructure for the whole process, to senior officers 
communicating their data interpretations as strategy. This section foregrounds the politics of 
integrating data, the affordances of electronic forms mobilised for timely data collection, the 
work of cleaning data, the close link between data use and the underlying categorisations, and 
the duration data needs to consolidate. It thus relates to how the production of representations 
in ‘centres of calculation’ (Latour, 1987) is organised and maintained while highlighting the 
messiness of parallel efforts for the US case. 
The collection of data requires a considerable amount of politics: people must be convinced to 
enter information in a predefined way and existing datasets must be integrated. While a lot of 
these processes had already become invisible in the UK police force, the work of the analysts 
in the US department demonstrates this clearly. Here, analysts, first driven by the consent de-
cree’s requirement of data collection for oversight and later by the function creep of this data 
collection having turned out useful for operational purposes, seek to continually integrate new 
sources of data previously held in separate databases. For this purpose, analysts often have to 
negotiate with external agencies such as the sheriff’s department under which conditions access 
is possible. Whether due to political animosities or the cost of setting up new systems, these 
efforts are not always fruitful. While this may be expected for inter-agency data exchange, 
analysts also have difficulty integrating the department’s own databases with the consequence 
that sometimes only workarounds such as scripts continually copying information from one 
database to the other solved the issues. Making existing databases interoperable is certainly not 
as smooth a process as implied in the ‘surveillant assemblage’ (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000). 
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While there is existing research highlighting problems of inter-agency information sharing 
(Boba et al., 2009; Sanders and Henderson, 2013; Taylor and Russell, 2012), information ex-
change is frequently framed as opening opportunities and the potential safeguards these prac-
tical restrictions pose against data misuse need further attention. 
Not only the integration of existing data but the input of new data itself must be organised. In 
both case studies, the bulk of the data collection stems from officers and detectives filling 
forms, recording body-worn camera video, collecting CCTV recordings, writing warrants for 
data from social media and phone companies, and more. Some of this data is fed directly into 
databases accessible to most in the department, while other information is held in separate files 
for investigations. To solicit the contributions from officers, the design of the database makes 
use of the affordances of electronic forms. These pre-structure the kind of information that can 
be entered and can thus render information immediately available. However, while electronic 
forms aim at ensuring the completeness of data through mandatory fields (and to some extent 
a feature for accountability that would, for example, check if all conditions for a lawful stop 
had been met), flaws in their implementation at times make filling them take time. Thus, or-
ganisationally they accelerate the availability of information while in individual instances they 
may take longer to complete. This especially becomes a problem where technologies malfunc-
tion, like in the case of automated dashcam video recordings that cause a recording deluge with 
officers having to label videos as ‘non-event’. As much as the affordances of electronic forms 
provide control over what can be input in fields (e.g. not allowing letters in the field for date 
of birth) and allow editing of mistakes, information will always be entered wrongfully. In the 
US department, this means that analysts spend considerable time cleaning data and, at the time 
of the research, developing scripts to catch misspellings of names to unify records. It also 
means that search results will not always be accurate so that officers and detectives must try 
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multiple spellings to find all records on the database. Errors also exist in the UK police force’s 
database, but here users can correct any errors they spot thereby distributing ‘data work’ and 
improving data quality over time. Both the existence of errors in the data and the duration of 
filling forms are crucial factors in officer decision making discussed further below. 
Perhaps most surprisingly, different districts in the US department maintain their own, parallel 
crime statistics. This further highlights the fragmentation of these systems as opposed to a uni-
fied ‘surveillant assemblage’ (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000). These idiosyncrasies in counting 
crime are a result of a) the centrally used categorisation system of crimes not matching with 
the information district commanders strategic decision making (e.g. misdemeanour arrests in-
cluding so-called ‘catch-and-release’ arrests) and b) the timing between a crime recorded on 
the database and it appearing in the crime statistics causing confusion (i.e. officers know of 
crimes that are not yet in the statistics). While nationally the uniform crime reports prepared 
by the FBI have a contested history part of which concerns the categories used (Maltz, 1977), 
it stands out that within the same department different counting systems are used. Whereas 
crime statistics are regularly discussed in their relation to (the manipulation of) public discourse 
on rising or falling crime rates (e.g. Maguire and McVie, 2017; Seidman and Couzens, 1974), 
this highlights the importance ascribed to crime statistics for management purposes as well as 
the close relationship between how crime is counted and the use these counts are put to. More-
over, the time it takes for crime counts to consolidate – because of, among other reasons, un-
founded calls, multiple calls for the same incident, reports that have to be written and reviewed, 
and crimes being reported late – calls into question the logic of ‘real-time’ forecasting of crime 
in predictive policing41. 
 
41 In addition to the duration of the bureaucratic process of registering a crime, the exact time of an incident is 
also often unknown. 
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9.2. Strategy and the entanglement of knowledges 
This section interrogates the entanglement of quantitative knowledge and experiential 
knowledge in strategic decision making. It returns to this question within the frames of ‘bi-
opower’ (Foucault, 2009) and ‘centres of calculation/translation’ (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987; 
Law, 2003) introduced in more detail in the literature review (chapter 2). It highlights the role 
of data analysis as an argumentative device with its implicit superiority over tacit knowledge. 
It further problematizes the influence of underlying categorizations and the time it takes for 
data to consolidate in contrast with the ‘objectivity’ associated with data. 
The design of the data platforms in the two case studies allows in principle42 for completely 
different approaches to crime statistics. In both cases, crime statistics are available to anyone 
in the organisation. However, the platform used by the US department allows seeing crime 
counts arranged by predefined categories such as crime types and districts, while the one in the 
UK allows officers to ‘drill down’ into aggregated data and identify the underlying casefiles. 
This connection between individual cases and crime statistics is opaque in the US department. 
Consequentially, in the UK anyone has the capability to detect patterns in the data and suggest 
‘problem-solving plans’, while the connection of crime counts to knowledge of the underlying 
cases is only available to district commanders in the US who rely on officers reporting the 
details. Thus, while both platforms could be considered as ‘centres of calculation’ (Latour, 
1987), the configuration in the UK is also markedly different. In decentralising the view that a 
‘centre of calculation’ affords, the UK police force tasks the periphery with the analysis while 
simultaneously pre-structuring the analysis with the logics of individual risk and allocation of 
 




resources to ‘problem-solving plans’. Yet, pre-structuring does not imply determination as the 
multitude of other priorities mobilised by officers in section 7.1 on the interpretation of risk 
scores demonstrates. Here, digital technologies transform the star-like shape43 of the ‘centre of 
calculation’ (Latour, 1987) into something new. This difference highlights the importance of 
detailed studies like the one carried out here in examining the features of new technological 
systems in policing. In the UK police force, coinciding efforts to centralize policing functions 
to save money because of financial pressures in the context of austerity politics and interview-
ees’ fear of this leading to ‘faceless policing’ relying more on data than tacit knowledge44, do 
not take away from the platform’s capability to pluralise decision making – or ‘democratize 
insight’ as the slogan goes – but stresses the need for non-techno-deterministic approaches to 
studying police technology in practice. 
One of the main questions raised in the literature review (chapter 2) is how the statistical 
knowledge of crime associated with ‘biopower’ (Foucault, 2003, 2009, 2010) is translated into 
actions and how this translation interacts with officers’ experiential knowledge. The use of 
quantitative data requires interpretation, first in its reading (what constitutes, for example, a 
cluster of crimes) and then in its translation into action. This is because the categorization nec-
essary to count has to eliminate information from the individual case to equate those within the 
same category. The loss in detail is compensated with the emergence of counts that indicate 
the frequency of these categories (e.g. types of crime) and patterns in these frequencies (e.g. 
spatial clusters of crimes). This creates an epistemological gap between an epistemology of 
crime (knowing crime through numbers) and an epistemology of crimes (knowing detailed 
accounts of individual incidents of crimes). This gap is particularly apparent in the US 
 
43 See Latour (2005: 177). 
44 Calling it ‘Abstract Police’, Terpstra et al. (2019) identify a similar tendency in the Netherlands and Scotland. 
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department’s CompStat style meetings where district commanders starting from the position 
of crime numbers come together with sergeants who know of the underlying cases (see section 
4.2). Where individual crimes drive priorities, the resulting actions are clear: investigation and, 
where leads exist, sending out patrols to look out for people or cars. The centre of calculation 
follows a command and control structure (see chapter 2). What actions to take based on crime 
counts is not as clear. In the US department a mixture of addressing the patterns as patterns, 
that is ordering increased patrols wherever more crimes happen and tasking detectives to solve 
crimes that recently increased (the ‘aggregation and reaction’ structure), and addressing pat-
terns by looking for underlying factors, that is reintroducing the tacit knowledge of crime in 
the district to differentiate ‘random’ crimes from crimes that could constitute a series commit-
ted by the same actors (the ‘attributing causes’ structure). Solely addressing quantitative crime 
patterns with increases in patrol leads to territorial policing that the department aims to avoid 
because the resulting ‘jump-out work’, as officers called it, had been harmful to community 
relations and central to the consent decree. Given the short sentences associated with this strat-
egy, it is also deemed ineffective by some. The problem here is that, without other knowledges, 
officers have no further instructions than to be in an area and so they search for (minor) infrac-
tions that have no relation to the reason they are there. Instructions to patrol certain areas are 
not well communicated to frontline officers who also regularly do not know where assigned 
areas are. This observation fits well with Benbouzid’s (2019) argument that predictive policing 
is first and foremost a managerial tool which seeks to solve exactly these issues. It also stresses 
that the managerial ideal of how the organisation is supposed to function and the resulting 
practice diverge, and in consequence the influence of ‘biopower’ becomes less direct. Instead, 
officers know what to look out for and in which areas when it is communicated more horizon-
tally by detectives. However, in parts of the organisation this does not happen because detec-
tives rely on officers receiving this information through a ‘be-on-the-lookout’-email-system 
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that produces an information overload with irrelevant information (see section 4.3.3). Yet, the 
possibility to improve the system to distribute messages only to relevant recipients, a task 
force’s use of a chat app for updates on investigations, and the ability to investigate the case 
files that make up the crime statistics in the UK police force, suggest that technology can not 
only support strategies based on crime statistics but also those based on a jointly produced 
experiential knowledge of crimes. 
Whether territorial policing or the more targeted policing based on accounts of the individual 
crimes, the logic of policing here follows a simple model of stimulus-response – what Manning 
(2008) has described as the ‘reactivity theme’ of policing. There are no deeper questions on 
why crimes happen. Rather, police react to spikes in crime rates (whether arbitrary or for a 
reason) with patrol for deterrence, or targeted investigation and arrest of perpetrators. While 
surely the same strategies exist for the UK police department, the data analysis allows for an-
other logic of dealing with crime. Here, patterns of crime are addressed with ‘problem-solving 
plans’, some of which seek to look beyond the perpetrators and seek for reasons in the social 
environment. That is, police liaise with social services on how to address some of the conditions 
believed to cause problems45. Thus the larger biopolitical question of how to govern crime as 
a statistical phenomenon – a question that is closely related to the ‘aetiology crisis’ in crimi-
nology (Matthews, 2014; Young, 1997) – shapes the availability of different possible reactions 
that police can have towards the occurrence of a crime (or crimes) and towards offenders. De-
terrence and addressing the social conditions of crime can be clearly associated with the logic 
of ‘security’ identified by Foucault (2009). In this framework crime only receives special at-
tention when the numbers increase more than ‘normal’, and the solutions aim at changing the 
 
45 While not focussed at living conditions, a similar logic of identifying ‘causes’ to crime exist in the field of 
environmental criminology. For example, an element of risk terrain modelling may be modifying the built-up 
environment (e.g. lighting) to reduce crime (Caplan and Kennedy, 2011). 
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conditions under which perpetrators act to reduce the possibility of crimes. Yet, the translation 
of crime numbers via tacit knowledge of the individual crimes into targeted actions also points 
to a new perspective: not only do diverse mechanisms of power coexist (Foucault, 2009: 21f), 
the priorities deduced from statistical knowledge of a population (of crime) can also be trans-
lated into actions that do not target the population and reduction in risk but that target individ-
uals. In policing practice not only the mechanisms but also the logics of governmentality are 
entangled – or, in the vocabulary of Law’s (1994) Organizing Modernity, plural, incomplete, 
and interacting orderings form a complex and messy social world. 
What perhaps stands out more than the entanglement of different knowledge practices are the 
ways numbers link with power relations. In the US department, the ritual of weekly CompStat 
meetings with their display of hierarchy maintains the importance of these numbers. But per-
haps more importantly, the comparison of crime statistics between districts that is enshrined in 
the visualisations and tables on the department’s dashboard suggests a competition in which 
commanders compare their districts’ ‘performance’. The numbers get assigned a high degree 
of importance exemplified by a lieutenant who recites the current week’s numbers by heart. 
Even if strategies for the week are decided based on detailed knowledge of the crimes that 
occurred, rises in crime numbers focus the attention on those types of crime that are more 
frequent. However, this is not a completely deterministic relation as variation between com-
manders exist. Importantly, the necessity for the ‘objective’ crime statistics to be interpreted 
affords moments of subjectivity in which decreases in crime are attributed to past police action 
while increases are unfortunate events independent of police action.  
This function of data analysis as an argumentative device is, in a different fashion, also preva-
lent in the UK police force. Here, the development of new data sources is set to become a self-
perpetuating process in which officers use data analysis to give weight to their ‘problem-
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solving plans’ and to make their own workloads visible to senior officers. Further, ethnographic 
research of tasking meetings would be necessary to identify to what degree arguments receive 
more weight if they are supported by data analysis. Similarly, this thesis argues that the risk 
scores reify the force’s ‘threat-harm-risk’ strategy towards dealing with those offenders caus-
ing the biggest share of incidents. The prominence of the risk scores is a constant reminder of 
this logic of prioritisation and further research will need to identify the degree to which the 
responsibility to use risk scores creates a new professional risk where an officer decides not to 
act on them (often because of other constraints or priorities, see section 7.1.2). 
Whether in the form of weekly crime counts or as individualised risk ratings, numbers are 
performative and exert a specific influence on how police prioritise the allocation of different 
resources from investigations to patrol. For this reason, the particularities of this quantitative 
knowledge need to be problematized. As mentioned above, crime data needs time to consoli-
date and different preferences for categorizations exist. The issue of timing means that deci-
sions taken on very recent data not only regularly chase random noise in the data (Wheeler, 
2016), but also introduce an element of uncertainty to the reality of the patterns that are ad-
dressed. This second issue alone requires qualitative knowledge of crimes to identify those 
recorded incidents that may have turned out not to be crimes. The focus on crime categories 
creates another problem, highlighted by a detective in the US department: while the categori-
zation of crimes may render patterns and trends within these categories visible, patterns across 
the categories (which are part of officers’ tacit knowledge) are rendered invisible. The connec-
tion between guns stolen from glove boxes and armed robberies would not be discussed in a 
violent crime meeting because there only the latter are relevant. This can become a problem 
for the police’s capability to investigate crimes when detectives’ role descriptions become 
equally compartmentalised into investigating only certain types of crime. Finally, the 
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categorization necessary for counting at times renders equitable what is not equitable. This 
issue is prevalent where the same indicators of officer ‘productivity’ are applied to officers 
with different sets of tasks. This is further discussed in the section on oversight below. 
9.3. Digital technologies in practice 
This section discusses three distinct areas in which this thesis contributes new perspectives 
through the analysis of rare empirical data on the uses of technologies in police practice. It 
starts with the role of breakdowns in fragmenting practice but also creating a new technological 
practice that forms a complementary process to the top-down adoption of new technologies. It 
then outlines a non-deterministic perspective on the role of databases in discretionary decision-
making in the US department and describes the co-construction of risk in the UK. Finally, it 
draws attention to the interpretation of data in investigations and the various spatio-temporal 
affordances of digital technologies that transform investigatory practices. 
9.3.1. Breakdown and the fragmentation of technological practice 
Techno-deterministic accounts of technologies in policing have no space for the breakdowns 
of technologies and subsequent fragmentations of practice resulting from individual worka-
rounds to the problems officers are faced with. Yet this is a recurrent theme throughout the US 
case study and the mere fact that the UK case is based on interviews with ‘superusers’ suggests 
different degrees of adoption. Simultaneously, access to technologies is unevenly distributed 
across the US department due to restrictions to roles, access through personal connections, 
limited software licenses, different affinities for technology and varying degrees of training. 
This section discusses the consequences of breakdowns, the workarounds officers find, and 
how breakdowns can become productive. 
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A simple consequence of breakdown, especially where there are no workarounds, can be dis-
trust and disuse. For example, officers reverted to the paper versions of forms recording at-
tended incidents because of a story of an officer having been held accountable to missing forms 
which were lost due to a server error46. In a different type of breakdown – a breakdown of the 
organisational context required for the use of the technology – license plate readers fitted to 
patrol cars are not used because those driving the vehicle are tasked with answering calls for 
service with little time to recover stolen cars or learn how to use the technology. However, 
more than the plain disuse of technology, technologies would be used by some while others 
would create their own workarounds. These range from the use of private phones for group 
chats, photos, and navigation to general-purpose tools like Excel and Google Drive, but also 
include non-digital technologies such as paper forms, push-pin walls, and direct communica-
tion via radio or in person. Apart from resulting concerns for data safety, the makeshift char-
acter of some of these solutions causes other problems such as officers driving with a phone 
for navigation or increased radio traffic for communications that duplicate existing but mal-
functioning systems. Workarounds can also be seen as demonstrating the need for updates and 
new technologies. What might become visible here is a process in which the use, breakdown, 
and repair of technologies in practice drive the change and adoption of police technologies 
rather than the top-down process of providing new technology and forcing adoption. This is 
one of the ways in which breakdowns can be productive. Another way lies in fostering a healthy 
amount of scepticism towards the data contained in police databases. Where search results re-
peatedly include unrelated persons, officers check carefully before acting on the information. 
Lastly, officers can also use breakdowns creatively to their advantage. This happens where 
 
46 The story had consequences – perhaps because of other experiences with the (un)reliability of the system –, 
although it did not include the full truth of additional factors that led to the officer’s sanctioning.  
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officers seat suspects in the car during rain to wait for a warrant to be verified allowing them 
to carry out a pat-down47. Thus, breakdowns inform the development and adoption of technol-
ogies, they mediate the trust put into data systems and their ’objectivity’, and they sometimes 
allow for creative uses in practice. 
9.3.2. Discretionary decision-making 
This work empirically and conceptually contributes to the existing literature on discretionary 
decision making. As discussed in the literature review (see section 2.3.1), the literature has 
focussed mostly on human factors of discretion, proponents and opponents of new technologies 
like predictive policing provide mostly techno-deterministic views of the relationship between 
officers and technology, and even the insightful works of Brayne and Christin (2020) and 
Sandhu and Fussey (2020) adopt a perspective in which machine and officer decision are set 
up to compete. While the managerial aspect of area-based predictive policing may provide such 
an adversarial relationship, the individualised risk scoring studied here suggests rather a co-
construction of risk in which officers add their own interpretations and priorities48. Moreover, 
viewing discretion as a socio-technical network in which technologies have non-deterministic 
affordances renders the influences that longer-existing digital technologies like databases have 
on officer decision making visible. Here, the human factors commonly associated with suspi-
cion formation (stereotypes, known persons and locations, incongruencies, and nonverbal 
 
47 The underlying interpretation of department policy is contentious among officers. 
48 There are indications that such a perspective of co-construction would also be productive for area based predic-
tive policing. Not only would it include the possibility for rejection as discussed by Brayne & Christin (2020), 
and Sandhu & Fussey (2020), but it also includes the possibility that officers use patrol instructions to ‘discover’ 
new areas and build their experiential knowledge as observed by Ratcliffe et al. (2019) (in addition to rejection). 
The degrees between these variants point to the varying power differentials that are possible in predictive policing 
implementations from direct orders to a decision aid. Thus, as argued in section 2.3.1, adopting a perspective in 




clues, see Johnson and Morgan, 2013) are extended by an element of digital congruency in 
which stories and observations have to match the database and mismatches have to be ex-
plained. This study also provides unique insight into the moral questions officers deal with 
when enforcing laws – coupled with the information on historical violations accessible through 
the database. This raises the question of what data should be available to officers. The following 
discusses first the findings regarding the database’s role in decisions to engage and the out-
comes of interactions and then addresses the co-construction of risk in the use of individualized 
risk scores. 
Technologies increasingly play a role in prompting officer engagements with the public. Ex-
amples of this are the proliferation of automated number plate recognition, tests of live facial 
recognition49, or predictive policing solutions that predicate where and with who officers en-
gage. None of these alert-based systems exist in the US department (the number plate recogni-
tion is only used for investigations). Consequentially the contrast with these technologies ren-
ders the timing by which technology comes into play visible. Only after the ‘human’ factors of 
suspicion have caused an initial interest, officers can perhaps search the license plate, or, more 
commonly, upon a stop do a routine search for the stopped individual and look for outstanding 
warrants, paid car insurance, and validity of driver’s license. In these cases, the database con-
tains clear instructions for the officer which force discretion on questions such as whether to 
write a ticket. Without the knowledge held on the database, there is no decision to make, the 
database creates discretion. Sometimes the information on the database may conflict with a 
person’s story or the officer’s observation. When this happens, the database forces discretion 
on trust and a drive towards resolving the discrepancy. The other way around, the database can 
 
49 For early research on live facial recognition see Fussey & Murray (2019). 
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match a story and decrease suspicion. Just as incongruency is one of the ‘human’ reasons for 
suspicion formation, officers seek digital congruency, a matching of reality and database. Thus, 
this research demonstrates that digitally held information is crucial to the discretionary deci-
sion-making during stops. 
When it comes to deciding on whether to hand out a ticket, officers weigh the fairness and 
effectivity of the penalty. Officers for instance would think twice where they sense financial 
hardship as the reason for fraudulent license plates or problems in the maintenance of a car. 
However, this considerable degree of compassion afforded by officers is complicated where 
databases provide a record of previous stops that resulted in warnings instead of fines. Further 
research will need to identify to what degree this information pushes officers towards enforce-
ment. This issue situates police officers as an important buffer between the law and its poten-
tially socially unjust consequences – a function of discretion highlighted by Pepinsky (1984). 
While in this instance opinions may vary on whether officers should or should not have this 
role and whether the database’s suggestion to act is problematic, another point of influence 
further problematizes officers’ access to an archive of past police encounters: what if previous 
attributions of guilt bias present ones so that officers do not further enquire? Past encounters 
made accessible during moments of discretion have the potential to enable a technologically 
mediated form of what Young (1977) termed ‘deviancy amplification’. 
The UK police force’s use of risk scores for individuals, as analysed in section 7.1, is a clear 
example of the need to go beyond techno-deterministic descriptions of officers’ interactions 
with technology. Officers do not just enact the risk scores. Instead, in a process of co-construc-
tion of risk, officers filter the listed individuals according to their own priorities (e.g. by area 
or type of crime), review ‘surprising’ risk ratings tracing the algorithm’s ‘reasoning’ and cor-
recting underlying errors in the database, add their own list of offenders based on experiential 
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knowledge, and, importantly, have to decide how many of the top offenders receive attention, 
for how long, and in what ways. For the last question, more than the risk rating, conditions of 
austerity influence whether officers choose supportive measures like housing and drug pro-
grams or rely on powers like Criminal Behaviour Orders to seek fast (re-)imprisonment of 
offenders. While the exact factors and weightings that go into the risk ratings are opaque to 
officers, the correlational logic of the algorithm does not, as authors like Chan & Bennett Moses 
(2016) fear, lead to the disappearance of causation as it is reintroduced by officers seeking 
reasons in the underlying files to explain unexpectedly high-risk ratings. If risk is co-con-
structed, what then is the influence of risk ratings? First, the algorithm sometimes surfaces 
names that officers are not aware of and thus prompts engagement in a radically new way. 
While this property is supposed to reduce risk overall (cases are processed that otherwise would 
not gain attention and lead to future incidents), it introduces a new professional risk in needing 
to justify why someone on the list does not receive attention (and has not received attention in 
the case of a future incident). In the perspective of Mary Douglas (1992): they allow for the 
allocation of blame. This leads to the second and perhaps main influence of risk scores which 
is more about organisational priorities than risk: they institutionalise a strategy focussed on 
individuals and the encoded priorities for different types of crime – what the institution calls a 
‘threat-harm-risk’-approach. Senior officers can ask for justifications in relation to the risk 
scores. This also highlights that in supporting the power of these tools factors outside the mere 
‘objectivity’ of quantitative knowledge evoked in much of the literature on this topic are im-
portant. Risk scores are embedded in hierarchical communications, they gain legitimacy from 
their practicality, from surprises that turn out to be correct, from predictive accuracy scores 




9.3.3. Digital technologies in investigatory practice 
This section highlights some of the affordances of technologies in shaping the spatio-temporal 
conditions of investigatory practice. Continuing with the theme of the previous section it first 
outlines the influences of data on decision-making before showcasing how technologies shift 
what information is available to investigators and, finally, what temporal affordances these 
technologies have in enabling looks into the past but also competing for officer time. Many of 
these affordances can only come into effect because these technologies have become ‘obliga-
tory passage points’ (Callon, 1999) indispensable to the problem of solving criminal cases. 
Covering a wide range of technologies relevant to investigations, this thesis provides a unique 
perspective on the use of technologies in investigations and contributes coordinates for future 
research. 
Like the risk scores described above, investigators collocate data with other sources of infor-
mation to interpret it. Perhaps more so than officers who accept information logged onto the 
police databases as fact, detectives stress the need for verifying information. An example of 
the need for combining different knowledges is the interpretation of phone records which de-
tectives insist requires detailed knowledge of the case. This is despite concerns for the time this 
analysis takes because of the vast amounts of unfiltered data received through warrants. Fur-
thermore, detectives not only interpret data but also consider the future use of this data in court. 
This is, for example, reflected in concerns of misinterpretation of social network graphs as 
established connections as opposed to mere co-occurrences in the database. The ‘facts’ do not 
speak for themselves. Interestingly, the concern for possible interpretations can lead detectives 
to think about possible ways to curate this data for prosecution by avoiding collecting all in-
formation. In child sexual abuse investigations screenshots could, for instance, be preferable to 
a ‘phone dump’ potentially including the victim’s own nude pictures which, so the detectives’ 
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concern, could be used by the defence to question the victim’s character. Thus, contrary to the 
common perception of police trying to collect all data possible, it becomes a double-edged 
sword that is not only useful to investigations but can overwhelm the investigation in its amount 
and allow an undesired defence in court. 
The previous sections have already discussed the new visibility that data bring about: risk 
scores bring attention to some individuals that would otherwise not have received police atten-
tion. This also includes the prioritisation of proactive investigations of incidents associated 
with ‘risky’ individuals. Similarly, the spatio-temporal crime patterns discussed above not only 
drive strategies from area-based patrol to problem-solving plans, but they can also reveal pat-
terns relevant for investigations (for example burglaries along the main motorway indicating 
how the burglars operate). 
More radically than showing crime patterns on maps, the underlying database now gives de-
tectives access to a large body of frontline knowledge routinely recorded in field information 
cards (FICs) during stops for eventual future use. This accessibility of the past is also central 
to the sensor networks of license plate readers and surveillance cameras. What all these new 
visibilities have in common is the central role of space: the ‘management’ of individuals is 
organised along a spatial differentiation of responsibility (e.g. neighbourhood teams), the pat-
terns come into view by mapping incidents spatially, the information recorded on police data-
bases reflects the spatial presence of police and patrol strategies based on spatial clusters of 
crime, the surveillance cameras concentrate surveillance activity on a limited set of spaces 
where cameras are installed with officers waiting for something to happen within their view, 
and the license plate readers segment the city by setting up virtual borders recording every 
entry and exit by car. The spatiality permeating daily police patrols and surveillance infrastruc-
ture thus not only informs potential feedback loops in predictive policing (Lum and Isaac, 
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2016) but possibly also influences the success of investigations – an aspect that needs to be 
studied further. This is particularly relevant because it may provoke tensions with concerns of 
over-policing which usually disregard investigations. 
One data source for investigations is social media. Although commonly referred to in spatial 
metaphors, one of the challenges for proactively working task force officers is to link infor-
mation on social media such as photos to places for potential further physical surveillance. 
While the analytical category of space may not be very productive here, social media creates a 
new space of visibility employed by both criminals and police. It is a space in which crimes 
are facilitated (as in gun sales through Instagram chats) and where criminals maintain their 
street credibility in a semi-public environment (e.g. posting pictures with guns). In reviewing 
the use of social media in investigatory practices, section 6.6 highlights the tension existing 
between the discoverability of otherwise invisible crimes online and the danger of ‘fishing 
expeditions’ where officers can access information that is publicly visible as well as through 
fake accounts without needing to apply for a warrant. This thesis provides rare empirical data 
on the use of social media in investigations and by highlighting this tension sets up debate on 
the regulation of this practice. The National Police Chief’s Council’s guidance for police in the 
UK, for instance, proposes a definition of levels of engagement from browsing to sustained 
contact through fake accounts which relate to levels of required training and oversight 
(Egawhary, 2019). 
The empirical analysis in this thesis addresses two temporal aspects of the use of technologies 
in policing: 1) as mentioned above sensor networks, but also the bureaucratic apparatus of 
recording information in forms, record the present for eventual future use. They function as 
what Waterton (2010) calls ‘epistemic time machines’. Digital technologies have allowed for 
an expanse in the amount of data routinely recorded and the subsequent accessibility of this 
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past through search tools (however flawed they may still be). This at first sight perhaps trivial 
mechanism transforms investigations in supplying new forms of evidence where previously 
detectives could only rely on witness statements. Body-worn cameras, for example, can make 
responding officers’ experience available to detectives with an amount of detail that written 
reports could never achieve. Beyond the frequently discussed concerns for privacy and propor-
tionality of state surveillance in relation to these technologies (e.g. see Ferguson, 2017b; Mer-
ola and Lum, 2012; Miller, 2014; Newell, 2013), this research highlights ethical concerns that 
come from the use of this data in investigations: On the one hand, evidence, like information 
collected from social media, can make a witness statement unnecessary for prosecution. This 
can reduce the burden the legal process places on the victim, especially in cases like child 
sexual abuse. On the other hand, recorded information may allow investigation and prosecution 
where the victim changes their mind on pressing charges leaving investigators with the decision 
of whether to use previously recorded statements to continue with the case, nonetheless. 2) 
Technologies are regularly discussed in their time-saving potentials for police work (Koper 
and Lum, 2019; Lum et al., 2017), which can certainly be the case as in the example of elec-
tronic warrants that relieve officers of needing to drive and see the judge in person. Similarly, 
‘artificial intelligence’-based software for video analysis can speed up the review of video foot-
age considerably. Yet, this research shows that the direction is not as unidirectional: Instead of 
an acceleration, technology can complicate and slow down processes. This happens, for exam-
ple, in the long search necessary to recover ‘be-on-the-lookout’-emails when needed, in the 
time consuming coding of phone records, or just during the plain breakdown of computer sys-
tems that need to be rebooted. Moreover, technology use not only impacts the duration of tasks, 
but officers also have to subscribe to the technologies’ inherent rhythms. Data on social media 
may be deleted after a fixed amount of time and officers thus must prioritise writing a warrant 
to other tasks, surveillance on social media requires staying up to date to retain the potential to 
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act in the physical world, and video recordings periodically overwrite because of storage limi-
tations setting a time window for detectives to retrieve footage from a crime scene. The tem-
poral affordances of technologies in policing revealed here may easily go unnoticed in day-to-
day practice but, for future research, raise the question of how detectives’ time is best allocated. 
9.4. Indeterminacy of oversight through data 
The technological monitoring through data and its goal of anticipatory conformity are, as out-
lined in the literature review (section 2.2), central elements to many accounts of data-driven 
managerialism (e.g. Beer, 2016; Espeland and Sauder, 2007; Muller, 2018; Power, 1997) – a 
managerialism that also features in Feeley & Simon’s (1992) ‘actuarial justice’ thesis. This 
section discusses the empirical insights from sections 4.4 and 8.2 focusing on the use of data 
in compliance and workload monitoring. Mirroring previous sections above, the data do not 
stand for itself but need interpretation and the categorizations that underly counts pose prob-
lems of comparability. Again, this work contributes a more nuanced perspective on the role of 
data in police decision-making going beyond techno-deterministic accounts. 
Compliance management is an important aspect of data collection in the US department and 
central to its fulfilment of the consent decree. Here, digitization allows for the centralisation of 
review and the ranked judgement of districts enables competition on compliance. For example, 
the compliance department scores body-worn camera footage from stops and reviews the jus-
tifications for officer actions given in reports. Where problems are identified the solutions are 
in direct connection with the data and misconduct can be addressed. This example sets a coun-
terpoint to the largely negative perspectives on the use of scores in management. However, it 
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contrasts with an attempt of employing normalization50 – identifying those for intervention that 
deviate from the statistical average – to guide managerial attention. In the US department of-
ficers are compared against departmental averages for measures such as numbers of arrests or 
uses of force. But the underlying categorizations equate officers in very different roles which 
causes supervisors to question their value. The normal distribution fails to create a norm. In-
stead, supervisors rely on their direct interactions with officers. In the UK police force, a similar 
phenomenon of numbers equating disparate functions that police officers fill is apparent in the 
measuring of workloads. Although a similar reliance on personal connections exists here too, 
the system allows for the flexibility of officers recording and adding previously unrecognized 
workloads. Thus, not every data-driven system for oversight has the same consequences. The 
ones discussed here showcase changes in behaviour, preference for tacit knowledge, and 
changes in recording input. 
9.5. Critical considerations 
This final section highlights four concerns arising from this research that are relevant for further 
research and police departments. These are related to the role of categorization, the temporal 
affordances of digital technologies, the limits of data use, and the context of austerity. 
First, the work that categories do and the consequences they have, both in the collection of 
crime data and in monitoring work, needs attention in practice and future research. Crime sta-
tistics are a powerful tool for identifying patterns and adjusting strategies, but they can also 
draw attention to spurious ‘trends’ and render connections between crimes invisible (especially 
where crime types are used to functionally separate roles in the department). Thus, a challenge 
 
50 In Security, Territory, Population, Foucault (2009: 72ff) distinguishes this biopolitical normalization with re-
gard to a normal distribution from disciplinary normation through training in accordance with a pre-defined norm. 
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for police departments is to ensure that officers’ experiential knowledge finds a way into stra-
tegic meetings as a critical backdrop for the interpretation of crime data and that senior officers 
know how to analyse crime statistics. Nourishing this experiential knowledge also means en-
suring exchange between different (often hierarchically organised) roles like between detec-
tives and patrol officers. Choosing a design for data visualisation that allows examining under-
lying case files, like in the UK police force studied here, can also enable a stronger engagement 
with crime statistics. For accountability and oversight, measuring the degree of compliance 
with policy in officers’ actions seems to be a more promising approach than comparing officer 
‘productivity’ based on contentious categorisations of work roles. 
Second, digital technologies not only make work more efficient but can similarly slow work 
down. This can be deployed strategically, as in paperwork that regulates the amount of stops 
officers are willing to make, or slow speed for license plate reader updates preventing car 
chases. But it can also happen by accident (as in the recording deluge associated with auto-
mated camera activations) and, for lack of training, software tools, or personal preferences, 
may significantly impact workloads (as in the case of detectives manually sifting phone rec-
ords). Research needs to pay attention to these temporal affordances of technologies in policing 
and police departments need to be conscious of how technology use can impact, for instance, 
time budgets of investigations whether in allocating more time for certain investigations, im-
proving training in the use of digital tools, or monitoring unintended consequences and break-
downs. 
Third, beyond questions of privacy, bias, and feedback loops raised in the discourse on predic-
tive policing, this research raises more fundamental questions of whether data should be used 
for the purposes that it is being put to. Under which circumstances should body-worn camera 
video replace witness statements, should patrol officers have access to records of past police 
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encounters where it is not relevant to their safety, how should officers make use of social media 
for investigations, should police records of cases that do not lead to convictions be part of risk 
ratings? Clear policies addressing the conditions for accessing and using data including the 
requirements of oversight and warrants are necessary to address these questions and engage 
with positions critical of the police as well as give guidance to officers. 
Last but not least, allocation of resources for policing has been at the heart of the ‘efficiency in 
times of austerity’ argument for predictive policing (see e.g. Beck and McCue, 2009) and, more 
recently, become a topic of public debate in the context of calls for defunding the police in the 
wake of the Black Lives Matter movement (see e.g. Sharkey, 2020; Thompson, 2020; Vitale, 
2017; Yglesias, 2020). While much of this debate is American, it largely resonates with con-
cerns in the UK case discussed here. Risk scores introduced to focus police activity to reduce 
future ‘demand’ only highlight those cases that are not prioritised. Most importantly, the anal-
ysis underpinning risk scores can reveal the failures of social services caused by years of aus-
terity politics which now appear as ‘risk factors’. As much as officers might prefer supportive 
measures of rehabilitation, under these conditions seeking enforcement and arrest may be the 
only option they see. In the face of housing problems and a mental health crisis, of poverty and 
racial segregation, police could use the same analysis to point to the larger social issues. In 
some places these issues could be addressed with reducing oversized police budgets; in others, 
police budgets are already too stretched to bring justice to victims of crime. 
These considerations demonstrate the value detailed empirical research can bring not only to 
scientific understandings of technology in policing but also in contributing to practical consid-
erations within police departments and the wider societal discourse on the limits of police 
power. This thesis reveals the multifaceted nature of technology in policing, its affordances in 
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11.1. Research outline for US case study 
 
 
Compliance by the numbers: Officer perceptions of data-driven measures in the context of 
[department]’s consent decree 
Researchers 
Daniel Marciniak (PhD Candidate at University of Essex, UK), contact: d.marciniak@essex.ac.uk 
Professor Pete Fussey (University of Essex, UK), contact: pfussey@essex.ac.uk 
Dr Daragh Murray (University of Essex, UK), contact: d.murray@essex.ac.uk 
 
Research Outline 
• Research Goals: [the police department] has put extensive data-driven management strate-
gies in place to insure compliance with its consent decree. This study examines how officers 
of different experience, rank, and assignment perceive of these changes. Its purpose is to 
gather empirical qualitative evidence to gain a general understanding of how data-driven 
changes can inform officer actions and compliance. The research is also interested in how 
data driven practices help inform and improve policing more generally and assess officers’ 
perspectives to such approaches. The project also holds scope to consider accommodating 
further research aims as defined by [the department].  
 
• Research Value:  
o Gathering data on the perspectives of police officers will be valuable as it will im-
prove understandings of the subjective views of the individuals directly affected by 
the implemented measures and thus can serve as a gauge for their long-term ef-
fects. 
o The research can provide valuable feedback on the consent decree’s implementa-
tion. It gives the opportunity to adjust measures if necessary and to highlight the 
progress that has been made so far. 
o The research will also assess officer’s level of engagement with data-driven and re-
lated technologically assisted policing tools.  
o Lastly, the research output will lend visibility to [the department’s] efforts in the aca-
demic literature, positioning the [department] as an example of transformation. 
Research Questions 
• How does available data and routinely collected data affect officer decision making? 
o Does data collection encourage compliance? 
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o How do computer systems inform the formation of reasonable suspicion? 
• What are officers’ attitudes towards the consent decree and its implementation process? 
o Are officers aware of departmental policies (e.g. regarding stop and search, and use 
of body-worn cameras)? 
o Do regulatory or oversight arrangements assist or hinder the ability of officers to 
carry out their work? 




Researchers intend to collect primary data using qualitative methods including semi-structured inter-
views and participant observation. Researchers expect to complete a minimum of 45 interviews with 
a mix of police officers with different experience, ranks, and assignments, as well as with personnel 
tasked with implementing [the department]’s data-driven management processes. Subject to consent 
from the participant, the interviews will be audio recorded and transcribed. Questions will address 
the key priorities outlined in each research theme above. 
Research Ethics 
• Our research is subject to strict ethical standards - covering issues including but not limited 
to consent, anonymity, appropriate data handling and participants’ right of withdrawal - in 
advance of any fieldwork. The proposed project has received ethical approval from the Uni-
versity of Essex in accordance with accepted international standards of ethics for social sci-
ence research.  
• Participants will receive an information sheet informing them about the research goals and 
providing them with the contact details of the researchers and the relevant ethics body at 
university. 
• Participants will then be asked to fill a confidential consent form to ensure they are fully in-
formed of and willing to participate in the research. In cases where this is not practical con-
sent will be audio-recorded. 
• Researchers are committed to upholding participants’ anonymity. Transcripts will be anony-
mized by replacing any type of identifying information such as name, rank, location or posi-
tion within the organisation. This information will be held separately to the data. 
• Only the identified researchers will have access to the data. Data will be stored in a secure 
and encrypted digital space. 
Action Plan 
1) Recruitment: To conduct the study researchers will stay in [the city] for around a month in 
the first instance. This is completely funded by academic grants and scholarships that have 
already been awarded. The [department] will not carry any financial cost. Research will 
begin by recruiting research participants supported by the department. In the past, this has 
been most effective if researchers contact information is shared across the department, and 
researchers are able to complete 3-5 ride-alongs with police officers.  
2) Interviews: Researchers will complete the interviews over the course the month. It is 
deemed practical to start with interviewing personnel tasked with implementing the consent 
decree. Interviews can be conducted wherever and whenever suits individual research 
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participants. To maintain objectivity and independence, interviews will be scheduled by in-
terviewees and interviewers. 
3) Analysis: Researchers will analyse research data over the course of 2 months before produc-
ing outputs. Outputs will include: 
a) A plain language report of research findings for the [department]. 
b) Researchers will seek independent publication of the study’s findings in academic jour-
nals. These will contribute to the understanding of transformation processes towards 
constitutional policing. The intention is to fairly represent interviewee’s perspectives in 
the academic literature. 





11.2. Detailed methodology and interview schedule. US case study 
 
 
Headline Research Aim 
[The department] has put extensive data-driven management strategies in place to enhance its deliv-
ery of policing and to monitor the performance of the organisation as a whole. This study proposes to 
examine the role of data and technology within current police work in [the city]. In doing so, it also 
seeks to co-develop a number of research aims identified by [the department] as important and valu-
able to them. The project is fully funded and is designed to incorporate questions and themes deemed 
useful by the host organization. Input in this regard is very welcome. 
The purpose of the research is to gather empirical qualitative evidence to gain a general understanding 
of how data-driven changes can inform officer actions. The research is interested in how data driven 
practices help inform and improve policing more generally and will assess officers’ perspectives re-
garding such approaches. 
The core focus of the research analyses the increasing data richness of policing environments and 
seeks to understand how such data and technology shapes policing practices, its deployment within 
operational settings and examine officer engagement with technology. In particular the research pro-
poses to focus on what data is available to officers, how it is used in an operational sense, what value 
is attributed to it, how individuals engage with and receive information and how technologies are used 
as tools for policing. Findings could also be used to inform an understanding of officers’ perspectives 
on the most useful forms of data (i.e. what they would like to receive and how they would like to 
receive it), the enablers and blockers for realising the potential of data-driven policing, and ways of 
improving officer engagement with data and technology. 
This document is intended as a provisional outline and a means to develop further discussion and 
scope out areas of shared interest between the department and the research team. 
Detailed methodology and interview schedule 
Research tasks will be shared between team members with Daniel Marciniak being present for four 
weeks and Prof Pete Fussey and Dr Daragh Murray conducting interviews during one week. Prof 
Fussey is the named individual with overall responsibility for matters of research management, gov-
ernance and ethics. 
As researchers we take the position that our research subjects are experts in their professional fields 
and have the potential to reveal important insights that may not be anticipated at the outset. This is 
why we retain an element of flexibility in our interview schedule and provide space for participants to 
voice their perspectives and experiences on their own terms. 
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For this reason, we adopt a semi-structured interview approach to provide a degree of structure 
across, and comparability between, responses yet offering the space to explore emerging areas of 
importance. We aim to set out our core interview schedule below along with a clarified outline of ideal 
participants. We are very open to discussing ways to further direct and shape the research. 
The following sets out the kind of questions we are intending to ask, and the topics we would like to 
address to meet the main research aims. It is not intended to be a complete set of questions, nor do 
all of them need to be addressed in every interview. 
In order to address the research questions stated in the research outline we propose to adopt a two-
step approach: 
1) Interviewing employees whose main tasks are in designing, processing and analysing data handled 
by the department, particularly data made available and designed to inform the decision making of 
officers on duty. The units named below are based on publicly available information on [the depart-
ment’s] organisational structure. Feedback on these choices would be very welcome. 
i. Interviews with members of the [compliance monitoring unit] on the role of data collection and 
analysis in the implementation of the consent decree 
1. How do you see your role in the department? 
2. What was/is your role relating to the consent decree? 
3. How is data used for the purpose of the consent decree? 
ii. Interviews with [internal investigations] on the routine data collection on use of force incidents 
1. How do you see your role in the department? 
2. Have you seen changes brought about by the consent decree? 
3. How do you use data in your everyday processes? 
4. Which initiatives have improved the collection of data? 
iii. Attending a number of [CompStat] sessions to observe how data is used and integrated into the 
management framework. 
2) Police uses of data and technology 
In a second step we would like to speak to [the department’s] staff about how they a) access data b) 
engage with data and technology, c) how data and technological policing tools affects and enhances 
their work, and d) how data and technology influences the management of the department. We aim 
for participants from varied levels of experience, rank and assignment. It would be valuable for us to 
participate in ride-alongs with officers on duty. This allows for a rich supplement to the interviews and 
observational data on themes that otherwise might not be readily articulated by the officers. 
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i. Interviews with detectives stationed centrally at headquarters and decentralised within districts. 
1. How does data analysis inform your work? 
2. What types of data do you use? 
3. What data would you like to have that is not currently available? 
4. Do you think that there are certain types of crimes that should allow for wider data access 
than others? 
5. Where do you see potential for data-driven approaches? 
ii. Interviews with officers about the use of numerous technological tools including social media data 
and other online resources, LPR, body work cameras, real-time crime analysis data and other data and 
technology-driven policing tools. 
1. How important is technology to your work? 
a. How do you see technology and digitally-generated data as a tool for your job? 
What data and technology do you use in your decision making? 
b. How do you engage with the following technologies: LPR, BWC, in car cameras, real-
time crime analysis? 
2. What are the best ways of receiving/engaging with data? Should information be made avail-
able or sent proactively via briefings etc.? 
3. Which sources of data do you consider the most credible? 
4. What data would you like that is not currently available?. 
5. How do you see the relationship between data driven insights and your own experience 
and knowledge? How does the data connect with what patrol officers know. Are officers con-
fident of preserving their own discretionary judgement and experiential knowledge? Are there 
training needs to leverage greater value from data-driven insights? 
iii. Interviews with supervisors about how the use of data driven insights and technological tools influ-
ence police work and their management of individuals and teams. 
1. How does digitally-derived data affect, inform and enhance policing? 
2. How can officer discretion be preserved in the face of the growth of data-driven insights? 
3. How does data help you do your job more efficiently? 




iv. Interview with the [crime analysts] 
1. How do you see your role in the department? 
2. What types of analysis do you carry out? 
3. What data is available to you? 
4. How does your analysis inform strategies and action? 
5. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the data you are working with? 




11.3. Research outline for UK case study 
 
 
Officer perceptions of data-driven insights: The use of [DataVis] at [UK police force] 
Researcher 
Daniel Marciniak (PhD Candidate at University of Essex), contact: d.marciniak@essex.ac.uk 
 
Research Outline 
[The police force] has given officers at every level of the force extensive access to data visualisations 
and predictive analytics enabling them to be their own analysts within a self-service environment. The 
system allows officers to triangulate the newly available digital information with the tacit knowledge 
about the communities they work with. The proposed study examines how officers of different expe-
rience, rank, and assignment make use of these tools. Its purpose is to gather empirical qualitative 
evidence to gain a general understanding of how data-driven changes can inform officer actions. The 
research is interested in how data-driven practices help inform and improve policing more generally 
and assess officers’ perspectives to such approaches.  
The researcher intends to collect primary data using qualitative methods including semi-structured 
interviews and, where possible, participant observation. The researcher aims to complete a minimum 
of 10 interviews with a mix of police officers with different experience, ranks, and assignments. Sub-
ject to consent from the participant, the interviews will be audio recorded and transcribed. 
The researcher takes the position that the research subjects are experts in their professional fields 
and have the potential to reveal important insights that may not be anticipated at the outset. The 
research question and example interview questions below shall serve as an orientation towards the 
main research aims and the kind of questions the researcher is going to ask. Participants will be given 
room to voice their own perspectives and experiences. 
 
Research Questions 
A) Triangulation of data-driven insights and tacit knowledge: 
a. How does the data inform your decision-making?  
b. How do you see the relationship between data-driven insights and your own experi-
ence and knowledge? 
c. Which elements of [DataVis] do you use? 
i. How do you use the risk scores available to you? 
ii. What are your experiences with the mapping feature of [DataVis]? 
B) Perceived changes brought about: 
a. Has the availability of data through [DataVis] changed your work? How? 
C) Evaluation: 
a. Would you rate the information available to you as reliable and objective? 
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b. What opportunities and risks do you see? 
c. Which aspects of [DataVis] do you find most useful?  
d. What data would you like to have that is not available to you at the moment? 
  
Research Ethics 
• The research is subject to strict ethical standards -  covering issues including but not limited 
to consent, anonymity, appropriate data handling and participants’ right of withdrawal - in 
advance of any fieldwork. The proposed project has received ethical approval from the Uni-
versity of Essex in accordance with accepted international standards of ethics for social sci-
ence research.  
• Participants will receive an information sheet informing them about the research goals and 
providing them with the contact details of the researcher and the relevant ethics body at 
university. 
• Participants will then be asked to fill a confidential consent form to ensure they are fully in-
formed of and willing to participate in the research. In cases where this is not practical con-
sent will be audio-recorded. This will be the case with any interviews conducted via phone 
calls. 
• The researcher is committed to upholding participants’ anonymity. Transcripts will be anon-
ymized by replacing any type of identifying information such as name, rank, location or posi-
tion within the organisation. This information will be held separately to the data. 
• Only the identified researcher will have access to the data. Data will be stored securely. 
Action Plan 
4) Recruitment: The research will begin by recruiting research participants supported by the 
department. This would be most effective, if the researcher’s contact information is shared 
with possible participants in the force. The researcher would aim to speak to between 10 
and 15 officers with different experience that work in neighbourhood policing, investiga-
tions, offender management and as supervisors. Ideally, the researcher would be able to 
accompany 2-4 police officers on duty.  
5) Interviews: Interviews can be conducted wherever and whenever suits individual research 
participants. This includes the possibility of phone interviews. To maintain objectivity and 
independence, interviews will be scheduled by interviewees and interviewer. 
6) Outputs: 
d) The findings from this study will contribute significantly to the researcher’s PhD thesis. 
e) The researcher will also seek independent publication of the study’s findings in academic 
journals. These will contribute to the understanding of the use of data-driven insights in 
policing. The intention is to fairly represent interviewee’s perspectives in the academic 
literature. 
f) A plain language report of research findings or other internal documents, briefing notes 




11.4. Participant information sheet 
Participant Information Sheet (07/07/2017)   
  
Project Title: Predictive Policing: A change in the generation of suspicion?  
  
My name is Daniel Marciniak. I am a doctoral researcher on Work Stream Two (Surveillance and Hu-
man Rights) of the Economic and Social Research Council and University of Essex-funded Human Rights, 
Big Data and Technology Project. I would like to invite you to take part in a research study. This docu-
ment sets out key information about the focus, approach and ethical guidelines governing the project. 
Also listed are contact details for named individuals holding overall responsibility for the project and 
its ethical standards of research.   
  
1. What is this specific research study hoping to achieve?  
  
This research study will be based on a series of qualitative interviews. The aim of these interviews is 
to gain a greater insight into what ‘predictive policing’ means, the reasons for which it is adopted, and 
the ways in which it transforms policing. Results from this study will inform research carried out in the 
Human Rights, Big Data and Technology Project.  
  
2. What is the Human Rights, Big Data and Technology Project?  
  
The Human Rights, Big Data and Technology Project is a five-year project funded by the Economic and 
Social Research Council (‘ESRC’) and the University of Essex. It is housed at the Human Rights Centre 
of the University of Essex. The project is divided into four work streams:   
  
• Work Stream One: ICT, Big Data and Human Rights  
• Work Stream Two: Surveillance and Human Rights  
• Work Stream Three: Health and Human Rights  
• Work Stream Four: Advancing Human Rights and Humanitarian Responses Through 
Big Data  
  
More information about the project as a whole can be found at: www.hrbdt.ac.uk. An up-to-date list 
of researchers can be found at: www.hrbdt.ac.uk/about-us/our-team/#researchers.  
  
3. Why am I approaching you?  
  
I am seeking the involvement of individuals within the police services and security agencies, as well as 
individuals from organizations that produce predictive policing technologies and supply such technol-
ogies to policing organizations, researchers that contribute to the development of predictive policing 
technologies, regulatory bodies and/or individuals from a range of non-governmental organizations 
that focus on scrutinizing police activities.  
  
4. What will be involved in participating?  
  
The (group) interviews will be semi-structured and will take place in a location of your choosing. It is 
envisaged that the interviews will normally take place within your organization, subject to invitation. 
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Interviews are scheduled to last around 45-60 minutes and will relate to the main research aims of the 
project, namely exploring participants’ experiences and understandings of predictive policing and its 
uses. More specifically, these questions will seek to focus on:   
  
• The types of predictive policing practices;  
• The reasons for their adoption;  
• The efficacy of such practices;  
• The ways in which performance is analyzed and systems subsequently improved; • Antici-
pated ethical concerns and the ways in which these are addressed;  
• The ways predictive policing technologies shape operational practice.  
  
5. How will the data be used?  
  
The interview will be audio recorded if you consent to this. The audio recording will only be used to 
ensure the accuracy of the transcription and will be destroyed once the transcription process is com-
plete. You also have the option to undertake the interview without an audio recording.   
  
The audio recording and/or any interview notes will be transcribed, anonymized (i.e. anything that 
could identify you removed including your name, organization and position within the organization) 
unless you consent to having your data attributed to you by name and analyzed for the research. 
Extracts or observations from the interviews may be written up in publications that arise from the 
research.   
  
The transcript and/or any interview notes can be shared with you upon request. To ensure that you 
receive this before any analysis takes place I strongly encourage you to contact me within two weeks 
of participation.    
  
The personal information you provide, such as your name, organisation and contact details, will be 
treated confidentially and personally identifiable details will be stored separately to the data. Data will 
be digitally encrypted and securely stored. Personal details will be replaced with an anonymised ID 
number. Any personally identifiable details will be destroyed once the analysis is completed, or at the 
end of the project if it is required for systematic comparisons of methods and techniques.   
  
As a participant you have a right to request to see any data or personal information held about you. If 
you wish to do so, please contact me.  
  
In order to archive the data gathered within this project and to make it available for future research, 
it will be offered to the UK Data Archive. This will be done following the above principles of data anon-
ymization unless you consent to having your data attributed to you by name. The UK Data Archive is 
specialised in the secure storage and management of economic and social research data.  
  
6. What are the benefits of taking part?  
  
You will have the opportunity to participate in a research study on an important issue. The information 
that you provide will be used to inform a thesis on predictive policing. It will also feed into the Work 
Stream’s research on understanding the human rights impacts of the use of technology and big data. 




7. Are there any risks involved?   
  
The central risks of participating in this research interview include concerns over anonymity, correct 
representation of the interviewee’s position and participant unwillingness to continue his/her engage-
ment with the research once it has started. I have anticipated these risks and have implemented 
measures to mitigate them.  
  
Any interviews will have gained ethical approval from the University of Essex prior to taking place. This 
research is guided by the British Sociological Association standards of ethical research and prioritizes 
the wellbeing of the research participant above all other concerns.  
8. How do I withdraw from the research?  
  
Participation in the interviews is entirely voluntary. I will provide information about the research and 
give you an opportunity to ask questions at the beginning of the interview. I will then check that you 
agree to continue. You can exit from the interview at any time, or you can ask me to temporarily stop 
the interview if you wish to stop participating. You do not need to provide an explanation for this and 
there will be no penalty for doing so.   
  
If you retrospectively want to withdraw from the research after the interview, please contact me. 
Please note that there are certain points beyond which it will be impossible to withdraw from the 
research – for instance, once I have published the results of the research. Therefore, I strongly encour-
age you to contact me within a month of participation if you wish to withdraw your data.   
  
  
9. Do you have any questions?  
  
You can contact me at:  
  
Daniel Marciniak  
Essex Law School  
University of Essex  
Wivenhoe Park  
CO4 3SQ   
Colchester  
 
d.marciniak@essex.ac.uk   
  
You can contact the PhD supervisor, Prof Pete Fussey, at:  
  
Department of Sociology  
University of Essex  
Wivenhoe Park  
CO4 3SQ   
Colchester  
  






10. Do you wish to make a complaint?  
  
If you have any ethical concerns about any aspect of this project, you should ask to speak to the re-
searcher Daniel Marciniak (d.marciniak@essex.ac.uk) in the first instance.  If you remain unhappy you 
can contact my PhD supervisor Prof Pete Fussey (pfussey@essex.ac.uk). If you wish to complain for-
mally you can do this by contacting the Research Governance & Planning Manager, University of Essex, 










11.6. Codes in the US case study 
1 Technological Practices 
Accountability, Insight 
Aesthetics, Presentation 



















FIC, EPR, other DB 








Reliability, Trust, Verification 
Sense Making, Understanding 
ShotSpotter 
Social Network Analysis, NIBIN 
Social Media 
Strategy 











Relations with Companies 
Relations with other Law Enforcement 






5 Connectivity and Association 
6 Visibility 


















Availability of Data 
Breakdown 


























Time and Place 
 
